Aquinas on Shame, Virtue, and the Virtuous Person

Kristanto, Dwi (2020) Aquinas on Shame, Virtue, and the Virtuous Person. The Thomist, 84 (2). pp. 263-291. ISSN 2473-3725

[img] Text
Artikel-Dwi Kristanto-The Thomist_protected.pdf

Download (321kB)
Official URL: https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/694

Abstract

SOME SCHOLARS within the Aristotelian tradition, notably C. C. Raymond and K. Kristjánsson, have recently questioned the Stagirite’s denials that shame (aidōs) can be a moral virtue in the proper sense of the term and that a virtuous person needs a sense of shame in addition to other moral virtues.2 Aristotle famously claims that, although shame is the mean between bashfulness and shamelessness, shame is “more like a feeling than a state of character” and that “one is ashamed of what is voluntary, but the virtuous person will never voluntarily do base things.”3Raymond and Kristjánsson argue that Aristotle has overlooked two interrelated distinctions: first, the distinction between an episodic or occurrent feeling of shame and a durable emotional disposition of a sense of shame, and second, the distinction between retrospective shame (which follows upon base actions) and prospective shame (which inhibits base actions).4 Even if it be conceded that virtuous [End Page 263] persons might not need to draw upon retrospective shame, according to Kristjánsson, they will still need proper dispositional shame or prospective shame as “a deterrent voice to warn them against potentially base future courses of action.” If not, Aristotle would be committed to a conception of a saintly or morally infallible virtuous person.5 For his part, Raymond contends that, if Aristotle admits that honor and social standing constitute external goods and that virtuous persons are not indifferent to what people think of them (to such a degree that avoiding disrepute can be the goal of action), “it seems that Aristotle should allow that aidōs can be a ‘prohairetic’ mean as well,” that is to say, a virtue, since “knowing when, how, and to what extent to care about the opinion of others will require practical wisdom.”6

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
A General Works > B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)

B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
A General Works > B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics

B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BL Religion
A General Works > B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BL Religion
Divisions: Program Pascasarjana > Program Pascasarjana Filsafat
Depositing User: STFD Skrket Driyarkara
Date Deposited: 14 Sep 2021 03:35
Last Modified: 14 Sep 2021 03:35
URI: http://repo.driyarkara.ac.id/id/eprint/334

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item