THE REPRESENTATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE MEDIA: HOW NAMING STRATEGY AFFECTS RECOGNITION OF THE ROLES OF THOSE INVOLVED

BY

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation will look at how the media assigns names for certain happenings and what patterns govern the choice of the names. It will examine how those names are distributed within texts to denote recognition and acknowledgement of what happened. Three happenings will be used as study cases, namely: the *May 1998 Riot*, the *Tiananmen Square Massacre* and the *Arab Spring*.

The three names above come with several alternatives such as *May 1998 Tragedy*, *6-4 Happening* or *Arab Revolution* and are used intermittently in the media depending on the angle of the stories, whether they are presented through the perspective of the authority or the victims. Some media also use several different names to refer to the same event in a single article. This study will compare the uses of those names in the international English media, the Indonesian English media, the Indonesian media and Chinese media.

The selections of the names above shed lights on a certain aspect of the cases. The nouns *riot*, *massacre* and *spring* not only indicate the nature of the happenings themselves but label a certain event in a favourable or disfavourable tone. The premodifiers were also chosen not only to give information on where, when and who aspects but also lead readers into focusing on a certain aspect rather than others. The use of a date as a premodifier may be considered to be the most neutral one as it does not implicate anybody. Meanwhile, the use of word *Happening* is also considered to be the less risky choice, amid controversy of whether the event is a massacre or just riots turned violent. This dissertation will look into how such naming decisions affect the way readers see the happenings themselves. It will also look into parts of or angles on the happenings that are highlighted and are prominently recognized subsequently as a result of the naming.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This dissertation is an extended study of my own paper for Discourse Analysis module in the first semester of my MA program at UEA. It was pure curiosity that drew me into looking further at naming patterns in the media and how they develop as part of a communication strategy. I was intrigued to find out how names for certain events were decided among so many choices and possible alternatives; how a certain pattern has been repeated over and over while the others have been overlooked. I have learned so much myself in the time I spent working on this dissertation and cannot be more grateful with all the support I got from my lecturers and the library staff.

My gratitude goes for my supervisor Prof. Andreas Musolff for leading me through the process of writing this dissertation. His explanations on Semantics have been very helpful for me to grasp the vast array of issues in the area. My gratitude also goes for other lecturers in UEA, especially to Dr. Gabrina Pounds and Dr. Clive Matthews, my friends, library staff and family, all of whom have helped me throughout the whole course of studying in Norwich.

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INTRODUCTION: HOW DO THE MEDIA DECIDE ON NAMES OF POLITICAL EVENTS AND WHAT DO DIFFERENT NAMES SIGNIFY?

Names function as more than just referents that help point out an object, a person, a place or a happening. We can identify a certain point of view or political stand point through the choice of a name. In an article published by The New York Times, Najla Said, the daughter of Palestinian American scholar Edward Said, said that she would call Palestine what her friends would call Israel on the map (Saltz, 2010). The choice of whether one calls it Palestine or Israel reveals one's political stance towards the Middle East's long-standing crisis. This dissertation examines how names reflect points of view and influence readers' understanding of political violence. It will focus on the creation and use of names for referring to high-profile events in Indonesia, China and the Arab region. These names have been chosen because each represents an event that has had alternative names. The *May 1998 riots* (in Indonesia), the *Tiananmen Square massacre* (in China) and the *Arab Spring* (in the Arab region) are not the exclusive names used in the media. Alternative names have been widely used and each represents either a different portrayal of the event or a different political stance towards the event. These names have also been chosen because they have used different types of pre-modifier as parts of the name. *May* is a date; *Tiananmen Square* is a location; and *Arab* is both participant and location. The three nouns used also fall into different categorizations: *riots*, *massacre* and *spring*. The differences in the pre-modifiers and noun categorizations can demonstrate how each category affects presentation of the event and recognition of what happened.

Linguistic choices in the media or other public information outlets have been the subject of rigorous studies under the realm of semantics and discourse analysis (Jabri, 1996; Fowler,

1991; Nossek, 2007). While semantics is used to explain the relations between the choice of words and the referent it points to, discourse analysis helps to reveal certain ideologies behind the usage of certain language. Clark (1992) said that naming or categorization is a powerful ideological tool. Different names represent a different recognition of what has happened. The media may represent a single piece of information with different messages by using different linguistic choices.

This dissertation will look at how different names and categorizations of the nature of a single event have affected the whole portrayal of the event. Firstly, it examines how those differences are manifested through different visual hooks and how the initial visual hook is shaped by the descriptions given by the media. Secondly, it considers how such a different visual hook affects understanding and portrayal of what happened. Thirdly, it looks at how the name affects the recognition of the role of those involved. Finally, it discusses how sense or context may intervene our understanding**.**

These particular steps were chosen to examine how each name encapsulates the descriptions of the events. Such an examination will be helpful in comparing how each name projects a different angle or version of a single event. Names may be chosen by the media to captivate readers' attention and direct them to focus on a certain aspect of the event. Meanwhile, alternatives to those names may be chosen by opposing parties in order to deflect readers from the main substance of the event. This is obvious in the case of Tiananmen Square massacre, which the Chinese government has denied ever occurred.

This dissertation will also touch on the issue of how readers understand the meaning of a reference used in a newspaper. Even when the media does not provide any context or background for an event referred to by a certain name, readers clearly make associations with what the name defines regardless of how accurate their personal projection might be. For example when the media uses the word *riot*, readers would immediately conjure up a certain

visual or a mental representation of what this is. The visual representation may be generated by riot images they have seen or from the concept of riots they know. Although each reader may have different semantic elements that amount to different definitions of riots, they would not have difficulties understanding what riots would involve. This is all because of the context and sense we use when we make meaning.

Different expressions with a single referent can focus on different aspects of the event that result in the different presentation and evoke different sense and evaluation. For example the name *May riots* has been alternatively referred to as the *May tragedy*. The word *riot* would entail a large mass of people and presumably involve an act of violence, while *tragedy* may entail either an individual or large group but does not necessarily involve violence. The word *riot* would give more information than *tragedy* as *tragedy* focuses on how one sees the end of something. *Riots* meanwhile focuses on what happens and not about how one perceives the whole event.

This dissertation utilizes semantics and discourse analysis to construct naming strategies in the media. Semantics will help explore the multi-dimensions of meaning and the extent to which readers are led to different understandings by different names. Discourse analysis is utilized to uncover the ideologies behind name choices in the media. The visual aspects of all of those names will be compared and examined to see how visual aspects intervene with the semantic meaning and finally how they affect recognition and understanding of what happened.

THEORY: HOW SEMANTICS AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS READ THE SIGNIFICANCE ON DIFFERENT NAMES

This dissertation will use two theories to look at naming. The first theory is Semantics and the second one is Discourse Analysis.

2. Semantics

2.1. Theory of reference

Reference means the acts of referring to or denoting an entity (which will be called referent) through means of linguistics features (Saeed, 1997). The theory of reference tries to attend to the questions of what relations a reference has to its referent. A reference does not only function to refer or point to an item but it also covers semantically relevant relations (Saeed, 1997; Löbner, 2002). Besides denoting or referring, a reference can also bring out the other side of meanings in a way that a reference can "signify", "instantiate", "fall under", "about", "apply" or "satisfy" the referent (Semantics, N.A.).

Saeed (1997) states that there are two approaches we use in the way people talk about the world: the first is the referential approach and second is the representational approach. The referential approach tries to answer questions regarding the relations between expression and the world they refer to. In other words, the reference approach considers how a certain word points to the world or the reality. Meanwhile, the representational approach tries to attend to the issue of how our mind projects the reality as expressed through the reference; what is the mental model of a situation or a thing (Murphy and Koskela, 2010). The reality or the thing out there may be the same but there are different ways of expressing that reality or thing. Reference and representation are two different things. A reference assigns a name as the identity of a referent while a representation assigns a certain perception towards a referent. Saeed (1997) pointed out that "a speaker can choose to view the same situation in different ways." Below is

an example of how a situation can be seen an action or an activity (a) and a condition or a state (b).

a. Joan is sleeping.

b. Joan is asleep.

2.2. Names

Names are labels for people and places which we use to talk about individuals or locations (Saeed, 1997). The use of names is normally bound by context in the assumption that the audience can identify the referent. Names can work to identify something or someone because of the shared knowledge between the speaker, who uses the name, and the addressee. There are two approaches in looking at how names work. The first is description theory and second is causal theory. Description theory says that a name is a label for one or more definite descriptions about something. A name provides a description for an entity. Meanwhile, causal theory emphasizes the act of naming. An entity obtains its name because someone assigns the name to the entity. Description theory focuses on what a name can tell about the entity it refers to while causal theory concerns the fact that a name is obtained through assignment process.

2.3. Noun phrases

Names or references come in the form of noun or noun phrases. In the names of events discussed in this dissertation, the noun phrases consist of pre-modifiers and nouns. Pre-modifiers are additional information given to give identity to the noun it attaches to, while the noun shows the nature of the event itself. A noun also reveals the evaluation of the speaker towards the event. For example, by representing a particular event as either *riots*, or *incident* or simply *happening*, different evaluations towards the same event are revealed.

2.4. Categorization

Human beings have the capability to classify things into different categories. Löbner (2002) stated that human beings "assign everything that enters our minds to one or more categories" (p.173). An entity may have several categories. Löbner gives the example of a man called John who belongs to the categories person, man, fictitious, bicycle owner. Categorization works because of the presence of mental representation. Löbner (2002, p.173) writes:

> "when we encounter an object, our cognitive apparatus will produce a preliminary description of it, which consists of what we perceive of the object, e.g. its size, shape, color, smell, etc. The description will be compared with the concepts we have in our mind and if the description happens to match with the concept dog, the object will be categorized as dogs."

Mental representation and conceptual hierarchies

Saeed (1997) pointed out there is an extra dimension to meaning which is called sense, which comes between words and the world it refers to. Sense evokes mental representations about the referent through the uses of different names. Human capabilities to denote or to put meanings into an expression are enabled by this sense function. Sense may evoke images or visuals but more often it refers to a concept (non-visual features) of a name or reference. The concept or image of an entity will be different from one person to another. For example, the mental representation of a table for one person might be different from another. Similarly, the mental representation of an abstract idea such as democracy or marriage also varies from one person to another. Saeed (1997) cites Charles Fillmore and George Lakoff's claim that speakers have theories about the world based on their experience and rooted in their culture.

A name does not only refer to an object or a concept but it also has meanings that come from cognitive signifying. The referent of a proper name is bound by the reference but sense is

not bound by references. A name may refer to a certain physical object only – names have limitation of objects they can denote— but a name has no limitation towards how many senses it can generate.

2.5. Icon, index and symbol

In the theory of signs, stimulus patterns that create meanings in human mind are divided into icon, index and symbol. Icon is part of an entity or a separate sign resembling an entity that is used to represent the whole entity. Index is a sign which points or communicate a message or a direction. Whereas symbol is a sign which is chosen arbitrarily to represent an entity and get its meaning from mental association (Saeed, 1997).

2.6. Metaphor

2.6.1. Metaphor in cognitive semantics

Metaphor is a figurative language which operates by transferring properties from one concept to another. This process of transferring is called transference. The starting point is called the target or tenor, while the comparison concept or the analogy is called source or vehicle (Saeed, 1997).

Metaphor works by mapping well understood source domains of experience onto more schematic ones (Chilton, 2004). The source domain may be innate or acquired in development, providing a source for conceptualisation.

2.7. Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is a methodological tool to help examine the use of language in terms of how it helps promote an ideology. The use of Discourse Analysis will involve using Systematic functional Linguistics (SFL) and Critical Discourse Analysis CDA). Functional grammar looks at how language functions. In SFL, language functions are divided into three aspects (Thompson, 1996). The first is the referential function in which the choice of words are meant to represent events or states of affair (the information); the second is the attitudinal function in which words are chosen to emphasize the attitude of the speaker towards certain issues (the tone); and the last is the textual function in which words are chosen to promote certain aspects of an issue (the message). Meanwhile, CDA will serve as a tool to examine the ideology behind the linguistic choices.

2.7.1. Systematic Functional Linguistics (SFL)

SFL as a methodological tool helps us to look into the language choice in speeches or written articles in order to understand how such choices have controlled meaning or the result of readings. SFL focuses on the role of language in "exerting, reflecting and reinforcing power" (Young and Fitzgerald, 2006, p.23).

2.7.2. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

Young and Fitzgerald (2006; p.8) state that "CDA focuses on linguistics analysis to expose misinterpretation, discrimination or particular position of power in all kinds of public discourse such as political speeches, newspaper and advertisements." One of the CDA features that will be used for the analysis here is appraisal theory. Appraisal theory looks at how the choice of words reveals the attitude of the speakers. Appraisal theory allows a focus on the way a speaker evaluates a situation, whether it is in a positive or negative light. Evaluation can be expressed directly or implicitly.

LITERATURE REVIEW: DIFFERENT NAMES REVEAL DIFFERENT POLITICAL STAND POINTS

3. Literature review

Several scholars have looked at the use of different references or names for a single referent. Lee (1992) and Chilton (2004) look at how different references generate different connotations. Fowler (1991) considers how reality is presented in news in a way that may favour a certain group and discredit the other. Nossek et al. (2007) focuses on linguistic choices made for references in political violence discourse and also how news outlets project a certain stand point when reporting political violence.

Lee (1992, p.8) wrote that "language is an instrument for the assignment of the phenomena of human experience to conceptual categories; it is clearly not simply a mirror that reflects reality. Rather, its function is to impose structures on our perception of the world". Different words denoting actions and situation, such as *massacre* versus *tragedy* and *riot* versus *chaos,* convey different ideologies and imply different levels of wrongdoing and different extents of social impact. In his study of word classification, Lee (1992) examined the differences in the application of the term *European settlement* versus *European invasion* in the context of the European arrival in Australia at the end of the eighteenth century. It is evident that the word *European settlement* was a term used by the Europeans to describe their peaceful migration to Australia in search of a better life. The latter term was used by the Aboriginal Australians who saw the arrivals as a threat to their existence. Lee (1992, p.15) stated that "whether speakers use *settlement* or *invasion* now provides some indication of their political viewpoint". There can be little doubt that the creation and usage of names in mainstream texts are controlled by the media. The readers' role is limited at the receiving end, to picking up

terms and names from the media and using them without necessarily considering the controversies behind them.

Chilton (2004, p.6) provided two examples in his study of how language choices matter in political discourse. In the first example he compares the use of *company wives* and *wives of the employees*. The author said that although both names have the same referent, they represent a different conceptualization. The first one may be interpreted as humans being a property or dependent subject while the latter points to their status without invoking derogative interpretations.

Fowler (1991) examines the concept of transitivity in the language of news reports to show how a certain reality is more prominently portrayed than others. Fowler (1991, p.71) states that "transitivity is the foundation of representation…and transitivity has the facility to analyze the same even in different ways". Transitivity strategy covers the inclusion of certain modifiers in the noun phrase as part of the agent or patient, omissions of certain participants in the form of nominalization and types of predicates (passive or active constructions). Other elements that Fowler looked at are lexical choices and structure in terms of how they affect meaning, both literal and connotative meaning. He also considers modality in the study of news language. The same author also conducted a study on names or titles used to refer to or address a person. He focuses on how a certain calling or addressing term may be either abusive or glorifying. He states that "newspaper…sorting people into categories, and placing discriminatory values on them" (p.110). He uses news reports from several newspapers on Libya and US conflicts in 1986 for his study of addressing terms. His analysis shows how opposing government members are addressed with either diminutive or honorific titles depending on whether the news room supports or disapproves of the discussed policy.

Meanwhile, Nossek et al. (2007) analyze how the media labeled victims in two different airplane crashes – the first one is the bringing down of a Korean plane by the Soviet army in

1983 and the other one is the shooting down of an Iranian airplane by the US army in 1988. American media treated victims in the two incidents differently in a way that reflected US foreign policy. Victims in the first crash, which implicated the US Cold War enemy, the Soviet Union, are labeled as “innocent human beings” and “loved one” in order to highlight the culpability of the then communist country in the loss of those lives. Meanwhile victims in the second crash, perpetrated by US soldiers, are not referred to in similar terms of endearment. They “were mentioned much less, the information less centered on their humanity and less likely to evoke empathy” (Nossek et al, 2007, p. 10).

While many studies using the approaches outlined above have focused on references to persons or activities, there appears to be a lack of studies which analyze the use of event names.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4. Analytical framework

4.1. Method of analysis

The study in this thesis will be conducted using a content analysis method. A single text will be studied and then compared to another text that shows different patterns in name usage.

4.2. Scope of research

As this dissertation is trying to look at how different media or information portals have assigned different names to one single political event, the data will be taken from several different media from different countries. The data is taken from transnational media to show how media outside the country where the event occurred have not translated the names used in the original countries. The foreign media tends to formulate their own name to project their approval or disapproval towards the event. The media from which the data originated is mainstream media. For each name, there will be at least one article as the example.

The writer of this dissertation may have to resort to the usage of a more famous name in referring to the event in this study. The author realizes this may lead to a slight bias as she chooses a certain name over other alternatives when referring to the events in this dissertation. However, she will try to maintain neutrality in analysis, although the names she chooses as the general reference in this dissertation may reflect a certain stand point or ideology.

ANALYSIS: DO DIFFERENT NAMES DIRECT US TO A DIFFERENT READING OF AN EVENT?

5. Analysis

The three names chosen for this study could be categorized as politically violent events as indicated in the title.

Political violence suggests the involvement of two opposing groups acting in a violent manner in pursuing their political agenda. Nossek et al. (2007) in his study of political violence stated that political violence does not have a single identical definition. He wrote:

> "Political violence or, in other words, violence in a political context is a broad definition encompassing a wide spectrum of behaviours and events, ranging from terrorism and war to political protest, and all involving some form of conflict. Political violence is invariably employed by a person or group with a political goal opposing a government or political rival" (Nossek et al., 2007, p.46).

Nossek et al. (2007) also indicates that political violence will often involve a message that is wanted to be covered by the media, in a way that the media itself can be exploited to serve the interest of a certain group as a part of the political agenda itself.

The targets and aims of the three events chosen for analysis confirm that they fall into the category of political violence. The *Tiananmen Square massacre* is immediately identifiable as an act of political violence as the nature of the clash was due to the students' protests for reform in China. The political violence aspect in the *May riots* and the *Arab Spring* may be not so obvious. Vatikiotis (1998) and Purdey (2006) stated that the May riots were the culmination of both social and political dynamics under the then president for thirty-two years Suharto,

which led to the anti-Chinese violence and subsequently fall of the dictator. The political aspect of the May riots and the social aspects can be seen as two sides of the same coin. Whereas Arab Spring, despite the name which does not indicate violence, is categorized as political violence due to the fact that the government transitions have not occurred peacefully. Although there was no massacre like the case in China, the presence of violence is indicated in the clashes between opposing groups during the power transition. (Political violence in the Arab Spring has ranged from student protests in Tunisia and Egypt to the ongoing civil war in Syria). *Arab Spring* is therefore a metaphor. It can literally mean a spring in the Arab region while as a metaphor it refers to either violent political crisis or promising political change – depending on text and context. The Tiananmen massacre and the Arab Spring may be more political than the May riots because they were initially student protests that turned violent. (Later, a discussion within this chapter will see how the definition of the May riots has not always been homogenous and that the event is inseparable from the fall of the then president Soeharto). The scale of political violence in the three events is also varied. The May riots was smaller in scale in terms of people involved and the destruction it has caused compared to the Arab Spring. However, the Tiananmen Square massacre would be smaller than the May riots if we take into account simply the number of casualties.

5.1. The May Riots

5.1.1. Background

The May riots occurred in Jakarta and several other cities in Indonesia. The riots, which broke out on 13 May 1998 and lasted three days, started after students were shot in a protest against the then president a day earlier. The media published reports that the mob targeted Chinese residences and shops in Chinatown. The riot, the casualties of which were never confirmed by the government but believed to reach thousands, was followed by the resignation of the then president Soeharto, on 21 May 1998.

In Indonesia, *May riots* (Kerusuhan Mei 1998) is the most common name used in the media to refer to the event, with some variations including *May 1998 riots (*Kerusuhan Mei 1998*), May 1998 Tragedy* (Tragedi May 1998) and *May 1998 Happening* (Peristiwa Mei 1998). Its alternative is *Anti-Chinese riots 1998*, which was mostly used by local English and foreign media.

Analysis

Although the name may suggest that the May riots was an isolated event, the May riots has been closely linked with the fall of then president Suharto. In local media reports, the May riots were reported to be part of a string of political events that started with the shootings of students during the Trisakti Tragedy or Trisakti Shooting. As the May riots covered a wide political, economic and social spectrum, books or media reports adopted slightly different emphasis on defining what constituted the riots.

In a report prepared by a government-sponsored commission formed shortly after the riot, the event was defined more as a political crisis derived from the 1997 presidential elections (Fact Finding Commission, 1998). The report provided an analysis of how the riots in different

cities were organized and an identification of groups involved. The anti-Chinese nature of the riot was not the focus of the reports. Although it stated that the local Chinese people were the main target, it was mentioned in passing and without further identification of the motive behind the choice of the victim group. In comparison, books or media written in English, either local or international, have placed greater emphasis on the Chinese aspect as the main target in the riots.

In his book on Indonesian politics, Michael Vatikiotis, a former journalist who was in the country during the event to cover for the now-defunct Far Eastern Review, wrote a chapter on the way in which the Chinese had become the main target in the riots. The book saw its first print in 1993 and an updated version to include the riot was published shortly after the crisis. The book does not contain the term *May 1998 riots* and Vatikiotis uses *Jakarta rioting* when referring to it.

> "When he [president Suharto] returned on 15 May, it was to a city ravaged by three days of rioting and looting and a political situation that was untenable. The Jakarta rioting was sparked by the Trisakti shootings. Both events essentially drained Suharto…Then the rioting began. Shops and banks were smashed opened and looted, cars were stopped on the toll-way and some of their occupants dragged out and beaten if they were Chinese. (Vatikiotis, 1998, p. 226)"

The index in the book does not contain the term *May riot* and it only records the term *violence against Chinese*. It is interesting to note that no international or English media source adopted the name *Jakarta riots*.

Besides calling it *riots*, news outlets have also used a variety of other nouns to categorize the event. In a news article by The New York Times, the event is referred to as *the economic chaos*, *anti-Chinese mobs* [raged in] *1998* and *the chaos of 1998* (Belford, 2010)

(See appendix A). The news report, which is titled "Chinese Preachers Bridge Indonesia's Ethnic Gap", does not make any reference to the *May riots*.

Name patterns

The use of the name *May* to refer to the case appeared in a local English newspaper as early as 17 July 1998 or roughly two months after the event. In an opinion piece written by Julia Suryakusuma for The Jakarta Post, the title of the article uses the word May: "May rapes become political issue" (Winarnita, 2011). *May rapes* refers to the rapes which occurred during the riots. Similarly, the fact finding commission that looked into the case also gave a title to their findings by using the word *May*. The report, which was completed and submitted to the government on 23 October 1998, is called "Report on 13-15 May Riots Event". Although there is no evidence that the report is the first Indonesian publication referring to the event with the term *May riots*, it is likely that the adoption of the term by an official commission helped popularize the term.

The term *May riots* became a popular option amid a range of other possible combinations such as *Jakarta 1998 riots* or *Anti-Chinese riots*. The main reason behind the popularity of the usage of *May riots* is probably because the name conveniently represents all the riots that occurred across the country at that time and does not prominently highlight a certain group as the victim. The commission that looked into the case reported that violence occurred in major cities such as Medan, Solo and Surabaya and casualties came from various ethnic backgrounds, although the report confirmed that rioters mainly targeted the Chinese. The use of the term *May riots* is considered to be more inclusive than *Jakarta riots* or *Anti-Chinese riots*, location focused and victim focused, respectively. In addition, the use of *anti Chinese riots* was not encouraged because it would have created controversy and debate

regarding the assumption that the riot exclusively targeted a group with a certain profile. The government has never openly admitted any Chinese discrimination in the rioting.

Conversely, international and local English media may have primarily used the term *Anti-Chinese 1998 riots* for several reasons. The name *Anti-Chinese 1998 riots* provide better identification of the nature of the event, while the term *May riots* tends to be more elusive. The term *Anti-Chinese riots* is more self-explanatory for foreign readers, who have no or little background knowledge of the situation. In addition, the name *Anti-Chinese 1998 riots* appeals more than *May 1998 riots* because the first is more indicative of discrimination issues. Race discrimination is considered as a type of news material which readers are sensitive to.

Name hierarchy

Diagram 1



News reports have linked both the Trisakti Tragedy and the fall of then president with the May 1998 event. The riot is chronologically sandwiched between those two events. The Trisakti Tragedy refers to the shootings by the army towards students who were protesting against the then president in the surroundings of the Trisakti University. The Trisakti Tragedy occurred on 12 May 1998, and nine days later, on 21 May 1998, president Suharto announced his resignation.

It is worth noting that the shooting has been referred to by using the name of the location of the university. The event is alternatively referred to as *Trisakti Shooting*. In comparison to the *May riots*, the shooting does not get named as the *May Tragedy* or the *May Shooting*. One possible argument is that the shooting happened in a well-know location. Unlike the riots, which occurred across the country, the shooting was concentrated only in a particular famous spot. Thus the media may have no difficulties in choosing the name as the shooting is limited within the boundary of the university. Similarly, the media does not call it *Jakarta Shooting*. Examples show that the media tends to stick to a landmark for naming if the event occurred there, without considering whether the event actually spread to a wider location or had a wider impact. This is similar to the case in which the media dubbed the killing in China as *Tiananmen Square massacre* instead of *Beijing massacre* or *June massacre*.

There is some evidence that the capital city is rarely used as a name even if that is where the event is taking place or it is affecting the whole city or is of a scale that affects the government located in the capital city. The May riots occurred mainly in Jakarta and also affected the government stability. Thus using the name *Jakarta riot*s in the way that Vatikiotis did, just appears to be a common sense choice. However, the name *Jakarta riots* never took off. The visual diagram above illustrating the hierarchy, shows that the use of capital city as the name of the event is skipped. The same diagram shows that the event started with the name of the month, passing over city-based names and moved to the participant-based name. For

readers living in a capital city, the name of the capital city is an internal premodifier that does not provide a clear frame of reference when being used as names for events. They need a premodifier or an identity that can be looked at externally and pointed at when using the name. As a premodifier, it has to be an entity beyond the reader (not an entity where the readers are positioned) such as a landmark, a month or another city.

Recognition of the role of those involved

Semantically, the noun *riot* in the *May riots* does not specify whether it involves two opposite parties, in a way that a noun such as *fighting* or *violence* would. *Riot* can simply point to a chaotic situation where a large number of people gather and do something violent towards something. The Oxford dictionary defines *riot* as: a violent disturbance of the peace by a crowd (Pearsall, 2013). It does not particularly specify whether the violence involves destructive force towards animate participants. Even if there are animate victims, they are not the main target of the action. Otherwise it would be referred to with a more direct noun such as *shooting, fighting,* or *attack*. Thus, a riot is just a violent disturbance that may involve animate victims as the consequence of disturbance. The noun *riot* does not indicate that someone is actually responsible in the way the word *violence* would indicate a perpetrator. In terms of description, the name would simply suggest that a riot occurred in May 1998. In contrast, the name *anti Chinese riots* contains a stronger message that assumes that a particular group has become victim.

Both *May riots* (or alternatively *May Happening* "Peristiwa Mei") and *Anti-Chinese riots* are derived through a nominalization process. The nominalization process shapes the way information is presented by taking away participants, either agent or patient. The process allows certain aspects such as perpetrator to be omitted from the sentence. The noun phrase *May riots* is the nominalization from sentences "The riots occurred in May 1998". The noun phrase *Anti-*

Chinese 1998 riots is also the result of nominalization. The original sentence could read "Chinese became the target in the riots in 1998". These sentences do not say who targeted the Chinese or who constituted the mob. This process allows information to be distributed partially in order to control readers' understanding.

It can be argued that the use of different names, either *May riots* or *anti Chinese riots*, may have little impact on recognition because most Indonesians would have had knowledge on the background to this event. The media reported about the case, including informing the public on what happened. Readers had information on who were implicated and who were the victims. Thus it could be argued that the name *May riots* had little effect in the whole discourse compared to the content of the news itself. While the role of the name in the recognition of the event may be speculative, it is evident that the name indicates what sort of evaluation the media has towards the happening. The media can use a name that shows their approval or disapproval towards the name. The *May riots* itself shows that the media is not critical towards the perpetrator; on the other hand, the name may come as a result of censorship when the media do not want to identify the involved parties, to avoid retaliation. The Chinese as the victims are rarely mentioned prominently in the news reports, although stories indicate the existence of Chinese discrimination.

As a name, the *May riots* is a reticent choice that does not provide significant information on the nature of the event or contribute to the portrayal of the role of the perpetrators. The use of the name May riots puts the event very much into a chronological perspective. The fact that the riots occurred in that time period is the one detail that is illuminated while the rest remains vague for certain purposes. The use of a date based name is preferable with a sensitive or controversial case because it avoids the significant or contentious details in the naming.

Mental representation

As May riot involves a wide range of aspects, everyone may come up with a different version when being asked about its description. Some may highlight more the political aspects while others may place more emphasis on the social aspects, or, some, on both of those aspects combined together. The emphasis given on what the event is depends much on one's social and political backgrounds and also what get highlighted the most in the media.

International media usually gave a brief introduction or explanation of what the event was all about regardless of what name they used to refer to it. In most cases, the media described it as "an anti Chinese riot that was followed by the fall of the then dictator Suharto". The Indonesian media sometimes provided a brief description or left it out altogether in an assumption that readers knew what it referred to. All the nominal expressions that have been discussed refer to the same event but the choice of the names reveal that they highlight different aspects of the same event.

Those names do not simply denote a reality but also represent a reality according to the concept or mental model of the language. As has been discussed above, there are two approaches in looking at the relation between the reference and its referent in semantics. The referential approach would be a much straightforward affair in which a name denotes an entity. All the names above denote a single happening. However, the representation approach provides an explanation of how each name suggests a different perspective of reality.

Each expression discussed in this section evokes different mental images and perceptions, even for a single person who already has her or his own knowledge of what the May riots was. In Indonesia**,** *May riots* may have more association with the political aspects of the crisis, such as the downfall of Soeharto, than the violence against the Chinese. The term *May riots*, with the use of the name of month, encourages readers to see the event in a more chronological way. It reminds readers of the whole crisis that started with protests and ended with the fall of Suharto. Meanwhile the name *anti-Chinese* itself would be more focused on the

violence against the Chinese than the downfall of Soeharto. As suggested through the name, the highlight is on the plight of the Chinese. All of those names encapsulate different pictures and lead to various descriptions of a same event. The use of the name *May riots* may not conjure a very picturesque description unless one has been widely exposed to the event. The name *Jakarta riot* may actually be more encapsulating as it provides an immediate vision of a riot in a capital city.

5.2. The Tiananmen Square Massacre

Background

University students in Beijing gathered in the surroundings of Tiananmen Square in April 1989 to show sympathy following the death of a pro-reform government official after he was sacked from the communist party. The gathering became a mass demonstration that spread to other cities, involving millions of people. The government cracked down on the protests by sending in army personnel in tanks. The crackdown ended with clashes with students on 6 June and casualties from the student side are believed to have reached two thousand (Chinese Red Cross data). Foreign media referred and still refer to the event as the *Tiananmen Square massacre*.

The event has never been acknowledged by the Chinese government, which has put tight censorship on what citizens can learn about it. Among local residents, the event is popularized as the *6-4 Happening* (六四事件) and *89 Democracy Movement* (八九民運). Internet searches for these two terms in mainland China are blocked by the government. A name search for the terms is accessible only in Hong Kong where Google is available. In mainland China, Internet searches are provided by local companies. The online news portal China Digital Times provides a list of the event names which are being blocked by the

government. Not only are popular references such as *Tiananmen Square massacre* or *64 Happening* subject to blocking but also less well-known combinations of numbers referring to the date of the event, for example 63+1= 64 (June 4), 65-1= 64, 24 years (the 24th anniversary of the massacre), June, Jun+4th, thirty-five (三十五), twenty-four (二十四), six+four (六+四) (Henochowicz, 2013).

As part of the Chinese government's censorship, the authorities provide their own version of and reference to the event. For example, on a government website, the event is referred to as the *1989 Political storm between Spring and Summer* (1989 年春夏之交的政治风波); The event is labeled as a *counter-revolution movement*, which the government blamed for harming its efforts at economic reforms (The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, 2009). This version of the event conflicts with the definition given by the international media. The analysis below will discuss how the choice of names reflects the stand point of an institution and how each name affects the representation and understanding of the event.

References for names used in the analysis are taken from international English media, Indonesian media and Chinese media.

Analysis

The event is popularly referred to as the *Tiananmen Square massacre* by the international English language media (See appendix B). The choice of the name *Tiananmen Square massacre* is generated by the fact that it is the location where the media thought the massacre had occurred.

James Miles, a BBC journalist who was covering the event in Beijing, said the name Tiananmen Square massacre was actually misleading because there was no massacre in Tiananmen Square (Miles, 2009). He said the media did not have enough access to what had

happened on that day and news reports were based on third parties' accounts or assumptions. In an article recounting what happened that day, Miles said that when he heard the military troops had started firing at people, he was not at the square. However, he wrote back to his office with reports saying that it had happened in the square based on an earlier assumption that the square was the location where the students had been concentrated for days (Miles, 2009). Miles also said that most of the media had assumed that the massacre took place in the square. The article quoted Miles as saying that major newspapers carried the misleading reports. For example The Washington Times used the title *Death in Tiananmen* (Miles, 2009). While the truth may remain sketchy, Miles said the killings happened in the vicinity of the square, not in the square itself. Although journalists have admitted the inaccuracy and revised the location, the media still uses the misleading term of *Tiananmen Square massacre* along with the wrong detail of locations. For example a BBC report wrote: "Several hundred civilians have been shot dead by the Chinese army during a bloody military operation to crush a democratic protest in Peking's (Beijing) Tiananmen Square" (BBC, 1989). Miles indicated that that the use of the misleading name had not only affected the detail per se but also overlooked the social and political impacts.

> "These terms can be faulted on points of detail. But their failing could also be said to be that they understate the magnitude of what happened. There was no Tiananmen Square massacre, but there was a Beijing massacre." (Miles, 2009)

Miles also further criticizes the use of the name *Tiananmen Square massacre* by saying that "the shorthand we often use of the *Tiananmen Square protests* of 1989 gives the impression that this was just a Beijing issue. It was not" (Miles, 2009).

Apart from the issues of the accuracy of the pre-modifier, the foreign media has also used a variety of nouns to categorize the event. Besides describing it as a *massacre*, English-language media used other nouns such as *crackdown* and *shootings* to categorize the event.

Massacre, *crackdowns*, and *shootings* are used to talk about the Chinese government with disfavor. The Oxford dictionary defines a massacre as "an indiscriminate and brutal slaughter of many people" (Pearsall, 2013). Semantically, shooting could be considered less brutal as it is aimed only at certain groups. The Oxford Dictionary defines shooting as simply the action or practice of shooting. Meanwhile, although crackdown may mean to trample on human rights it has a softer meaning than the first two as it does not involve killing. The Oxford Dictionary definition is: A series of severe measure to restrict undesirable or illegal people or behavior. All those names emphasize the violence aspects and portray the Chinese authorities as being responsible for the casualties. To counter all those foreign media reports, the Chinese authorities created a new metaphorical name that refers to the event in a different light.

The Chinese version of the event

The Chinese government has denied the massacre as reported by the international media**.** As noted, in order to elude the accusation of massacre, it has blocked internet searches which use international names. It has put its own reference and version of what happened that day. A government website describes what happened below:

> "Between the Spring and Summer, Beijing and several other cities witnessed the political storm, (in which) the party and government had relied on its people to deal with the turmoil, to quell the counter-revolutionary riots in Beijing, defended the socialist state power, maintaining the fundamental interests of the people, ensuring that the reform, openness to the world and modernization continue to make progress" (The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, 2009) (See appendix C).

The site calls the event *the political storm between Spring and Summer*. The name uses storm as a metaphor to associate the concept of political chaos with a weather phenomena. Meanwhile

Spring and Summer, although not being metaphors, is added to enhance the vision of the crisis as a weather disruption that occurred in the beautiful season of Spring and the warmth of Summer. The government has made this reference in an effort to persuade readers to conjure up an image which is in line with the government's version of the event. The student protest is a political storm, a disturbance that the government had to deal with.

The definition of the event is also different from the version provided by international media outlet such as the BBC. The Chinese government said the event was a counter-revolutionary riot. In doing so the government was trying to point out that the turmoil was orchestrated by people trying to halt the revolution in China. By contrast, western media argued that the event marked an attempted student revolution in China. James Miles said the government has exploited the weakness and inaccuracy in the media reports to its own benefit. The absence of confirmation of the location or number of casualties has allowed the government to control their own version of the event. It is evident that the contradiction in the definitions and the discrepancy regarding the number of casualties affects readers' recognition of what happened and who is responsible.

Name pattern

To avoid censorship, Chinese bloggers have used *64 Happening* or its equivalent date-based name to refer to the event in their blog writings. The name *64 Happening* is very subtle and its usage has also been adopted by Chinese media published outside China. An example is a report by BBC Chinese entitled "President Ma issues a statement on the commemoration of *64 Happening*" (BBC, 2011). The term *64* is occasionally used as a collocation with the word *happening* or *massacre* to categorize what happened. It can also stand independently as *64* without further noun to clarify the nature of the event. The word *happening* has the most neutral tone as it does not give any judgment on whether the event is bad or good. The term *64*

Happening is a result of a nominalization process. The nominalization process allows omitting details which otherwise may have to be included in a sentence. The Chinese word for happening (事件) is a common term used in referring to a certain event. Although the name happening itself has a neutral tone, it also rings a significant alarm bell. If something is dubbed as a *happening*, it must be of significant importance and probably of a catastrophic nature. The diagram below will visualize the naming pattern in the media and blogs.

Diagram 2



The diagram above shows that the name *Tiananmen Square massacre* conveys the strongest message as indicated through the word *massacre*. The word *massacre* presumes that a large group of people has been illegally killed in a brutal way by another group of people. Miles (2009) said the name Tiananmen Square massacre is not accurate because the killing actually occurred across Beijing. He suggested that the name should have been changed into *Beijing massacre*. The event in Beijing should have been referred to by using the capital city, not only because it took place across the capital city but also because it has massive social and political impacts. Miles indicated the use of the landmark for naming is not only inaccurate location wise but also socially and politically as it confines us to think that the impact of the event is limited to a certain local area. Miles said that the use of the capital city for the name would work to have us thinking that it is larger and serious in scale (Miles, 2009).

Other than pre-modifiers, events are also categorized differently as represented through the noun for the names. In the diagram, the middle box has names which convey more subtle messages as they do not identify much except for a date when an incident or happening occurred. The noun *incident* does not give much information regarding the nature of the event. The use of the date and a neutral noun such as *incident* can be argued to be a safe choice as it does not implicate anything or anyone. When facing a controversial event, the media may resort to using a date-based name due to its neutrality. The term in the right box is a metaphor. It was created in an attempt to visualize a picture which concurs with the government's claim that the student protests that day were a disturbance to political stability in the country. The massacre picture is challenged through the visualization of a beautiful season in which a storm occurs. The student protest is thereby depicted as an unwelcome storm that comes in the middle of two beautiful seasons.

The choice of the name shows attitude and judgment towards the event. The name *Tiananmen* is used when a media or bloggers or users would like to show strong disagreement with what happened. For example, the group of mothers whose children were killed during the event called themselves *Mother of Tiananmen* (Wang, 2012). This group does not call themselves *Mother of 64*. Although both the name *Tiananmen* and the name *64* or *1989* are parts of the events, the first has an advantage in that it provides clearer identification. Tiananmen as an important landmark in China provides a clearer identity to the group rather than the two digits number 64 or the four digits 1989.

Mental representation

In terms of the naming pattern, the use of a date does not conjure up any strong representation of an event. Date-based names are therefore preferable as references for events

in which the government is implicated because it avoids identification. Aside from the *May 1998 riots*, another example of date application in the naming is the use of *911* to refer to the terrorism attack in New York in 2001. *911* sound subtler than *WTC Attack* or worse, *the Arab Attack*. It is interesting to notice that both *911* and *64* are used without a noun word that would clarify the nature of the event.

It is difficult to measure how much the use of particular names or references affect our understanding or recognition of the events they refer to because our understandings are not derived from names alone but also from background news and information. While there is no evidence that names can affect understanding of an event, it is obvious that the choice of references or names implies a certain evaluation and attitude towards the events they represent. It is arguable that the lack of description in *64* shows that the event is of sensitive nature which people would not want to identify in a more explicit way. The brevity of *64* could also imply a preference not to be very visual when referring to the event. The subtlety of the name such as *911* or *64* has certain advantages. The name helps remind the public of what happened, especially every 11th September, without having to evoke unpleasantness through the usage of a descriptive name. Similarly, *64* may possibly represent both a method to elude from government censorship and to avoid evoking unpleasantness through descriptive names.

Recognition of the role of those involved

In descriptive theory, names work to designate a referent because of the shared definition. Different names can be made to refer to something based on consensus. Name shows attitude and does not yield significant influences that can make readers think of a different set

of details. Readers are capable of putting a meaning -- in forms of images or just a concept – regardless of what types of pre-modifier a name uses. A reference does not change the referent regardless of whether the event is called *Tiananmen Square massacre* or *64* or *political storm*. It does not influence our judgment of the event. The use of different names does not affect our understanding of the event but may generate a different sense of urgency. Due to its lack of identification and presumption, the name *64* does not invoke urgency in the way that *Tiananmen massacre* does. The use of the name *Tiananmen massacre* presumes that a group of people were unlawfully killed. The name alerts readers that a crime has been committed. Conversely, the name *political storm between Spring and Summer* does not invoke any sense of urgency because it does not reveal any particular identity. The name does not identify which political storm is being referred to or which spring and summer. Readers may be able to locate the meaning of the metaphorical term but they will not be able to see the significance. The name does not indicate anything that would arouse readers' attention the way that the *Tiananmen massacre* would.

The choice of the names, either *64* or *Tiananmen Square massacre*, shows the attitude of the media outlet towards the event. The choice of the name *Tiananmen Square massacre* shows the western media's emphasis on the massacre aspects and their disagreement with the way the local government handled student protests. The use of other names such as *64* or *1989* by Chinese bloggers shows their subtlety and ways of avoiding censorship. Meanwhile, the metaphor *political storm between Spring and Summer* by the Chinese authorities shows that the government is trying to avoid responsibility and shift readers' attention away from the crime they had committed.

5.3. The Arab Spring

Background

The uprisings in Tunisia in 2011 spread to other countries in the Arab region in a movement that has led to the fall of several dictators. The event in Tunisia is known as the *Jasmine Revolution*, while the collective event in the region itself is known as *Arab Spring*.

The international media also modified *Arab Spring* into *China Spring* (Hess, 2013) or *Jasmine Revolution* into *Jasmine Revolution in China* (Johnson, 2011) to refer to a possibility of similar uprisings in China (See appendix D and E). Meanwhile, the media has also changed the *spring* metaphor into *winter* as in *Arab Winter* to indicate a looming stalemate in the efforts to reform the politics in the region after the uprisings.

In Indonesia, the media uses several alternatives to refer to the event, namely *The Rise of Arab* (Kebangkitan Arab), *The Struggle of Arab* (Perjuangan rakyat Arab) or the exact English name *Arab Spring* (Koran Jakarta, 2013) (See appendix F). Data below is taken from the Indonesian media and the international English media.

Analysis

In an article published by Aljazeera.com, Massad (2012) indicated that the term *Arab Spring* was coined and popularized by Foreign Policy, a US magazine on politics and economic issues. Massad said that the use of the term *Arab Spring* "was not simply an arbitrary or even seasonal choice of nomenclature, but rather a US strategy of controlling their aims and goals" (2012). He compared it to the way the Americans have used the term *Prague Spring* to describe an economic liberation that would bring Czech closer to the American economic system.

Besides the term *Prague Spring*, the use of the word *spring* has several other precedents. Massad indicated that the other examples of the use of the term *spring* include *Damascus Spring*, which refers to the political upheaval in June 2000 in Lebanon, and *Beirut Spring*, which refers to the Saudi-backed protest against the government in Syria in 2005.

The use of the noun *spring* has nothing to do with whether the revolt or the protest happened during the season. The word *spring*, as also argued by Massad, was used mainly because it evoked a positive image of the event. Spring denotes the end of winter season and the arrival of a beautiful season where flowers start to blossom. Meanwhile, as a metaphor it has a connotative meaning that refers to the start of a new life. In general, *Arab Spring* refers to the start of another era in the region after a period of dictatorship.

In this case, we can see the choice to use the name *Arab Spring* has precedents which date back to previous events in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. It has been argued that the name originated from the western media and has been used exclusively for revolts that have been in line with US interests.

Edward Said, a proponent of theory of Orientalism, proposed that the West had imposed on the Arab a certain image that is associated with it being inferior, exotic, Islam and sensual. To support his arguments, Said (2000) looked at how Arab people were being described in literature or texts in general. One particular text he looked into is a book written by the French novelist Gustave Flaubert during the author's visit to Egypt between 1849 and 1850. Said argued that the repertoire in the book consists of words such as *harems, princes, prince, slaves, veils, dancing girls*, all of which conjure up a sensual or an exotic picture of the Arab country (p.109). Said argued that a certain fantasy about Arab people became a lasting prejudice that overshadows the Arab world. Another scholar, Jack Shaheen (2003), wrote in his book that Hollywood movies have portrayed Arab people in a certain fashion that fits into the prejudice as mentioned by Said. It is not impossible that the creation of the name *Arab Spring* illustrates a similar pattern of stereotyping. The choice of the name *spring* would evoke a strong picturesque image where readers can associate with beauty and other niceties in the season. Meanwhile, when used in pair with the word *Arab*, the collocation will render a different connotative meaning that does not actually correctly represent the hostile crisis in the region.

The event that preceded the Arab Spring was also referred to as the *Jasmine Revolution* (referring to the 2011 Tunisian revolt, which was soon followed by similar revolts elsewhere in the Arab region). Jasmine, which is a national symbol of the country, has also been used as the name of a previous similar revolt in the country in 1987.

Through the perspective of Orientalism, the names *Arab Spring* or *Jasmine Revolution* can be seen as coined to bring out a sensual and exotic image that resonates with the western prejudices about the Arab region. There is another example of a name coinage in which the choice of the diction represents the western idea of an Arab nation. Jefferson Morley, a journalist with The Washington Times, wrote that the US government has used the term *Cedar Revolution* to refer to a Lebanese revolt against pro-Syrian governments after the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister, Rafiq Hariri. Morley (2005) argued that the US called the revolts *Cedar Revolution* in an effort to replace the name *Intifada* which is used by the Lebanese media.

Morley argued that the US government avoided using the name *Intifada* because the term had been previously used to refer to a Palestinian revolt against Israel. According to Morley “It (Lebanese Spring) evokes benevolent nature, not unpleasant memories of Israeli military might. It fits rather more comfortably with Bush's foreign policy notion that "freedom is on the march" in the Middle East”. Cedar is the national symbol of Lebanon which is also featured in the country’s flag.

Similarly, the conflict in the Arab region is described as a spring, a name which may not best encapsulate the violent aspects of these events. The name is somehow designed to enable readers to see the whole event in an agreeable manner. Furthermore, the name *Arab Spring* does not focus on the process but more on the result by offering a metaphorical spring as the representation of a hope. The name *Arab Spring* has also made debates surrounding the revolution or crisis in the region more picturesque, less fierce, because writers can then use the

opposite metaphor to convey their disagreements and arguments on the course of the event. For example Massad (2012) in pointing out his disagreement with America's role in the crisis, states that

> "The battle of the seasons is on*;* while the Americans are pressing on for an American Spring in the Arab world that will only be experienced as another American-sponsored Summer drought for the majority of the people of the region, the Arab peoples are working to transform the recent uprisings into nothing short of a cold American Winter."

Massad uses the *battle of seasons* to describe how the US could catapult the revolution in the region into chaos (from a spring into a winter). Massad also uses *American spring in the Arab world* to point out the way the US has tried to push forward with its own agenda in the region (It is not a natural Arab spring but more a spring imposed by the Americans). Meanwhile the *American sponsored summer drought* points to an imminent stalemate of political crisis in the region under the US intervention. *A cold American winter* gives us a pictorial concept of possibilities of Arab's struggle for democracy turning into a failure as a result of the American presence in the revolt.

Similarly, the term *spring* has allowed the media to present their views on the events through the extensive use of season metaphors. The media is strewn with titles such as "Arab Spring, Chinese Winter" (Fallow, 2009) "Why wasn't there a Chinese Spring?" (Hess, 2013), "Tunisia: Why the Jasmine Revolution won't bloom" (Spencer, 2011) (See appendix D, G and H). *Chinese Winter* refers to the absence of a similar Arab revolution in China, *Chinese Spring* refers to the possibilities of a similar revolution to the one in the Arab region occurring in China. Finally, the use of metaphor in the phrase "the Jasmine won't bloom" represents a view that the revolution in Tunisia will not be followed with the creation of a good new government.

In this analysis, I also try to pin down the meaning of the name *Arab Spring* by comparing it with a string of other names. *Arab Spring* has been used to refer to the political turmoil in the whole region. Meanwhile, the name used to refer to the country's individual crisis is made up of [country's name] + [revolution / uprisings], for example, the name *Egypt Revolution* or *Syria Uprisings*. The other point worth making is that the media does not have a fixed formula in the naming system. I would raise as an example the Turkish uprising which the media popularly refers to as *Taksim Square protest*, or, the uprising in China as analyzed above, which is referred to as *Tiananmen Square massacre*. The protests in Egypt in 2011 were also concentrated in Cairo's Tahrir Square but the media did not popularize that name in the same way as they did for *Taksim Square protest* in Turkey. (There are a few examples of Tahrir Square being used to refer to the Egyptian crisis, but they are not very well-known). The media also does not prominently use the name *Cairo Protests* or *Cairo Uprising* in the news coverage.

It is arguable that the media follows a certain pattern in naming an event. In the case of *Arab Spring*, the media has followed the example of the more prominent name created by the mainstream media such as Foreign Policy. However, in the case of the absence of a more powerful discourse that creates names, the international media will either use the name of a well- known landmark where the protests occur or the name of the country if the scale of protest is nationwide. Meanwhile, the use of the country's name is reserved for foreign publication outside the country. For example, the use of *Egypt revolution* is only found in international English publications such as BBC and is not used in any local publication in the country.

The crisis in the Arab region is referred to via different names across the media in the world. It is interesting to note that the name *Arab Spring* did not actually catch on in Indonesia. Indonesian media will use a generic name such as *fight, crisis* or *revolution* to refer to it. *Arab Spring* does not have a direct translation in Indonesian because the translation does not make sense to Indonesian ears. As a tropical country which has no spring season, the literal

translation of *Arab Spring* would simply mean a real spring in the region. It would be hard to allude to the association or connotation of hope even when the term is used in the particular context.

To refer to the whole event in the region, the media may use the English noun phrase without translating it. Besides using the English term, Indonesian media has used a variety of words to describe it, such as *Kebangkitan Arab* (the Rise of Arab) or *Revolusi Arab* (Arab Revolution). Indonesian media has described the event in a favourable tone, as seen through the names they have used. The use of a more literal meaning to describe what happened in the Arab region will point to the current condition and what sorts of activities happened there. Meanwhile the use of a metaphor such as *Arab Spring* may not refer to an activity but a state. The *Arab Spring* was a state with a more ambiguous referent while the *Rise of Arab* is a more obvious reference to an action.

Name pattern and hierarchy

Arab Spring can be seen as index, icon and also symbol used in communicating the event. It is an index because the term *spring* is chosen to point to a certain idea. It is also an icon as the name makes use of parts of the event's identity, namely *Arab*, to point to the whole event. It is a symbol because the word and concept of *spring* was chosen arbitrarily to represent the event. *Arab Spring* is not a reference obtained through a nominalization process. It works more like an arbitrary brand name (especially the word *Spring*).

In the diagram below, we can see that *Arab Spring* functions like a generic name that includes the whole region's crisis. Meanwhile, [country] + [uprising/revolution] belongs to the second level of a hierarchy. It covers only the crisis in the country mentioned in the name. Names with a formula of using a country's trademark such as *Jasmine* for Tunisia are also in

the second level position (*Jasmine Revolution*). At the lowest level are names which are tied up with locations in which the events happened, such as Tahrir Square. Events' names are defined by locations or a specific property when the happenings are largely concentrated in that location, and occurring on a smaller scale.

Diagram 3



On the right side of the second level derivation, the head for the noun phrases are the symbolic identity of the country. The choice of which national symbol to use should take into consideration whether it serves the imagery purpose or to some extent fits with readers' assumptions about the country's characteristics. Following Said's theory of Orientalism, [If one argues with] the Middle East or Eastern European uprisings were named after the sensual image attached to them by westerns audience or media. Similarly, The *Cedar, Jasmine* and *Spring* are names that evoke sensual, exotic imagery of the east.

Another point worth mentioning is that the name [capital city] + [protest/uprising] is not very popular. Although capital cities may represent the challenged center of power, the use of the name does not hold as much appeal as would a landmark based or symbolic identity based name. The name [Landmark]+[uprising/protest] is used because, aside from pointing to the de facto location of where the happening occurred, it also has a sensual appeal and evokes particular for imagery.

Meanwhile, the [country] + [uprisings] name, although it may not have as much sensual appeal as a landmark-based name, is used for identification purposes for international readers.

Egypt revolution is only used by the international media to identify the country, while for the domestic media the more immediate name would be based on the landmark or location of the event. A name with symbolic identity is more inclusive (to cover everybody in the country), while landmark based name serves the iconic purposes in the theory of communication. Although a landmark based name may sound exclusive in the sense that it limits the action and consequences to a group of people in a certain location, it is actually inclusive in nature. The use of landmark is merely an icon that does not only point out the location where it occurs but also represents the whole country. Somehow, even for domestic media, the use of a capital city based name is not popular. One possibility to explain this pattern is that capital city based names register exclusivity in a sense that it indicates that it has only occurred in the capital city. A possible hypothesis is that if a big riot occurred in the capital city, it must be followed by small scale riots in other cities, as was the case with *May riots*. By the time the media decided to use the capital city as the name, they may have seen similar riots spilling into other parts of the country. In addition, as previously mentioned, the use of capital city will mean pointing inward towards the place where the media and readers are situated. By using a more specific location in the capital city, such as a landmark, the text or the media will help readers to index to an entity beyond itself (indexing externally). A similar example of indexing externally is the use of the name *Egypt uprisings* by the foreign media. The local media cannot use the term *Egypt uprisings* because it will lead to further questions where in Egypt the uprisings occurred. Similarly, the use of a capital city by the media for readers living in the capital city will not provide a clear frame of reference.

Mental presentation

Arab Spring appears mostly in titles and is rarely exclusively used in an article. Besides *Arab Spring*, other terms used alternatively (sometimes in a single article) are *revolution* (Hess, 2013), *uprisings* (Hess, 2013), *protest movements* (Fallows, 2011), *regime changes* (Fallows,

2011) or *awakening* (Cannistraro, 2011). The term *Arab Spring* is never used exclusively because it does not project a wholly accurate picture of the situation that would be in line with the story in the news. It appears mostly in the title because as a metaphor, *Arab Spring* sounds encapsulating and it can function as a pun. For example, an article titled "Arab Spring, Chinese Winter" (Fallows, 2011) illustrates how the use of figurative language can tell so much in so few words. Through the juxtaposition of Spring and Winter, readers can see what the author is trying to say: Arab is in a promising transition while China is facing another stalemate in politics.

In the news piece itself, the text has to employ some other terms that will represent the situation in a more accurate manner: the street erupted, the demonstrator and regime changes, wave of repression and nationwide protests. *Arab Spring* somehow does not automatically evoke the right mental representation in a way that terms such as *Arab Revolution* does.

Recognition of the role of those involved

The name *Arab Spring* highlights Arab people and puts them in the center of the story. However, the word *spring* may deflect the role the people have played in the movement. If the name had been *Arab Revolution*, it would provide a much clearer recognition of what Arab people are engaging in. *Arab Spring* emphasizes on the people but the metaphor *Spring* reduces their significance. As discussed earlier, the name is promulgated by the American magazine, Foreign Policy to represent the event in a favourable manner. It is possible to speculate that the name *Arab Revolution* is not chosen because the name suggests that Arab people are in full power and control towards the course of the crisis. Meanwhile, the name *uprising* is perhaps not chosen because it suggests a failed revolt. Similar to the other cases in which the word *spring* has been used, the term *Arab Spring* , it has been argued here, is popularized to give

Americans full control in the discourse on the issue. In a way, the name does not give much recognition to Arab people because the name *spring* tones down their role.

5.4. Discussion

What rules govern name popularity?

When an event breaks out, different media may refer to it with different names before they finally concur on a single name. Although in some cases, the media may not come to any consensus on a name, each media outlet uses different names to point to a single event. A quick examination of the names that are used in the media reveals that choices generally range from those imbued with hype to those with an understatement; and from those with descriptive to those with symbolic qualities. There is no evidence that names are coined according to a set of clear rules or patterns that would guarantee their adoption by the majority of the media.

This section will consider how various media outlets come to a decision on what name they shall use in referring to an event. It will compare several names of events with different structures to illustrate the absence of rules that governs name adoption. The first is the *Battle of Seattle*, which refers to the strike staged by activists during the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999. The strike turned into minor unrest after the police shot tear gas at peaceful protesters after some others had broken into and raided a number of shops and businesses. The second example is the *events of May 1968* in France, which refers to the strikes in the country led by students and workers. The use of the noun *event* does not offer a clue on what sort of activities took place at that time. Compared to the *Battle of Seattle*, the *events of May 1968* would sound like an understatement. Whilst the *Battle of Seattle* offers a landscape that would indicate a conflict between two or more parties, the latter does not indicate either the nature or the scale of the activity; the only identification that is offered is a date when it took place. Both names

contain different values: the *Battle of Seattle* is a hype and the other is an understatement. Despite differences in structure, these two names have penetrated comprehensively into local and international media.

By contrast, the political strike by supporters of the opposition parties in Thailand in 2009 and 2010 has not assumed a single name. The first event in 2009 was conducted by supporters of the then opposition party People's Alliance for Democracy, who were symbolized by yellow shirts. The second, in 2010, was conducted by supporters of the ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, whose supporters wore red shirts. To refer to the two events, the international and local media simply called them red shirt or yellow shirt protests, or anti-government protest. However, some local media used the alternative of location, referring to the 2010 event as *Ratchaprasong protest*. Other alternatives are *cruel April* (เมษาโหด) or *savage May* (พฤษภาอำมหิต). The difficulties of finding a single name to refer to the whole situation may arise from the fact that the uprising took place over a long time (from March to May 2010) and hence this eliminates the use of a particular month as a name. The strikes also covered a vast area and participants involved two big groups staged the strikes one after another. The local media was also polarized, with both factions controlling their own major media outlets.

These examples illustrate the diverse landscape of names. When a particular situation occurs, the media will decide on their standpoint and come up with a name. Thus each name reflects the newsroom's judgment (or lack of judgment) towards an event. Although each name indicates the sorts of judgment news media has, there are no conclusive patterns of how a certain name is chosen over another alternative that could similarly represent the event in a same judgment. One possible explanation is that there is a cognitive pattern that goes unmapped during the nominalization process that leads to the birth of these popular names and to how they acquire public recognition. Such processes remain obscure and difficult to examine and are therefore beyond the scope of this dissertation.

The following section focuses instead on the stage after, which is the nominalization process, which enables us to trace where noun phrases for names originate from. The next section will also look into name abuse which sometimes happens along the nominalization process. Name abuses occur when a name is imbued with certain values that may not give the most accurate depiction of an event but is adopted as it fits with the newsroom judgment. The discussion will also consider differences in naming choices between local and foreign media.

Nominalization as a naming strategy

The previous discussion of the three names for events in Indonesia, China and the Arab region has offered an explanation of how names come into being. They come through nominalization processes in which a name makes use of a pre-modifier as the identity of the noun it precedes. The noun itself categorizes the activity. Nominalization processes sum up an event in noun phrases with choices of words presenting the event that would direct readers to see it in a positive, negative or neutral light.

It is not clear whether the degree to which a pre-modifier encapsulates the event is a priority in the process of deciding on names. Certainly, in the nominalization process, a pre-modifier is chosen not because of how it can capture the event but more on it might represent the aspect that is to be highlighted. Two examples of this are *May riots* and *anti-Chinese riots*, which represent two different perspectives. Readers may not be able to locate discrimination aspects in *May riots* the way they do in *anti Chinese riots*. Although *anti Chinese riots* can capture the event better, is more visual and provides a better understanding to readers, it is not chosen because the name presumes that there are Chinese and people who are anti Chinese, a fact that has been disputed by the government.

In other words, the way we see an event is controlled by names. For example the use of *anti Chinese riots* in a text would mean the discourse will emphasize the plight of the minority

whereas the use of *May riots* reflects a more cautious attitude towards the anti Chinese aspect. This however does not affect our recognition. Recognition of an event and whether we see an event positively or negatively are influenced through many other aspects, such as details of the events and how the issues are debated in the media. Thus, names matter as the identity of an event that affects our mental representation but not recognition of an event. Our recognition is constituted by many aspects, but our mental representation may firstly be induced by names.

It can be argued that a name does not hold much significance beyond that of being a pointer to a designated area we are already familiar with (we already have a judgment of whether it is a positive or negative event). Pre-modifiers and their nouns are just identities assigned to designate a certain event. Although a name may tone down an unpleasant event, minds are programmed to read something in a certain way regardless of the name, for example, the word *happening* such as in the *64 Happening*. Although the word *happening* has a neutral tone, readers would assume that it must refer to something unpleasant. However, we are not so much influenced by the choice of pre-modifier or in certain cases, the choice of the noun. This is because we are capable of categorizing and putting a meaning in a certain context. Sense and context interweave in our understanding all the time.

The other important point is that some references do not function as a name. An example is the *Jakarta rioting* and *Syria uprising*. The term *Jakarta rioting* and *Syria uprising* are references that have yet to gain the status of names the way *May riots*, *Tiananmen Square massacre* or *Arab Spring* have. The term *rioting* and *uprising* are categories assigned to those events and they can be swapped with any other words with similar meanings (for example, with *Jakarta turmoil* or *Syria protest*). *Anti Chinese riots* also functions more as a reference rather than a proper name such as *Arab Spring*. As a proper name, *Arab Spring* is written in capital letters for both initials while *May riots* and *Tiananmen Square massacre* are written in capital letters only for the first initials. As a proper name, *Arab Spring* has the benefit of a

unique identity that is therefore more long lasting. The downside is that the name is ambiguous as it does not really sum up the nature of the event. Meanwhile, descriptive names such as the *May riots* or *Tiananmen Square massacre* may reveal the nature of the event better but the names may have lost their referencing point over a longer period of time, especially with the first name (Younger generations may not have any idea and ask which *May riots*).

Differences in naming choice between local and foreign media

There is no evidence that English media has different name patterns from local media as far as linguistics is concerned. English and local media both make use of date or location to refer to events. Foreign media may have to resort to descriptive names, such as *anti-Chinese riots*, because they are writing for readers who do not have much background on the issue. The other possible reason is that foreign media has more freedom in using a descriptive name as they do not come under readers' scrutiny the same way the local media does. For example, local media have refrained from using *anti-Chinese riots* because group identification may be deemed to be too sensitive. Instead, the Indonesian media has used date-based names for the event of riots; names which contain participants are less likely to be used. An example is the *Tanjung Priok riots* in Jakarta in 1984, in which Tanjung Priok is the place where the riots occurred. Similarly, when racial conflicts erupted in Central Borneo and Maluku provinces in Indonesia, local media used the location to refer to the events. The first event was dubbed the *Sampit riots* while the latter is referred to as the *Ambon riots*. Racial profiling is not encouraged in the media to avoid retaliation from both conflicting sides. By contrast, foreign media has identified races or origins to refer to those conflicts in their news reports because it provides better background information for foreign readers. Foreign readers are less likely to have a personal interest and may have little possibility of involvement in the conflict, thus retaliation issues are not a major concern. While local media tries not to provoke anger in their news reports by choosing toned

down names, the foreign media has used stronger names or categorization to describe the events. An example is the BBC, which referred to the *Sampit riots* as the *Borneo massacre* (BBC, 2001). Owing to its proximity with the subject of the coverage, the local media may subject themselves to self -censorships. The use of the noun *massacre* is not popular for the similar reasons of avoiding retaliation. In the example of the *Borneo massacre*, the name Borneo is chosen because it is more familiar to foreign readers rather than Sampit, which is just a small city in the island of Borneo.

Name abuse

Media does have limited choices when it comes to choosing a name. The pre-modifier used as part of the reference must at least function as an icon or an index, while the choice of the noun must represent the reality that has occurred. The media cannot simply choose any name just to attract readers' attention. However, the media can pick a remote name to obscure or tone down an event. For example, to play down the scale of the violence occurred, the Chinese authorities opted for a metaphor to refer to the massacre in Beijing.

Name abuse or inaccuracy may occur if a name uses the remotest part of an event to refer to it. An example is the name *Jasmine Revolution* in Tunisia, mentioned previously. Jasmine is considered a remote part because it is not involved in the event of the revolution. Jasmine can refer to just any Jasmine flower on earth or it can also refer to the flower symbol appearing in Tunisian flags. The remoteness will obscure the event, as readers may not be able to locate the meaning of Jasmine in the name. Another example of making use of a remote part of an event as the name is when names apply dates as part of the references. It is said to be remote because a date does not indicate much about the background or implications of the event. The opposite of the remote part would be the use of the most proximate identity. An example is the use of location as in *Tiananmen Square massacre*.

The use of location is a popular choice for the media. Location gives a better identity to a name because it will define an event better than a date will. However, the use of a location may prove difficult because it has a more defined boundary than a date. One has to be specific when using a location: for example, whether it occurred only at a certain spot, across the city or the country. The other issue is the use of a capital city, as the name may lead to a wider meaning beyond suggesting where an event took place. An example is Miles's (2009) that the name *Tiananmen Square protests* should have been changed into *Beijing massacre* for two reasons. The first is that the massacre occurred across the city instead of just in the square and the second is that the crisis was a national issue beyond the location of the actual killing. He argues that the name *Tiananmen Square massacre* sounds as if the massacre is a random incident. It is evident that there is a tendency for the media to stick to famous landmarks for naming, regardless of whether it happened exactly in the square or not. In the absence of famous landmarks as the location, the media may use area names for that purpose. As previously explained, there is evidence that the media avoids using capital cities as a reference, for example *Jakarta riots* or *Beijing riots*, because they may sound too generic and ambiguous. The use of such reference may lead to questions of which Jakarta riots or which Beijing riots.

The other issue related to name abuse is when a name is coined to fit into a certain representation or prejudice. The name *Arab Spring* has been created by western concepts of an Arab world. *Arab Spring* may not be the best name to sum up the whole course of the event in the region. It only suggests how the event is expected to unfold. As a result of its inconclusive name, *Arab Spring* has become a source of pun in headlines to show disagreement on how the situation may end up. An example is the use of name *Arab Winter* to suggest the possibility that the event turns into a political stalemate.

CONCLUSION: DIFFERENT REPRESENTATION OF VIOLENT POLITICAL EVENTS UNDER NAMING STRATEGIES

The name patterns discussed in the analysis chapter are imbued with either dates, locations or participants. The date and location represent the identity assigned to each event while the nouns are the categorization classifying the event. If those names are to be understood in terms of signs, *May riots* and *Tiananmen Square massacre* function more like icons while *Arab Spring* can be seen as an index. Both the words *May* and *Tiananmen Square* are icon or parts of the events that represent the whole event as an entity. By contrast, *Arab Spring* mainly serves as an index in the sense that it directs readers to see the transition of Arab politics in a positive light. *May riots* and *Tiananmen Square massacre* come about from the nominalization process and can be stretched into sentences that incorporate the pre-modifiers, by contrast *Arab Spring* is a metaphor that is chosen to represent how the event is expected to unfold.

The use of date epitomizes the naming strategies for controversial events in order to tone down the meaning they carry. Thus *May riots* is a softer and more inclusive version of *anti-Chinese riots.* The government has never confirmed that discrimination took place during the riots and thus the use of the latter would be seen as problematic. Similarly, the name *64 Incident* alludes to the event in China in a much subtler way than its international counterpart of *Tiananmen Square massacre*.

Metaphors are frequently used to lead readers to see an event in a particular way. The name *Arab Spring* was used by the western media and the metaphor created by the Chinese government to refer to the massacre are meant to provide a representation of their own version. *Arab Spring* would be a much toned down version of *Arab Revolution* and similarly, the *Political Storm Between Spring and Summer* also alludes to a different kind of crisis than what *Tiananmen Square massacre* suggests.

The differences in names may affect representation but not recognition because readers are exposed to debates and controversies surrounding the events. The pair of names *May riots* and *anti-Chinese riots* and also *Tiananmen Square massacre* and *64 Incident* all evoke different presentations of an event. Similarly, *Arab Spring* and *Arab Revolution* have different senses and presentations. The different presentations are put in place as efforts to control reading results**.** As an initial indicator to readers, the name may manage to lead readers in the intended direction, but as has been argued above, recognitions also come from various sources. Names play a minimum role in influencing perception because in the end they function more as an approach the media use to tell readers of a narrative, but not as a major compass readers use to judge an issue.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

Source: **http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/world/asia/15iht-indo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0**

July 14, 2010

Chinese Preachers Bridge Indonesia's Ethnic Gap

By AUBREY BELFORD

CIBUBUR, INDONESIA — In Indonesia's crowded world of celebrity Muslim preachers, it often pays to have a trademark. For Koko Liem, his ever-present Chinese-style outfits — garish satin tunics paired with matching skullcaps — play the role.

Whether in television appearances or Koran recitals, the approach of Mr. Liem, a 31-year-old convert to Islam from Indonesia's ethnic Chinese minority, is undeniably kitschy. In multihued permutations of his signature garb, he mixes preaching with guest appearances on dating and talk shows and promotes a religiously themed text-messaging service through his Web site.

Mr. Liem is one of a small but significant group of ethnic Chinese preachers to emerge over the past decade with a simple message: that being a member of Indonesia's dominant majority — Muslims — and its historically most maligned minority — Chinese — need not be mutually exclusive.

"Clerics don't only have to wear turbans. I'm a Chinese cleric. This is how I am," Mr. Liem said at his home outside Jakarta, bouncing around boyishly on the couch in a crimson version of what he calls the "Koko Liem Costume."

To outsiders, that assertion may seem unremarkable, even banal. But in Indonesia, it represents a powerful break with the past.

Pogroms and prejudice against Chinese have been a constant theme in Indonesian history. Discrimination peaked under the three-decade rule of the dictator Suharto, who banned the public expression of Chinese culture, language and religion. Despite being widely despised for holding a disproportionate share of the country's wealth, Chinese were also, somewhat paradoxically, treated as potential sympathizers of the China-linked Indonesian Communist

Party, which was wiped out in the 1965-66 purge that left more than half a million people dead.

In the economic chaos that led up to Suharto's fall in 1998, riots and mass rapes drove many Chinese into exile abroad. There are no solid figures for how many Chinese live in Indonesia today, but they are generally believed to make up 2 to 3 percent of the 235 million people in Indonesia. Most Chinese here are Christians, Buddhists or followers of traditional beliefs; very few are Muslim.

In contemporary democratic Indonesia, official discrimination is gone, and Chinese culture has dramatically emerged from the shadows — although disparaging remarks are still heard about the Chinese, who are often stereotyped as greedy and deceitful. Megawati Sukarnoputri, the former president, made Chinese New Year an official holiday in 2002, and since then, it has been granted perhaps the highest honor possible in this country's shopping mall-dominated, traffic-clogged capital: holiday sales and ubiquitous themed advertising.

"You see now on TV shows, there are many Chinese presenters, Chinese singers, also in the movies," said Benny Setiono, the head of the Chinese Indonesian Association. "Before there were no Chinese in all this. Now they're everywhere."

Mr. Liem — who converted from Buddhism as a teenager in northern Sumatra and took shelter in his Islamic boarding school outside Jakarta as anti-Chinese mobs raged in 1998 — said his role was to teach the universality of Islam. "If a Chinese person becomes a Muslim, and he understands the religion, even to the point of being a cleric like me," Mr. Liem said, "people are more awed and moved: 'He's just a Chinese, who wasn't a Muslim before. Now he is one, and his religion is greater than ours. He can lecture on religion, he can memorize the Koran, what can we do?"'

Mr. Liem is a relative minnow in Indonesia's booming world of celebrity preachers. Like their Christian counterparts in the West, these men and women often use their personal biographies and charisma, rather than traditional religious knowledge, to win adherents through television appearances and packed tour schedules.

Their popularity, says Noorhaidi Hasan, a lecturer on Islam and politics at Sunan Kalijaga Islamic University, owes much to their ability to satisfy a need among urban, middle-class Muslims to appear spiritually connected despite living lives in which obtaining, and displaying, wealth is an overriding preoccupation. They give their followers, he said, "moral legitimacy" for a life of consumerism.

No longer restrained by the discrimination of the former regime, small numbers of Chinese Muslims like Mr. Liem — and even female preachers like Tan Mei Hwa and Irene Handono — have carved out a niche by tying their ethnicity to tales of spiritual renewal.

“After Suharto, Chinese had the opportunity to demonstrate their own identity as Chinese. Not just ethnically as Chinese but also part of the Muslim ummah,” Mr. Hasan said, using the Arabic term for the community of believers.

Not all of the Chinese preachers in Indonesia present a sunny, television-friendly face, however. Perhaps the best known of the bunch is Anton Medan, a former gangster from the Suharto era who sports the deep scars of previous fights and says he has half a dozen bullets lodged in his body.

Born a Buddhist and drawn into petty street crime as a child, Mr. Medan spent a total of nearly 19 years in prison for robbery and murder before his spiritual awakening.

“I ruled Jakarta — I was running gambling, everything, until ’91, ’92, when I became a Muslim, and it was all finished. It was a total change,” Mr. Medan said, smoking a clove cigarette while self-consciously covering a gouge in his right forearm.

Mr. Medan is a controversial figure in some circles, having been accused of helping orchestrate the chaos of 1998 — a charge he flatly denies. He eschews much of the more entertainment-focused end of the missionary business, concentrating instead on preaching tours, local politics and nonreligious business ventures that range from garment manufacturing to indoor soccer. He has built an Islamic boarding school outside Jakarta and three multilevel, Chinese palace-style mosques in Indonesia and Malaysia.

Mr. Medan said he had encountered some anti-Chinese sentiment from small, marginal Islamist groups. While his gangster-to-God transformation forms the core of his story, he peppers his teachings with exhortations to Muslims to adopt what he calls the “Chinese mind” — meaning, a bit of business acumen.

He frequently reminds the faithful of the contributions of Chinese missionaries in bringing Islam to the Indonesian archipelago, including the famed voyages of the Ming dynasty admiral Zheng He, a Muslim. But he is dismissive of other preachers, like Koko Liem, whom he sees as “tacky.”

“Muslims in Indonesia are stupid. They choose speakers and preachers that are famous from TV, not because of their struggles,” he said, bitterly.

“The difference between Koko Liem and me is like earth and sky.”

Appendix B

Source:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/4/newsid_2496000/2496277.stm

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1989: Massacre in Tiananmen Square

Several hundred civilians have been shot dead by the Chinese army during a bloody military operation to crush a democratic protest in Peking's (Beijing) Tiananmen Square.

Tanks rumbled through the capital's streets late on 3 June as the army moved into the square from several directions, randomly firing on unarmed protesters.

The injured were rushed to hospital on bicycle rickshaws by frantic residents shocked by the army's sudden and extreme response to the peaceful mass protest.

Demonstrators, mainly students, had occupied the square for seven weeks, refusing to move until their demands for democratic reform were met.

The protests began with a march by students in memory of former party leader Hu Yaobang, who had died a week before.

But as the days passed, millions of people from all walks of life joined in, angered by widespread corruption and calling for democracy.

Tonight's military offensive came after several failed attempts to persuade the protesters to leave.

Throughout the day the government warned it would do whatever it saw necessary to clamp down on what it described as "social chaos".

But even though violence was expected, the ferocity of the attack took many by surprise, bringing condemnation from around the world.

US President George Bush said he deeply deplored the use of force, and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said she was "shocked and appalled by the shootings".

Amid the panic and confusion students could be heard shouting "fascists stop killing," and "down with the government".

At a nearby children's hospital operating theatres were filled with casualties with gunshot wounds, many of them local residents who were not taking part in the protests.

Early this morning at least 30 more were killed in two volleys of gunfire, which came without warning. Terrified crowds fled, leaving bodies in the road.

Meanwhile reports have emerged of troops searching the main Peking university campus for ringleaders, beating and killing those they suspect of co-ordinating the protests.

Appendix C

Source: http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-10/09/content_1434332.htm

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Note: The article appears on a government website, which provides a brief history of what happened in 1989. The article starts with a lead paragraph (the highlighted part) as follows:

"Between the Spring and Summer, Beijing and several other cities witnessed the political storm, (in which) the party and government had relied on its people to deal with the turmoil, to quell the counter-revolutionary riots in Beijing, defended the socialist state power, maintaining the fundamental interests of the people, ensuring that the reform, openness to the world and modernization continue to make progress." (The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, 2009)

中华人民共和国大事记（1989 年）

中央政府门户网站　www.gov.cn　　2009 年 10 月 09 日　　来源：新华社

１９８９年

春夏之交　北京和其他一些城市发生政治风波，党和政府依靠人民，旗帜鲜明地反对动乱，平息在北京发生的反革命暴乱，捍卫了社会主义国家政权，维护了人民的根本利益，保证了改革开放和现代化建设继续前进。

５月１６日　邓小平会见来访的苏联最高苏维埃主席团主席、苏共中央总书记戈尔巴乔夫。中苏关系实现正常化。

6月9日　邓小平接见首都戒严部队军以上干部，指出北京发生的政治风波是国际的大气候和中国自己的小气候所决定了的，强调要坚定不移地执行党的十一届三中全会以来制定的一系列路线、方针、政策，要认真总结经验，对的要继续坚持，失误的要纠正，不足的要加点劲。

6月23日－24日　中共十三届四中全会召开，撤销赵紫阳党内一切领导职务，选举江泽民为中央委员会总书记。全会明确宣告，党的十一届三中全会以来的路线和基本政策，绝不会因为发生这场政治风波而动摇。

9月29日　庆祝中华人民共和国成立40周年大会举行，江泽民发表讲话，全面阐述邓小平关于建设有中国特色的社会主义理论的指导意义。

11月6日－9日　中共十三届五中全会召开，通过《中共中央关于进一步治理整顿和深化改革的决定》。全会高度评价邓小平对党和国家的历史贡献，强调他是中国改革开放和现代化建设“当之无愧的总设计师”，同意邓小平辞去中央军委主席职务，决定江泽民任中央军委主席。

12月21日　中共中央发出《关于加强和改善党对工会、共青团、妇联工作领导的通知》。

12月26日　七届全国人大常委会第十一次会议通过《城市居民委员会组织法》、《环境保护法》和《城市规划法》。

12月30日　中共中央发出《关于坚持和完善中国共产党领导的多党合作和政治协商制度的意见》。

Appendix D

Source: http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/22/why-wasnt-there-a-chinese-spring/?all=true

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THE DIPLOMAT

Why Wasn't There a Chinese Spring?

EAST ASIA | POLITICS | REGION | TOPIC | CHINA
February 22, 2013 *By Steve Hess*

Although sharing many of the same problems as Arab societies, the Arab Spring never arrived in Beijing. Why?

Image credit:Flickr (Keith Roper)

It has now been two years since the self-immolation of the Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, provided the spark that set the Arab world aflame. A wave of protests spread throughout the region in quick succession and led to the overthrow of long ruling autocrats in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, and possibly Syria.

The collapse of regimes like Hosni Mubarak's in Egypt, which many considered "an exemplar of…durable authoritarianism" was a salient reminder to many that such revolutions are "inherently unpredictable." Before long some began to speculate that the protest movements might spread to authoritarian states outside the Arab world, including China. Indeed, the Chinese government was among those that feared the unrest would spread to China because, as one observer noted, China faced the same kind of "social and political tensions caused by rising inequality, injustice, and corruption" that plagued much of the Arab world on the eve of the uprisings.

Alas it was not to be as the Chinese government has proven far more durable than many of its counterparts in the Arab world. This inevitably raises the question of what factors differentiated the Chinese government from its Arab counterparts in places like Egypt?

Fortunately,in the more than two years since Mubarak fell, a number of theories have been advanced to explain the Arab Spring.

One set of explanations has centered on social and economic drivers. According to this reasoning, unrest in the region was driven by a highly discontented and mobilized society. Youth unemployment and official corruption enraged citizens throughout much of the Arab

world and the diffusion of new communications technologies, particularly social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter, enabled these individuals to channel these grievances into effective anti-regime collective action.

One shortcoming of this explanation is that the same sources of discontent and social media websites are available throughout the developing world, but successful revolutions are rare. In China, for example, official statistics suggest youth unemployment is low, but independent research has found that the problem may be large and growing, particularly among the type of young, urban and highly educated groups who have spearheaded many revolutions historically. Meanwhile, cross-national measures of corruption place China squarely between Tunisia and Egypt. Finally, Internet penetration rates also place China shoulder-to-shoulder with Tunisia and Egypt, and social media has increasingly appeared as a critical tool for mobilizing Chinese protestors in frequent "mass incidents," and spreading news of sensitive topics, such as official corruption and public health threats posed by environmental pollution.

Many academics have made the case that the quality of authoritarian rule in Egypt, Tunisia and other toppled dictatorships has lagged behind that in China, causing a breakdown in the former but not the latter. Beijing has developed crack internal security forces for dispersing crowds and constructed its regime around a hegemonic, well-established political party. While these explanations have merit, researchers had identified similar authoritarian support in the Arab world immediately before the turbulent year of 2011. One key to the resilience of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt were their "robust" security forces, which were well-trained and armed – thanks in part to generous American support – and supposedly fiercely loyal to the regime.

Meanwhile, Mubarak and Ben Ali were carefully institutionalizing their regimes by constructing hegemonic political parties and skillfully using nominally democratic elections and legislatures to maintain regime cohesion and co-opt potential challengers. Meanwhile, in China, presumed to be bolstered by more effective institutions, public scandals surrounding high-ranking leaders, such as the wealth of Wen Jiabao's family or the dramatic fall of Bo Xilai, and the malfeasance and corruption of middle and low-ranking officials, reveal that politics within the CCP may not be as orderly, managed and predictable as once imagined.

But, of course, the Chinese regime has not collapsed and does not seem to be in its death throes. This is puzzling in some respects, because the country experiences annual protests that reportedly topped 180,000 as recently as 2010. Clearly popular discontent is high and Chinese citizens participate in contentious politics in large numbers, but these remain mostly localized affairs targeted at local issues, such as corrupt, low-ranking officials who engage in land grabs. Aside from the June 4 incident of 1989, they have not transformed into protest movements coordinated on a national scale and positioned against the central government itself, as appeared rapidly in Tunis and Egypt's Tahrir square.

So why have Chinese citizens trended towards localized protests rather than the national protest movements seen in the Arab spring? As discussed in an important body of research, one source of this difference is linked to the structure of the state itself. In China, unlike most autocracies – including Mubarak's Egypt and Ben Ali's Tunisia—the state is highly decentralized. Local governments are given a substantial level of autonomy over development policies as well as social management – decisions related to dealing with popular challengers through repression or alternatively, the extension of concessions.

Since local authorities make decisions over the carrots and sticks used to address the demands of citizens with a high degree of autonomy, these officials rather than the national leadership or the regime itself are the primary target of most protest actions. In fact, it is a common phenomenon in China that aggrieved locals will appeal to the Center for assistance against corrupt local officials, even making reference to local officials' poor enforcement of central directives and policies.Thus, the struggles faced by everyday Chinese are often directed at particular local officials and local issues, limiting the desire of protestors to take the dangerous leap of coordinating their actions across local communities to challenge the regime itself.

As a consequence, much like the Middle East, the years 2011 and 2012 *have* been ones characterized by very high levels of protest activities in China. However, because of the decentralized nature of the Chinese state, these battles have been ones won and lost by claimants contesting local officials rather than challenging the regime itself.

Steve Hess is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and East Asian & Pacific Rim Studies at the University of Bridgeport's College of Public and International Affairs. He is a specialist on contentious politics in authoritarian regimes with particular emphasis on China. He is the author, most recently, of the forthcoming article in the International Political Science Review, "From the Arab Spring to the Chinese Winter," from which this piece was adapted.

Appendix E

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/world/asia/24china.html?_r=0

THE NEW YORK TIMES

February 23, 2011

Calls for a 'Jasmine Revolution' in China Persist

By IAN JOHNSON

BEIJING — A small but stubborn protest movement is continuing calls for demonstrations despite a campaign of arrests and censorship that underscores China's concern over unrest and revolts in authoritarian countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

According to the Hong Kong-based Information Center for Human Rights and Democracy, three people were detained for "inciting subversion of state power" after they reposted calls for protests last weekend. The detentions could not be confirmed independently, but they follow roundups of scores of dissidents and rights lawyers. Some well-known lawyers who handle sensitive cases were placed under house arrest and some were beaten badly, according to human rights activists.

Activists, possibly from outside China, have called on citizens in China to express their displeasure at the country's lack of reforms and officials' corruption by silently meeting in front of department stores or other public areas for a "Jasmine Revolution," a named borrowed from the Tunisian revolt that set off the Middle East unrest.

Organizers have now called for the protests to continue each Sunday, and gave a list of spots in a dozen major cities where people could "go for a stroll" this coming Sunday at 2 p.m.

Because the calls are made via Twitter and other services widely blocked in China, they circulate only to those who know how to bypass Internet censors. But Chinese authorities have been responding with their customary zeal. On Sunday, a protest in Beijing was overwhelmed by police officers.

And the word "jasmine" has been blocked on popular social networking sites and chat rooms.

The authorities might have a hard time eradicating the word completely. Jasmine is also the name of a popular Chinese folk song.

It was supposedly the favorite of China's previous leader, Jiang Zemin, who asked it to be played at the 1997 transfer of Hong Kong, the former British colony, to China. In addition, videos exist of China's current leader, Hu Jintao singing the song while on a trip in Africa.

Some of these videos were posted on social networking sites, forcing censors to have to decide if they should take down videos of senior leaders that could be explained as an expression of patriotism.

"The real story is the indirect ways that Chinese citizens can use music and historical meaning to make this incredibly subversive statement, to take a most popular folk song and post it," said Sharon Hom, executive director of New York-based Human Rights in China. "The point is there is an information crack and it is growing."

Appendix F

Source: http://koran-jakarta.com/index.php/detail/view01/104390

Note : The article reported how the political situation in the Arab region has affected the political and economic stability of the other regions. The article quoted an expert stating his concerns over the increase in the oil price and refugees from the region. The article uses the English name “Arab Spring” (not translated into Indonesian), which was accompanied with an explanation of what is the “Arab Spring”. The lead sentence of the article (the highlighted part) translated into English as follows:

“Wave of democratization in countries in the Middle East or Arab Spring has changed the political map in the region.”

KORAN JAKARTA

Rabu, 31 Oktober 2012 | 01:51:54 WIB

Gejolak Timur Tengah "Arab Spring" Ubah Peta Politik Kawasan

JAKARTA - Gelombang demokratisasi negara-negara di kawasan Timur Tengah atau Arab Spring yang terjadi sejak Desember 2010 telah mengubah peta politik di kawasan itu. Perubahan peta politik itu sedikit banyak memengaruhi stabilitas politik dan ekonomi secara global, termasuk ke Indonesia.

Hal tersebut diungkapkan oleh Kepala Pusat Penelitian Politik Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (P2 Politik LIPI), Sjamsudin, pada seminar "Respons Indonesia terhadap Dinamika Politik Timur Tengah" di Gedung LIPI Jakarta, Selasa (30/10).

Menurut Sjamsudin, Arab Spring berdampak cukup signifikan dari segi ekonomi dan sosial. Dampak tersebut ialah semakin melambungnya harga sejumlah komoditas dan bahan bakar minyak serta meningkatnya jumlah pengungsi dari Timur Tengah.

"Imbas dari krisis politik berkelanjutan di Timur Tengah itu tidak hanya meningkatkan harga komoditas minyak bumi, tetapi lebih jauh dalam bidang sosial dapat menimbulkan kekhawatiran penduduk lokal sehingga mereka memutuskan untuk mengungsi ke daerah lain atau bahkan ke negara lain, termasuk ke Indonesia," kata Sjamsuddin.

Namun, lanjut Sjamsuddin, dalam upaya melaksanakan kebijakan politik luar negeri bebas

aktif untuk kepentingan nasional, Indonesia dapat ikut berperan menanggulangi krisis politik di Timur Tengah. Peranan itu dalam bentuk meningkatkan hubungan kerja sama bilateral dengan negara-negara Timur Tengah serta mengoptimalkan peran dalam mendorong proses demokratisasi dan perdamaian di kawasan itu.

"Jadi, peran tersebut dapat dilakukan pemerintah dengan meningkatkan kerja sama di berbagai bidang, yakni politik, ekonomi, dan sosial," tegas Sjamsudin.

Dia menambahkan Pemerintah Indonesia juga dapat membangun kerja sama melalui penyelenggaraan dialog keagamaan serta kerja sama lain yang mencakup usaha-usaha perdamaian, demokrasi, dan perlindungan hak asasi manusia (HAM).

"Upaya tersebut dapat membuat Indonesia semakin dikenal dunia internasional karena turut berperan aktif dalam upaya penanggulangan krisis di politik Timur Tengah," tandas dia. idr/I-1

Appendix G

Source: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/arab-spring-chinese-winter/308601/2/

The Atlantic

Arab Spring, Chinese Winter

Just after the streets of Tunisia and Egypt erupted, China saw a series of “Jasmine” protests—until the government stopped them cold. Its methods were subtler than they had been at Tiananmen Square, and more insidious. Was the regime’s defensive reaction just paranoia? Or is the Chinese public less satisfied—and more combustible—than it appears?

By James Fallows

SOMETHING BIG IS happening in China, and it started soon after the onset of the “Arab Spring” demonstrations and regime changes first in Tunisia and then in Egypt: the most serious and widespread wave of repression since the Tiananmen Square crackdowns 22 years ago. Of course, “worst since Tiananmen Square” does not mean “as bad as Tiananmen Square.” As the government has taken pains to ensure, there have been no coordinated nationwide protests so far, and troops from the People’s Liberation Army, in their instantly recognizable green uniforms, have not played the major role that they did then in containing dissent. Instead, enforcement around the country has been left mainly to regular police, typically in their dark-blue uniforms; the much-feared “urban management” patrols known as *chengguan*, also in dark blue; large reserve armies of plainclothesmen; and many other less visible parts of the state’s internal-security apparatus, which now has a larger budget than China’s regular military does.

Unlike in 1989, for most people in most of the country, life and business since the beginning of the Arab Spring have hummed along relatively normally. The main domestic concerns in China at the moment are rapid inflation, especially in food prices; a severe long-term nationwide drought (broken by occasional severe localized flooding), which has threatened farms in the country’s normally wet southern provinces and brought Dust Bowl conditions to parts of the normally dry north; and widening scandals and public fear about tainted food supplies. In May, a report based on figures from the Chinese Ministry of Health showed that cancer had become the country’s leading cause of death, which is an unusual and revealing distinction. In poorer countries, infectious diseases are usually the main killers; in richer ones, heart disease and other consequences of a sedentary, wealthy lifestyle. The rising prevalence of cancer, including in “cancer villages” near factories or mines in China’s still-poor countryside, was taken even by Chinese commentators as another indication of the urgency of

dealing with the environmental consequences of the country's nonstop growth. For modern China, though, all of these are familiar concerns.

A set of less familiar problems developed with amazing speed early in the year. In mid-January, Hu Jintao met Barack Obama in Washington, on what would be Hu's last official visit to the United States. In a little more than a year, Hu will finish his second five-year term as president and relinquish the job, presumably to anointee/Vice President Xi Jinping. The meetings in Washington were as constructive and positive-toned as such events can be. Obama gave Hu the gala White House state dinner (which my wife and I attended) that he had notably not received on his previous American visit: five years earlier, George W. Bush had offered Hu only a lunch at the White House, an omission the more startling given the standard Chinese practice of building even the most trivial business meeting around a celebratory banquet. Officials from both sides noted their areas of political and economic disagreement (arms sales to Taiwan, status of the Dalai Lama, etc.) but also signed numerous cooperative agreements, in fields ranging from clean-energy research to student exchanges and increased military interactions. President Ben Ali had been forced from power in Tunisia just days before Hu Jintao traveled to Washington. The Tahrir Square protests against Hosni Mubarak in Egypt began just after Hu returned to Beijing, and were soon followed by the uprisings in Jordan, Yemen, Syria, and Libya. The spread of protest from one Arab-Islamic country to its neighbors might have seemed predictable. Less so was the effect in China.

On Sunday afternoon, February 20, while Muammar Qaddafi's troops were shooting into unarmed crowds in Benghazi, a handful of Chinese staged the first of a projected series of weekly "Jasmine" protests designed to extend the spirit of the Arab Spring protests to several major Chinese cities. The demonstration in Beijing was held in front of a McDonald's restaurant at the Wangfujing intersection, not far from the Forbidden City and Tiananmen Square. That day, several dozen demonstrators were matched by about the same number of foreign reporters, plus large numbers of passersby and onlookers (Wangfujing on a weekend is one of Beijing's most jammed areas) and larger groups of uniformed and plainclothes police.

Among the onlookers was Jon Huntsman Jr. with his family. Huntsman, then in his last weeks as the U.S. ambassador to China before returning to run for the presidency, looked like a Chinese pop-culture caricature of a cool-cat American. He was wearing sunglasses—the day was cold but brilliantly clear—and a *Top Gun*–style brown-leather aviator jacket with a big American-flag patch on the left shoulder. He had become a well-known figure in Beijing, from his bike rides around town and his command of spoken Mandarin, and he was quickly picked out by Chinese in the crowd and captured on camera phones in photos and a video that soon spread across the Internet.

Even though Huntsman maintained that he'd been out on a family stroll and happened by the protest inadvertently, no one in China believed that, and the video of him with two strapping sons, misidentified as bodyguards, quickly circulated in China as proof that the United States was engineering the protests. I don't know whether Huntsman's presence was an accident. I do know that having America's senior representative on the scene was damaging, given the hypersensitivity of the Chinese government and many citizens to the merest hint of foreign meddling in domestic affairs. (On the most-circulated video, a Chinese man yells at Huntsman, "You want chaos for China, don't you?") It also illustrated the awkwardness of Huntsman's staying on as ambassador to America's most important partner/rival country while publicly contemplating a run against the president who had appointed him.

Within two days, the street outside the Wangfujing McDonald's had been almost entirely blocked by out-of-nowhere "street repair" construction hoardings. The following Sunday, when the next Jasmine march was supposed to take place, almost no demonstrators appeared in Wangfujing. Instead there were large numbers of foreign reporters and tourists, and countless hundreds of security forces. Jasmine demonstrators in Shanghai mustered a larger showing that day, but that turned out to be a high-water mark. By late February, the Jasmine "movement" was on its way to being decisively shut down.

MY WIFE AND I were in China, mainly Beijing, through February and March, so we had a chance to see how this movement tentatively built itself and was then quelled, at least for a while. One of the realities hardest to convey about modern China (and *Atlantic* readers know that I certainly have tried over the years) is how life there can be simultaneously so wide-open and so tightly controlled. In most of the country and for most people's pursuits, this Chinese Winter that followed an Arab Spring left life looking normal. The economy kept growing; farmers worried about their crops and students about their tests; engineers designed new high-speed rail lines. I was in China mainly to report on the country's big high-tech ambitions, and there was absolutely nothing about my interviews or factory visits that was not business as usual.

Yet for those in China who defined their business as involving politics of any sort, the pressure was intense. First, in February, a large number of the country's human-rights and public-interest lawyers (yes, they exist) were arrested or detained, or were disappeared, in the style of Pinochet's Chile. Once they were gone, people they might have represented and defended—writers, professors, bloggers, activists of many sorts—were arrested or made to disappear too. The Nobel Committee expressed concern not just that the most recent recipient of the Peace Prize, the civil-rights activist Liu Xiaobo, was still imprisoned but that they had not heard anything from him for months. "Signs of tightening control have been visible for several years," Joshua Rosenzweig, a human-rights official in Hong Kong, wrote in March. "But the authorities are now employing a range of new, illegal methods to silence their critics … Most terrifying of all is the way in which enforced disappearance appears to have become almost routine."

Apart from Liu Xiaobo, the Chinese activist best known around the world is the artist Ai Weiwei. Inside China he had, among other causes, sought investigations into the lax building standards that led to thousands of schoolchildren's deaths in the Sichuan earthquake of 2008. On April 3 of this year, as he was about to board a plane in Beijing for Hong Kong, he was detained too. Eventually he was charged with tax evasion, and remained in legal jeopardy even after his release in June. "If the authorities can detain a figure of such stature arbitrarily and hold him incommunicado as long as they want with no access to family or legal counsel, then no one in China is safe from the whims and anxieties of those in power," Wei Jingsheng, who himself had served 15 years in prison for political crimes before being released to the United States in the 1990s, wrote in the *Christian Science Monitor* after the arrest.

I realize that a chronicle of such cases becomes tedious, especially with unfamiliar names. But every day, new names appeared—on foreign news sites, not in the Chinese press—along with other illustrations of a society politically closing up and cracking down. Conferences with international attendees were canceled at the last minute. So too, with one day's notice, was a prestigious annual debate tournament, among teams from 16 leading Chinese universities. The topic, a reconsideration of the ideals set out for China a century ago in the revolution that overthrew the last Qing emperor, in 1911, was deemed too sensitive. Foreign

journalists were one by one called in "for tea," code for a cautionary talk with security officials. Usually the officials warned that the journalists would be expelled if they violated "rules"—some newly imposed, some long on the books but not enforced—requiring advance official permission before interviewing Chinese citizens.

Church meetings were disrupted. Members of "sensitive" ethnic groups—Tibetans, Muslim Uighurs, Inner Mongolians, all of whose home districts had been scenes of ongoing protest—came in for special scrutiny. One day in March, major boulevards in Beijing suddenly were lined with older women, bundled up in overcoats and with red armbands identifying them as public-safety patrols, who sat on stools at 20-yard intervals and kept watch for disruption. They had no practical effect except as reminders that the authorities were on guard and in control.

During the earliest stages of the Arab Spring, the mainstream Chinese media virtually ignored its existence. Then, as the drama in Egypt became un-ignorable, coverage in China emphasized the dangerous chaos and excesses. Then the theme became: whether or not such upheaval made sense for anyone else, it was the wrong way for China and would jeopardize the country's hard-won gains. *Global Times*, a nationalist paper, said of Western protests about Ai Weiwei's arrest: "The West's behavior aims at disrupting the attention of Chinese society and attempts to modify the value system of the Chinese people."

In a way, the most surprising and thoroughgoing change in Chinese daily life was in access to the Internet. As I wrote in these pages three years ago ("The Connection Has Been Reset," March 2008), the genius of China's Internet censorship has been its flexible repression. The filtering system known officially as Golden Shield and unofficially as the Great Firewall made finding unauthorized material just difficult enough that the great majority of Chinese citizens wouldn't bother. Meanwhile, enough loopholes and pressure valves remained open that people who really cared about escaping its confines always could. A very significant loophole took the form of the government's blind eye toward VPNs—"Virtual Private Networks," which gave anyone willing to spend a dollar or two a week safe passage through the Great Firewall. You signed up for a VPN service, you made your connection, and from that point on you prowled the Internet just as if you were logged on from London or New York.

People who could afford VPNs, including most foreigners and many in the Chinese elite, could view Internet censorship as a problem for the country but not personally for them. And most people assumed that this loophole would always stay open—how could universities or corporations do business otherwise? Even the man known in China as the father of the Great Firewall, a computer scientist (and university president!) named Fang Binxing, made waves in February by telling a leading Chinese newspaper that he kept six VPNs running on his computers at home.

That report was soon pulled from the paper's Web site—and at about that same time, serious disruption of VPN activity began. For a while I thought something was wrong with my computer. I'd try to get my e-mail, or to go to a foreign news site—and after a few minutes of waiting, I would realize that the connection was simply not ever going to get through. Part of the Great Firewall's power is that you don't see a message saying "access denied." Things just … don't work, and you can't be sure why. But officials from VPN companies said they were being targeted, in a way they'd never experienced before. "The Klingon Empire scored a couple of solid hits on the USS Enterprise," the CEO of one of the leading VPNs, Witopia,

wrote to his customers in March (along with discreet tips on new ports and connections to try).

The VPN disruption seemed worst on weekends and was sometimes an absolute blackout for hours on end. My own theory, which no one I interviewed could disprove, was that this was a proof of concept for the security agencies—a demonstration that they could cut off channels to the outside world immediately, if the need arose. But even when the system was turned back on, the Internet in much of China was hobbled. If you have spent time in South Korea, Japan, or Singapore, you know that broadband systems there make the typical U.S. "high-speed" connection seem pokey. But China's Internet controls can seem like a return to the days of 1,200-baud dial-up access. After each Web click, it could take five, 10, 30 seconds for a page to appear. "Anyone bullish about China should come and try to use the internet here," an American graduate student named Matt Schiavenza wrote in a frustrated tweet this year. (Twitter, like Facebook and Blogger and many Google services, is unusable in China without a VPN.) Or, as the head of a foreign tech company wrote to me in an e-mail early this year, "Ultimately, if they want to take the country's internet connections 'Third World,' none of us can prevent that."

After the Japanese earthquake in March, Bill Powell, a writer for *Time* who had gone to Fukushima from his base in Shanghai, told me about a site, AllThingsNuclear.org, whose information he considered most reliable and up-to-date. When Powell returned to China, he found that this site too was blocked by the Great Firewall. "What are they afraid of?" he wrote in a Web posting. "Or is the answer simply that these days, they are afraid of EVERYTHING?"

WHAT THE CENTRAL Chinese leadership might be afraid of, and why, is the central political question about China now. The hair-trigger defensiveness of the government's response resembles that of a tottering Arab Spring regime, while overall the nation's prospects could not seem more different from, say, Egypt's. Economically, countries throughout the North Africa/Middle East crescent have been stagnant. China, as you might have heard, has been an economic success. Qaddafi, Mubarak, Ben Ali, and others have governed as if they had a lifetime hold on power. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao were not elected by the public, but they will give up power after two terms.

Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and the like have discontented reserve armies of unemployed young men. Because of its one-child policy, China has, if anything, a shortage of young women and men, relative to the retirees they will have to support. This March, as the Chinese crackdown intensified, the Pew Global Attitudes Project released the results of surveys the previous year in China and Egypt, among other places. The contrast was stark. Twenty-eight percent of Egyptians were "satisfied" with their country's direction, down from 47 percent a few years earlier; 87 percent of Chinese were satisfied, up from 83 percent. Only 23 percent of Egyptians were optimistic about their own life prospects over the next five years, versus 74 percent of Chinese (and 52 percent of Americans). Surveys in China can be suspect, and Pew notes in the fine print that its Chinese survey sample was "disproportionately urban," under-weighting China's rural poor. Still, the general impression that most people in China buy into the prevailing system rings true.

Why, then, has the government reacted as if the country were on the brink of revolt? Do the Chinese authorities know something about their country's realities that groups like Pew have missed, and therefore understand that they are hanging by a thread? Or, out of reflex and

paranoia, are they responding far more harshly than circumstances really require, in ways that could backfire in the long run?

While in China and afterward, I asked everyone I could: Is the government eerily perceptive, or destructively obtuse? There's no proof on either side, but here are the arguments for each view.

Those who think the government has good reason to be worried say that the accumulated tensions—political, economic, environmental, and social—of China's all-out growth have reached an unbearable extreme. By this interpretation, the seeming satisfaction of the Chinese public is a veneer that could easily crack. "If one were to read only the Party-controlled media, one might get the impression that China is prosperous, stable, and headed for an age of 'great peace and prosperity,'" Liu Xiaobo himself wrote, in an essay shortly before he was arrested. (The English version, translated by Perry Link of Princeton, will appear this fall in a collection of Liu's essays and poems, *No Enemies, No Hatred*.) He continued:

Not only from the Internet, but from foreign news sources as well as the internal documents of the regime itself—its 'crisis reports'—we know that more and more major conflicts, often involving violence and bloodshed, have been breaking out between citizens and officials all across China. The country rests at the brink of a volcano.

By June of this year, a wave of bombings, riots, and violent protests at widely dispersed sites across the country illustrated what Liu was warning about. The trigger of the uprisings varied city by city—ethnic tensions in some areas, beatings by police or *chengguan* in others—but they added to a mood of nationwide tension. "With rampant official corruption, inflation, economic disparity, and all sorts of social injustice and political tensions, the threat to the CCP rule is very much real," Cheng Li, who grew up in Shanghai and is now a specialist in Chinese politics at the Brookings Institution, told me this summer.

Five years ago, in his book *China's Trapped Transition*, Minxin Pei argued that China would be hitting a limit of its current economic growth scheme in about seven years' time, or about now. Pei, who is also originally from Shanghai and is now at Claremont McKenna College, in California, said that China's state-led development model would work wonderfully—up to a point. The same traits that made the country a miracle of the infrastructure-and-cheap-exports era would handicap it, he said, when it had to compete in higher-value industries and jobs, as it is now trying to do.

"If you were sitting in Hu Jintao's office, you would see the protests, the ethnic tensions," he told me recently, "and you might think, 'If we are not tough enough, things could quickly get out of control.'" From the central authorities' point of view, according to Pei, there is one clear lesson of Tiananmen Square: "They have learned from past experience in 1989 that you have to be very tough at the beginning, to nip things in the bud. It is much better to have overkill than underkill."

I heard similar sentiments from people now working in China, Chinese and foreign alike. For instance, a well-known economist in China, who asked not to be named, said that the government was worried precisely because it understood the difficulties of the economic adjustments ahead. "There is increasing awareness of how out-of-control the growth model has become, and it will require a sharp adjustment involving a growth slowdown," this person said. "The more aware the leaders are of the strains in the economy, the more worried they

are about the difficulty of the adjustment"—mainly through layoffs, bankruptcies, and other economic shocks.

If, months or years from now, the volcano should explode and the veneer of control should crack, it will be easy to find evidence that this was inevitable all along. When I asked an academic at one of China's leading universities how he would explain the government's harshness, he wrote in an e-mail that the level of public discontent was extreme:

It is hard to get anyone in Beijing under the age of 30 to indicate anything but contempt for the government, and I suspect this is true in a lot of other cities. There really is a sense among young people and college students that everyone is grabbing everything they can, and it is noteworthy that princelings [children of senior party leaders] no longer want to be investment bankers but rather want to be private equity investors. In other words, getting paid millions for your connections isn't interesting anymore. Owning the whole lot is better.

Premier Wen Jiabao is seen as the big-hearted "grandpa" of China, always the first to visit disaster scenes. His son, Winston Wen, has an M.B.A. from Northwestern and has worked in private equity.

The other view is that the situation in China is indeed tense—but that it has always been tense, and that so many people have so much to lose from any radical change, that the country's own buffering forces would contain a disruption even if the government weren't cracking down so hard.

The main reason is that for all the complaints and dissatisfactions with today's Communist rule, there is no visible alternative—in part, of course, because the government has worked so hard to keep such alternatives from emerging. This is a less satisfying side of the argument to advance. You look worse if you turn out to be wrong, and it seems unimaginative to say that an uneasy status quo might go on indefinitely. Still, it is what I would guess if forced to choose.

I asked Chas Freeman what he made of China's current turmoil. He is a former diplomat who served as Richard Nixon's interpreter during his visit to China in 1972. Because Freeman was working during the discussions between Nixon and Zhou Enlai, he knows that one of the most famous stories about Zhou is not true. Half the commencement speakers in America have quoted Zhou's alleged response when asked whether the French Revolution had been a success: "Too soon to tell." Ah, those far-seeing Chinese! In fact, Freeman points out, Zhou was not talking about the French Revolution of 1789. He was talking about the upheavals that began in France in 1968 and had not fully simmered down by the time he and Nixon talked.

When it came to contemporary China, Freeman said that he takes seriously the complaints about economic inequality, ethnic tension, and other potential sources of instability. But, he said, they remind him of conversations he had when living in Taiwan in the 1970s, before Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang party had moved from quasi-military rule to open elections. "People would say they are corrupt, they have no vision, they have a ridiculous ideology we have to kowtow to, but that no one believes in practice," he told me. "And I would say, 'If they're so bad, why don't you get rid of them?' That would be greeted with absolute incredulity." Taiwanese of that era would tell him that, corrupt or not, the party was steadily bringing prosperity. Or that there was no point in complaining, since the party would

eliminate anyone who challenged its rule. The parallel with mainland China was obvious. A generation later, Taiwan had become democratized.

Conceivably, that is what another generation might mean for the mainland—especially if the next wave of rulers are less hair-trigger about security, and more concerned about the lobotomizing effects on their society of, for instance, making it so hard to use the Internet. Which in turn is part of a climate that keeps their universities from becoming magnets for the world's talent, which in turn puts a drag on China's attempts to foster the Apples, Googles, GEs of the future. We don't know, but we can guess that whatever China's situation is, a generation from now, we will be able to look back and find signs that it was fated all along. "People predicted the fall of the Chinese Communist Party in 1989, and it didn't happen," Perry Link told me. "People did not predict the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and it did happen. I'm sure that whatever happens in China, or doesn't, we will be able to look back and say why." If only it were possible to do that now.

Appendix H

Source:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/tunisia/8261961/Tunisia-Why-the-Jasmine-Revolution-wont-bloom.html

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THE TELEGRAPH

Tunisia: Why the Jasmine Revolution won't bloom

16 Jan 2011

Friday's coup in Tunisia sent shockwaves throughout the Arab world. But don't expect it to herald an era of democratic reform, says Richard Spencer

There is a Tunisian proverb that says if an old man is incontinent, his sons will call him wise and full of advice. The family of President Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali, suddenly expelled from their beachfront palaces, may today be wondering if they should have been a little more honest with themselves.

Here is Mr Ben Ali's advice to America on the Arab world, given to a visiting assistant secretary of state in 2008. He was glad Tunisia was in the Maghreb not the Levant, he said – part of stable North Africa, not the fractious Middle East.

Muammar Gaddafi of Libya was "not a normal person", he added. As for Egypt, the Arab world's most populous nation and for so long its cultural beating heart, it had not long to go. The situation there was "explosive", he said. "Sooner or later the Muslim Brotherhood will take over."

It is easy to laugh now, as you read the diplomatic treasure trove that is Wikileaks. It turned out it was Mr Ben Ali himself, the sensible, modernising, outward-looking friend of the West, who was on the way out. On Friday night, as his plane circled the Mediterranean desperately looking for somewhere to put down, did he think back to that conversation and kick himself?

If anyone knows how a dictatorship works, it should be a dictator. So Mr Ben Ali's gross misreading of the situation that culminated in his humiliating flight from an angry mob in downtown Tunis should be a warning. Those now hoping that Tunisia's revolution will herald an era of democratic reform across the region had better be prepared for the unexpected.

It began before the government was actually gone. Some were already calling the events of the last week a "Jasmine Revolution" after the national flower of Tunisia, a not-so-coded reference to the wave of post-Soviet uprisings that swept away similar old guards.

It is an easy thought. For a region whose politics coined the epithet “Byzantine”, what happened this week in Tunisia was remarkably simple. The country has had a successful education system, by both Arab and African standards. The number of its young attending university and tertiary college, 31 per cent, would look good on any international league table.

Lots of foreign investment, mostly from its former colonial power France and fellow inmates of the eurozone, showed what money could do. Unfortunately, thanks to the corruption of the political system and the presidential family, which awarded the contracts to friends and spent the proceeds on foreign luxuries, it did little for those it had educated. So they took to the streets.

And when they did so, they were not the sort of opportunistic flash mob that is easily scared off by tear gas or diverted into the suburbs for a spot of looting. “Ben Ali, thank you, but that’s enough,” was the polite chant of one group of demonstrators.

“On est civilisé,” protested another at baton-wielding cops, using the colonisers’ language to emphasise the point: “we are civilised.”

They were not Islamists, either: though there are no doubt Islamist supporters in the country, they are, by common account, overwhelmingly outnumbered by those who want a more liberal rule, not less.

Many of those involved were the type who could easily be found discussing their PhDs in a Parisian bistro or New York Starbucks. “We want Ben Ali to go,” said Radia Nasraoui, a lawyer. “All we’ve known since he’s been in power has been misery, prisons, torture, repression and unfair trials.”

What must particularly alarm Tunisia’s neighbours is that Mr Ben Ali had done all the things that the better sort of Middle Eastern autocracy has done so successfully for so long. As protests grew, he gave with one hand, doling out subsidies to sugar, cooking oil and other food prices, and took with the other, rounding up the “usual suspects”, such as Hamma Hammami, leader of the local Communist Party.

Abroad, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International put out the usual agonised appeal for personal freedoms to be respected, to a deafening silence from Tunisia’s main backers.

The United States had just voted through another $12 million in military aid. France announced it would be premature to “hand down lessons”. The foreign minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, said the message to Tunisia should be one of “friendship” and offered to send security forces to help “resolve the situation”.

France was also said to be a driving force behind a decision by Baroness Ashton, the EU foreign affairs representative, to continue talks on upgrading relations with Tunisia to “advanced status”.

Still, Mr Ben Ali went. And within hours, opposition forces across the Middle East were seizing their opportunity. As Tunisians gathered outside their embassy in Cairo to celebrate

their regime's passing, young locals joined them. "Listen to the Tunisians, it's your turn Egyptians," they shouted.

Egypt is far poorer and, with 80 million tightly crammed inhabitants, far more overpopulated. Its leader, President Hosni Mubarak, has been in power even longer – 30 years and counting.

Some joked that Mr Ben Ali, whose plane into exile was refused permission to land in a repentant France before heading east to Saudi Arabia, dropped in first on Mr Mubarak's seaside home in Sharm el Sheikh. "Come to stay?" Mr Mubarak asks. "No, come to pick you up," replies Mr Ben Ali.

Ayman Nour, a liberal politician who dared to stand against Mr Mubarak in the last presidential "election" in 2005, earning himself seven per cent of the vote and a five-year jail term, told The Sunday Telegraph that there were many similarities between the two countries.

"The government managed to convince the West it was the only alternative to extremism and terrorism, just like in Egypt," he said. "And until a few days ago, what happened in Tunisia was seen as an impossibility. This has given optimism to dissidents in Egypt."

What holds for dictatorships also holds for the region's other main form of government: absolute monarchy. Saudi Arabia, a misunderstood country, is often seen as torn between its plutocratic, dissolute princes and its plutocratic, Islamist ones. The truth is more complex: as in Tunisia, an attempt to modernise by sending its youth abroad to study has led to the creation of a new class of opposition. New groups like the Association for Political and Civil Rights argue that democracy need not involve ceding power to Islamic fundamentalists. It could cede power instead to economists who can grapple with the implications of a burgeoning population, two thirds aged under 25, with an average income – despite all that oil money – of under $7,000 a year.

As in Tunisia, a generation that has been given no political voice has found one on the web. The government has responded by publishing new rules to police blogs – but these were full yesterday of provocative comments calling for a "celebration of Tunisia's victory".

Yet there is good reason for the nerves clearly displayed by the United States and other Western powers in the face of events in Tunisia. What comes next? The State Department may sneer superciliously at some of the people with whom it does business, as Wikileaks shows, but it is not stupid.

There is one already vibrant democracy in the Arab world, and its government also collapsed this week. You wait decades for a change in government, as they say, and then two coups come at once.

This country was Lebanon, where Hizbollah withdrew its representatives and their allies from a power-sharing cabinet. Saad Hariri, the pro-Western prime minister, is still in office, but hardly in charge. Hizbollah's private army is now the main force in the land, and a government of which it is part is hardly likely to dismantle it. This is not the sort of democratic precedent that the West welcomes.

The days of Pan-Arab nationalism are dead. Though economic stagnation, stemming from a Mediterranean mix of over-reliance on the state and cronyism, may be a common motive, the manifestations of discontent are now very different from country to country.

The main opposition in Egypt, for example, is not Mr Nour, but the Muslim Brotherhood. “The most important lesson here is for your people in the West,” warned Esam el-Erian, a council member, last night. “You must send a message that they depend on dictatorships, pushing strategies that are against the religion of the people.” Today in Jordan, the Brotherhood’s local branch, the Islamic Action Front, will build on events in Tunisia by staging their own sit-in in the capital Amman.

Those Gulf kingdoms that have experimented with more democracy have quickly found Salafi Islamic parties, more radical even than the Brotherhood, claiming seats in legislative assemblies.

If, as some analysts believe, the final dismissal of Mr Ben Ali came when his backers said quietly they could not tolerate further bloodshed, the attitude might be different in a case where the main opposition is vociferously anti-Western.

That does not mean unrest is not coming. In Tunisia, the trigger for the uprising was the suicide of one young unemployed graduate. In other places over three decades there have been other triggers – stolen elections, ethic riots, even, in South Korea in 1987, the arrival of the Olympics.

Many such turning points are on the Middle East’s horizon: presidential elections in Egypt, where Mr Mubarak may or may not decide to stand yet again; riots over food prices in Algeria next door; the threat of war with Israel in Syria and Lebanon. In none of these countries will change come quietly.

Tunisia may be a victim of its own success. “When you have a more educated people they are more demanding,” said Lahcen Achy, an economist at the Carnegie Endowment in Beirut. “They should have thought about upgrading their institutions and politics to match the expectations of their people.”

But other countries with slow-changing institutions are also educating their young. “It all depends on who is quicker, the government or the people,” said Dr Eriani said when asked whether Egypt would have a revolution.

“People cannot wait any longer,” said Maysara Malas, a leader of Jordan’s engineering union, in front of another Amman demonstration. “All the dictators will soon depart.”

And if it is still unclear what will replace them in Tunisia, how much the less so elsewhere.

* Additional reporting by Samer al-Atrush in Cairo