

CAN INDONESIAN POLITICS LEARN SOMETHING FROM KANT?

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ABSTRACT

This presentation asks whether Indonesian politics can learn something from the political ethics of Immanuel Kant. It first recalls Kant's two fundamental principles: "peace thru law" and his "categorical imperative": that human beings must never be treated as mere means to some end. It then reflects on Indonesia's long march to becoming a full-fledged democracy based on respect for human rights, a democracy that now is in crisis. The presentation then returns to the fact, that democracy and human rights were already controversial during the discussions in preparation of Indonesia's independence in 1945. Trying to understand this reluctance the presentation looks into their cultural background, specifically into Javanese ethics of harmony and conceptions of power. This shows that Kant's ethics can, indeed, give a decisive prick to Indonesian political ethics, fortifying it against sliding back into an unethical pragmatism. On the other hand, a reflection on traditional Javanese ethics can even strengthen the foundation Kant gave to his categorical imperative.

SHORTER PROMOTIONAL TEXT:

The Author reflects on the ongoing difficulties Indonesia experiences with democracy and the safeguarding of human rights. He then looks into the cultural background, specifically into Javanese ethics of harmony and conceptions of power, to conclude that Kant's ethics can, indeed, give a decisive prick to Indonesian political ethics, but could also learn something from Indonesia.

DEAR FRIENDS,

This year philosophers the world over remember the birthday of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant in Koenigsberg 300 years ago. I am very happy to have been invited to say something at this seminar. In my eyes, Kant is still the most important philosopher of the last 500 years. Kant has shown to us what we can and what we cannot know, what it means to be not only a decent, but a moral person, and Kant has put some very serious questions regarding religion and belief in God. Whoever philosophizes since Kant has to take a position towards Kant.

TWO PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ETHICS

Here I limit myself to Kant's ethics and political philosophy. I shall ask: Have Kant's ethics and political philosophy relevance for Indonesia? I want to focus on two principles of Kant.

The first is – as Prof. Lutz Bachmann just explained to us – his principle of “peace thru law”. Kant talks about peace between nations, but it is also valid for peace within a nation, peace because the law is obeyed and people are secure.

Kant's idea is as simple, as it is brilliant. It lies in the combination of two ideas: First, there must be a clear moral commit-

ment to obeying the law. But second, that, in a republican form of state, thus in our language, in a democracy, the pragmatic dynamics of "nature" will then make what is morally demanded – commitment to peace – the sensible thing to do. In other words: If there is a clear commitment by the state to always act according to the law, and if the law is just and wise, obeying the law is in the natural interest of the people. Thus they will easily obey it. In short: The state must be a *Rechtsstaat* (based on the law).

The second principle is Kant's categorical imperative in its third form: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only" [429¹]. Thus, a human person must never be treated only as a means for some end, but always as an end in itself. Even for the salvation of 999 people is it ethically wrong, thus it is a crime, to sacrifice one person. It is this principle that underlies the idea of human rights, rights every single person enjoys, that may never be overwritten by any strategic reasoning.

Thus I ask: are these two central principles of Immanuel Kant's ethics relevant for Indonesia?

ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INDONESIA

Of course, they are. But let me start from Indonesian history. Ethical convictions did, indeed, play a big role in Indonesia's becoming a nation. There are three dates that are particularly conspicuous: 1928, 1945 and "Reformasi", 1998-2002.

1928

In 1928 hundredths of youth from all over Indonesia convened in – then – Batavia for the Second Youth Congress. On October 28 they proclaimed their famous Youth Pledge: "First: We, the sons

and daughters of Indonesia, acknowledge one motherland, the land of Indonesia. Second: We, the sons and daughters of Indonesia, acknowledge one nation, the nation of Indonesia. Third: We, the sons and daughters of Indonesia, uphold the language of unity, the Indonesian language."

This was not only a political pledge. It was driven by two strong ethical convictions: That every nation has a right to self-determination, thus that colonialism and the Dutch domination over Indonesia was a great injustice that had to be brought to an end. And that colonialism was exploitation de l'homme par l'homme : Where colonial masters exploited indigenous subjects.²

It was the power of these two ethical convictions that achieved something indeed amazing, something that evaded many other: countries that the people of Nusantara, hundreds of different ethnicities, cultures, languages and religious orientations, living on more than thousand islands, became one Indonesian nation.

1945

In 1945, in preparation for independence, the founding fathers of the nation were asking: On what ideals could this ethnically, culturally dan religiously so divers Indonesia be based? Was it secular nationalism, or was it religion – which would, of course, have meant Islam? It was Sukarno who on Juni 1st gave the answer: Indonesia was neither, it was based on five principles he called Pancasila. These principles where then thoroughly deliberated and found their definitive formulation in the preamble of the Constitution of August 18, 1945, one day after the Declaration of Independence. They are:

- [1] Belief in One Divinity,
- [2] Just and civilized humanism,
- [3] Unity of Indonesia,
- [4] Democracy, lead by the guidance of wisdom in common deliberation/representation,
- [5] Social justice for the whole Indonesian people.³

In Indonesia Pancasila is often called Indonesia's national ideology. I avoid this expression. Since Karl Marx used "ideology" for "false thinking", the word has a bad smell. What is typical for ideologies is their totalitarian character. But Pancasila is in no way totalitarian. Pancasila's five fundamental moral principles have to be constantly translated into political practice, which in a democracy of course happens thru democratic discourse. I call Pancasila the five fundamental values, ideals and ethical norms that should guide Indonesian politics.

1998-2002

Pancasila proved itself in the crisis years 1998 – 2002. At the end of 1997, in consequence of the so-called monetary crisis (krismon) the Rupiah deflated to one tenth of its value, many Indonesians fell back into poverty, local conflicts erupted between different ethnicities, between Muslims and Christians in Eastern Indonesia: people were asking whether Indonesia would break up like Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union? The May 1998 Revolution of the students finally brought down Soeharto after 32 years in power. But what Indonesians call "Reformasi" succeeded. Indonesia did no breakup. The conflicts could be ended, and, finally, democracy, human rights and that Indonesia was a Rechtsstaat ("negara hukum") was put into the Indonesian Constitution (§ 1.c). On the basis of Pancasila.

Has, after more than 50 years, what was demanded by Kant finally became reality in Indonesia?

INDONESIA IN CRISIS?

But now, 25 years after Reformasi, Indonesia's democracy is in serious troubles. Open state support for one of the three pairs of presidential and vice presidential candidates, evidence of serious ballot rigging, made last month's elections the worst elections in the history of Indonesia.

But the decline had already begun much earlier. From the very beginning

Reformasi did not succeed in realizing what was the battle cry of the students that brought Soeharto down: *Brantas KKN*: Bring down corruption, collusion and nepotism. Parliament never succeeded in representing the people that elected them. There is no political Left in parliament. Our parties have no ideological orientation. Parties decayed into representations of the interests of dynasties. To become a member of parliament one needs to put up at least 5 billion Rupiah, about 350.000 Euro. No wonder that many parliamentarians have been convicted of corruption. In Indonesian language: our democracy decayed into an oligarchy. Political parties were rewarded for supporting the government by getting financially rewarding ministries. No wonder that more than 80 percent of parliament were in the government coalition. You never heard a critical voice from parliament.

Six years ago the highly efficient *Corruption Eradication Commission* (KPK) was drawn its teeth by being put under government supervision. Politicians that do not toe the government line can be threatened. At the same time a newly introduced law


on ITE ("Information and Electronic Transactions") opened the way to accuse critics of defamation.

DISUNITY ON DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Why could this happen? Let us go back to July 1945, the discussions on Indonesia's constitution. From the very beginning the assembled members of the BPUPKI (*Council for the Preparation of the Independence of Indonesia*) had difficulties with two points: With democracy and human rights. Individual human rights and democracy with its "one person one vote" smelled of Western individualism. In his famous speech of May 31 Supomo had already declared that the concept of individual human rights smacked of liberalism and individualism and was incompatible with what he called Indonesian collectivism, we would better say, sense of community. While Sukarno famously declared: "We planned in our Constitution the sovereignty of the people and not the sovereignty of the individuum." (p. 9, 13)

Thus, there were no individual human rights put into the constitution and instead of "democracy" they put into Pancasila the almost untranslatable and even for Indonesians difficult to explain "Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan", verbally "relatedness to the people lead by the guidance of wisdom in common deliberation/representation."

To understand where this resistance to the formulation of individual rights comes from, let us have a look at traditional Indonesian culture. I choose the Javanese culture, the cultural background of 40 percent of all Indonesians, the culture Supomo had referred to.



A LOOK AT JAVANESE CULTURE

Ethics of Harmony

For the Javanese, their wellbeing depends on harmonious relations with the three dimensions of their existence: society, nature and the supernatural world (*alam ghaib*). Disturbances in one dimension will be reflected in disturbances in the other two dimensions. Therefore, for the Javanese the central ethical value is *rukun*, living together in harmony. Insisting on one's own ideas and rights is easily regarded as a sign of *pamrih*, of a lack of ethical maturity. One should be prepared – *ikhlas* – to postpone one's own aspirations in favour of what the community decides. Thus *rukun*, harmony, is the central value of Javanese ethics.

The moral ambiguity of ethics of harmony lies in the danger that in the name of harmony injustice could be justified as common interest or by pressure to preserve unity. It is the same danger that is inherent in utilitarian ethics. Here Kant's categorical imperative becomes the prick to stir Javanese ethics out of any too easy acquiescence with "harmony above all". Harmony yes, but never at the cost of injuring the human dignity of a single person.

We come to a similar conclusion if we look at the Javanese conception of power.

The Javanese Conception of Power

In Javanese tradition, political power is not just a relationship between persons, but essentially participation in the invisible, continually creative divine energy that permeates the cosmos. A ruler is a person capable of sucking the numinous energy of the cosmos into himself so that whatever happens in his realm happens through him. Nothing, so to say, moves if not through the

ruler. From the ruler, peace and prosperity stream outwards across the land because he concentrates and directs all available energy.

Power is obtained and preserved in ways that help concentrating on inner power, as fasting, sleep deprivation, sexual abstinence and especially meditating (*semadi*), but also by visiting places with an aura of power like the graves of kings.

When, on the other hand, natural calamities, say the eruption of a volcano (think of the Galunggung! 1982) or a plague of rats, or political and social unrest, hit the country, the Javanese subject will see it as sign of a weakening of the capability of the ruler to concentrate cosmic energy.⁴

The implications of this conception of power are obvious. Power is something physically real, but of numinous quality. It is strictly personal in the sense that it is connected to the person of the ruler. His power is absolute. He did not receive it from the people. He owes them nothing. The ruler is under no obligation to render account of how he uses his power, or better, how power works through him. The ruler is not bound by any law. In the opposite, the law is an outflow of his power.

But this does not mean that the ruler can do anything. In Javanese perspective power is not something neutral, as in the Western view where you can use power for good or bad ends. Power is intrinsically positive. The proof of the genuineness of the power of a ruler is the prosperity, peace and satisfaction of his people. The ruler does not lose his power because of external causes, but because he loses the ability to concentrate divine energy within himself. This happens when he begins to exploit his people and behaves in a tyrannical manner, thus when he abuses his power for his personal pleasure. Exploiting his people would

mean that he has lost the essential perspective that the source of his power lies in his own centre and not somewhere outside. People will interpret such behaviour of the ruler as a sign that his time is up.

But things are not that simple. In the Javanese shadow play, the *wayang*, the great noble heroes, Arjuna, Werkudara, Rama get their power through meditation. But so does Rahwana, the personification of evil who in the end brings destruction upon his subjects. Thus, power and meditation are not in themselves positive. Actually, up to these days people do meditate in order to become powerful, and meditating is, therefore, regarded with suspicion lest it is done in order to get magical powers [C. Geertz 1969, 320]. Thus Javanese know quite well that power can be evil.

But the Javanese understanding of power is still more sophisticated. In every *wayang* performance, there is the *gara-gara* scene which begins at about one o'clock in the morning. In the midst of great commotion, with the hero of the play, often Arjuna, at the centre, four strange figures appear on the stage, completely relaxed, entertaining themselves with all kind of pranks, oblivious to the mounting tensions of the play. They are the *punakawan*, *Semar*, *Gareng*, *Petruk* and *Bagong*. The *punakawan* are the faithful servants of the respective hero of the story, folksy people who speak a coarse Javanese and are masters in mixing gestures of highest feudal respect with obvious derision. The point that all Javanese already know, is that without the assistance of the *punakawan* Arjuna and all the other heroes cannot succeed. Only if lead by Semar the noble knights can fulfil their mission. The nobility of the *Pandawa* shows in the fact that they always respect the *punakawan* and listen to their council.

It is difficult not to call the appearance of the *punakawan* subversive. All the plays of the *wayang* extol the supernatural power and the refinement of the noble knights, but everybody knows that without the *punakawan* they will never succeed. Thus the Javanese know all along that the supposed invincibility of their beloved heroes isn't that impressive: If the *punakawan* are not around, they get lost and they lose.

Now the *punakawan* are common people, village people. But they, in fact, protect their lords. Just by watching them as loving servants would do, keeping mostly in the background, making jokes, but keeping an eye on their lords, they make sure that things go in the right direction. While acknowledging the rulership and power of their lords, Javanese nevertheless know that it is the people from whom they have their splendour. In the same way, the Javanese people, the peasants, will humbly acknowledge the divine splendour of their kings and deliver rice and fruit to the royal court. But only to a point. When their ruler completely loses all sense of decency and oppresses and exploits them beyond what is still bearable, they will rise. They might silently prostrate themselves for days in front of the palace to force the king so face the injustice he is committing, or they might rise up, as they did under the Dutch, often lead by one of them who claimed to be a *Mahdi* or *ratu adil*, a just king.⁵

The Pandawa always treat their Punakawan with respect and love. Their evil enemies, the Kurawa, also have their Punakawan, Togog and Saraita, but they never listen to their advice and in consequence always lose. This means that the way the lords behave towards their *punakawan* shows their moral quality. The *Pandawa* are the good and noble one because they treat the *punakawan* in a good and noble way. And the *Kurawa* are the bad one because they treat their *punakawan* badly. The *Pandawa* win

in the end because they behave morally and the *Kurawa* lose because they are the evil ones.

Thus, ethics do count for the Javanese in judging their lords. The moral quality of their rulers is decisive for judging them. Therefore, the ideology of the god-king or the man with super-human legitimacy who, therefore, stands above being judged on moral terms, is not completely stomachached by the Javanese. The *wayang* shows that the whole idea of supernatural power does not really work out: it is the protection of the *punakawan* that assures victory for the strong, and not their supernatural strength; and it shows that morality is the decisive point of view in judging rulers and heroes.

BACK TO KANT

It seems obvious that a traditional Javanese understanding of power needs time to get used to Kant's "peace thru law", the sovereignty of the law. For the Javanese, not the law, but the powerholder is the point of reference. Thus the king or the sultan. While on the village level Javanese were very familiar with common deliberation and common, let as say, democratic decision making (*musyawarah* and *mupakat*). But both obedience to the king and village deliberation and decision making are person related. And the law is relative to what it achieves. If a decision outside the law would promise a better result, then be it. Therefore, the conviction that "*everything can be arranged*" ("*apa pun bisa diatur*") is deeply rooted in traditional personalized ethics.

It is precisely this kind of pragmatism lies behind the decay of our post-Reformasi democracy. Pragmatism means that what is regarded as conducive to achieving policy goals, is determined by the decision makers. Pragmatism means that the powerful

politicians and capital owners get what they regard as just, and this need not be what objectively is just.

Therefore, Kant's first condition is crucial: a clear moral commitment by the political leadership to obeying the law, on principle. If the law is no longer conducive to solving the problems of the nation, it can and should be democratically changed. But as long as it is valid, it has to be obeyed. It seems clear that Kant's political ethics could kickstart a learning process that could be crucial for the success of Indonesian democracy. From Kant Indonesia should learn to take her own identity as a *Rechtsstaat* seriously.

LEARNING FROM JAVANESE ETHICS?

Now let us take a second look at Javanese ethics. Yes, Javanese ethics are ethics of harmony. Not my interests, but peace and harmony of the community should always be given priority. But how do Javanese learn not to put their personal interests in first place? In the bosom of their family they learn that attitudes like *sepi ing pamrih* (free from selfishness), *ramé ing gawé* (vigorous in fulfilling one's duties) and *nrima* (accepting all that happens to one self in a calm way) are rewarding in themselves because they give inner freedom, the ability to *rela* and *ikhlas* (inner willingness to let go of something if this is necessary), *éling* (remember where I come from and where I shall go to), *pracaya* (to trust), *tresna* (to love), *temen* (to be honest), *adil* (being just), that they should behave in a noble way (*budi luhur*) and care for others (*ngemong*). Javanese experience these non-egoistical attitudes as deeply rewarding. The readiness to put the unity of the community first is nothing heteronomous. It comes from the heart.

Thus the prick of Kant's categorical imperative would not be to introduce some new ethics, but to open the awareness that in a

modern, moving, changing world a person can only be protected from being utilized – something Javanese abhor too - by explicitly stating that a person never should be regarded only as a means to something.

The same holds for the Javanese perception of power. There is an element in the Javanese way of looking at politics that should become a strong bridge between a traditional, feudal perception of power and a republican attitude. This element is the Javanese conviction we saw expressed so clearly in the *punakawan*, that power should be wielded in a moral way, and that this moral way shows, among others, in the respect the rulers show towards common people.⁶ This respect is rooted in a deep conviction that the power of the ruler is, on last account, rooted in the protection and love of their people.

All these attitudes are genuinely moral. And, this is the point, they are not intrinsically bound up to values like harmony although they support them. In the name of these attitudes a Javanese individual, precisely because he or she does really care and really is not willing to do something that is unjust, will have to take a stand even against the group, if this is demanded by the situation. Thus, intrinsically Javanese morals are open to moral courage, honesty and taking a stand against the community in the name of justice. Javanese do not have to stop being Javanese in order to make the Kantian respect for human dignity a cornerstone of their moral convictions.

Let us take a further step. In my opinion there is a blind spot in Kant's reasoning and Javanese ethics can help to overcome it. Kant's whole moral philosophy proceeds from his insight that there is only one thing that is good in itself, and this is *good will*. And good will shows by always acting according to the categori-

cal imperative to act "only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant, 1785, 421). But what if somebody counters: Why should I care? Certainly nobody has ever acted morally only because she thought that her maxim could be made an universal law.

Kant actually gives an answer, although in a strangely casual way, as if not sure how to place it within his system, in his *Critique of Practical Reason*. Not in the main body of his treatise, but in note 4, 5 and 6 where he names the "fact of reason" ("*Faktum der Vernunft*") [Kant 1978, 141, A 56]) that "cannot be denied". Thus that we know already that we should always act in a moral way.

That's all. All his other famous considerations are about concepts: of "the will" against "inclinations", of "maxims", of what is "good", of humans as "rational natures", of "general legislation" and so forth. The result is a thin broth of ethics of duties where people act because of respect for the law, and not because of inclinations. Love as motivation for choosing the morally right, God beware! In the end, Kant's moral philosophy – his theory about the essence of the moral act as developed in the *Groundwork* and the *second Critique* (while in his much later *Metaphysics of Morals* Kant offers a remarkable teaching on moral attitudes) – does not much more than give the criteria for recognizing which maxims are morally acceptable and which are not.⁷ That ethics are about goodness practically gets lost with Kant.

Javanese ethics, on the opposite, are centred on goodness, while "duty" plays only a subordinate part. But goodness not in an abstract way, but as realized in concrete ways through a rich array of moral attitudes that are the sign of a morally mature person, of a person we could trust in, thus of a good person.

Whether it is the readiness to let go of one's narrow egoistical interests, or the attitude of faithfully doing one's duty, the readiness to leave to one's opponent the chance for a new beginning (*téga larané nanging ora téga patiné*, "one might cause him pain, but one does not kill him off"), or the readiness to contribute to the positive atmosphere of the community: All these attitudes include an awareness, that it is by trying to be good that one becomes a noble person. Javanese believe that by developing such attitudes, they develop and mature in their own identity, an identity which, in Javanese eyes, has a depth-dimension, the deepening realization of one's unity with God (*manunggaling kawula Gusti*, the "unity of servant and Lord"). Not by appealing to the law of reason and the duty of rational beings to fulfil their duties for the sake of duty, but by showing how learning to behave morally helps a person to grow, to become his or her own lord, to experience inner peace and a growing positive relation to others, to experience life as more and more meaningful.⁸

Let me put in a last point. Because being moral is not so much a question of making the moral choice but of growing into an positive moral attitude as Iris Murdoch has beautifully shown [1970], we can now understand the central importance Javanese give to the refining of their inner feeling (*ulah rasa*), a point outside the horizon of Kant. Being moral, meaning being good from the heart, honest, just, faithful and so on, and, in consequence taking decisions in a moral way, is realized in an ongoing process of developing an ever finer inner "feeling" (*rasa*), it is a process of inner growing. Feeling for the feelings of the members of their family or their group, for fitting behaviour, for the right word in the right place, for making a point. It is an openness for the world one lives in, a sensitivity for one's surroundings and for oneself in the shine of the Good that is experienced in the *hati nurani*.

CONCLUSION

Let me conclude. Yes, Indonesian politics can learn something extremely important from Kant if we want to rescue our democracy. We still must learn that democracy can only succeed when the law is obeyed on principle, always, without question. Thus, no easy going on the Rechtsstaat. And no backsliding on human rights. Kant's categorical imperative makes instrumentalizing human beings the absolute immoral thing. Let us not gamble away what we have won.

Thus, to say it in Japanese English: *fenkuyu Immanuel*, in Batak Indonesian: *thank you Opung*.

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- ¹ English translation from: I. Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, transl by L. W. Beck, New York/London: Macmillan/Collier Macmillan, 47.
 - ² This conviction became the first paragraph of the "Opening" of the Indonesian Constitution of August 18, 1945: "That indeed, independence is the right of all nations, and therefore, colonialism in the world must be abolished because it is incompatible with humanity and justice.")
 - ³ Allow me to point out a feature of Pancasila which is generally not given attention. Pancasila, on the one hand, is rooted in the cultural traditions of the people of Nusantara. Pancasila is not a foreign import. But on the other hand – something that probably was not even realized by Soekarno (which proves his geniality) – does Pancasila express the most fundamental ethical principles growingly agreed upon by post-traditional societies, expressed in documents like the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* of 1948. They are *freedom of religion*, the *outlawing of the use of violence in order to solve conflicts (beradab)*, *respect for human rights, democracy and social justice*. The only fundamental demand of international ethics not contained in Pancasila, *care for the integrity of our natural environment*, which in 1945 when Pancasila was formulated was still out of the horizon of humanity, could be put into the second principle: civilized (*beradab*) humanism demands civilized behavior not only towards other human beings, but also towards the whole nature.
 - ⁴ I follow, more or less, B.R.O.G. Anderson 1972, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture", in: Claire Holt (ed.), *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 1972, S. 1-69; Soemarsaid Moertono 1968, *State and*

Statecraft in Old Java. A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University; Robert Heine-Geldern 1963, *Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press; and others. I myself have explained the Javanese view of power in: Franz Magnis-Suseno 1981, *Javanische Weisheit und Ethik, Studien zu einer östlichen Moral*, München etc.: Oldenbourg, 84-98 (and translations: *Etika Jawa. Sebuah Analisa Falsafi tentang Kebijaksanaan Hidup Jawa*, Jakarta: Gramedia 1984, 98-113; and: *Javanese Ethics and World-view. The Javanese Idea of the Good Life*, Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama 1997, 100-115).

- 5 See Sartono Kartodirdjo 1973, *Protest Movements in Rural Java. A Study of Agrarian Unrecht in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- 6 I do not enter, here, into the lively discussion during the 20ths of the last century among the Indonesian nationalist movement, among them Sukarno and Hatta, about whether a democratic Indonesian state – which all wanted – could be built from within Indonesian culture. In short: While Sukarno pointed to traditional "village democracy" ("*demokrasi desa*"), as for instance *rembug desa*, as the model from which to build Indonesian democracy, Hatta saw in "village democracy" the starting point for still to be developed modern democratic attitudes, but for the democratic state saw only one model, the western parliamentary one, but extended into the national economy, see "Franz Magnis-Suseno 1995, *Mencari Sosok Demokrasi. Sebuah Telaah Filosofis*, Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, chapter 2.
- 7 Ottfried Höffe [*Immanuel Kant*, München: C. Beck 1983, 202-5] calls "the three pieces of theory: the idea of the absolutely good, the categorical imperative and the principle of autonomy" "necessary, but not sufficient elements of philosophical ethics." The "fact of reason" is the fourth element that shows that morality really does exist.
- 8 Iris Murdoch [Iris Murdoch 1970, *The Sovereignty of Good*, London/Boston, Mass.: Routledge & Kegan/Ark Paperbacks 1985] has shown forcefully and ironically how the focus by Kant and later ethics on the will - where "value" ... is ... attached somehow to the human will – this foot-loose, solitary, substanceless will [16], - a shadow clinging to a shadow. A dreary moral solipsism" [58] - is a misunderstanding of what morality is all about. One becomes moral by opening one's eyes to reality, in the light of the rays of "the good". When the moment of deciding has come, the decision usually has already been made.