Setting Up a Teacher Incentive System: The Case of DKI Jakarta

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Table of Acronyms

Abbreviations	Explanation			
CCTV	Closed-circuit television			
CPNS	Calon Pegawai Negeri Sipil – Candidates of Civil Servant			
КЈР	KJP Kartu Jakarta Pintar – Scholarship for Students from lower income families in DKI Jakarta			
MoEC	Ministry of Education and Culture			
ТК	Taman Kanan-kanak – Kindergarten			
TKD	Tunjangan Kinerja Daerah – Local Performance Allowance			
TPG	Tunjangan Profesi Guru – Teacher Professional Allowance			
PAUD Pendidikan Anak Usia Dini – Early Childhood Education				
PKG Penilaian Kinerja Guru – Teacher and Principal Performance Assessment				
PNS Pegawai Negeri Sipil – Civil Servant				
PRP Performance-Related Pay				
SD Sekolah Dasar – Primary School				
SLB	Sekolah Luar Biasa – Inclusive School			
SMP	Sekolah Menengah Pertama – Lower Secondary School			
SMA	Sekolah Menengah Atas – Upper Secondary School			
SMK	Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan – Vocational School			
SNED	Sistema Nacional de Evaluación del Desempeño Docente - Chile's National System of School's Performance Assessment			
UKG	Ujian Kompetensi Guru – Teacher Competency Assessment			

1. Introduction

Teachers are the most critical factor in the provision of quality education services. In the United States, students with great teachers advance 1.5 grade levels or more over a single school year, compared with just 0.5 of a grade level for those with ineffective teachers (Hanusek, 1992). Teacher quality can matter even more in developing countries (Bau and Das (2017); as cited in the World Development Report 2018).¹ Despite important differences in teacher effectiveness, there is little consensus regarding what determines teacher performance. Education systems across the world have implemented various types of policy actions to improve the performance of teachers. One of the most popular policy interventions is 'merit pay' which has generated considerable debate concerning its effectiveness.

In 2005, Indonesia passed a new 'Teacher Law' (Law No. 14/2005 on Teachers), which aimed to improve the quality of Indonesian teachers, while also launching a massive program on teacher incentives. To improve teacher quality, the Teacher Law included provisions to professionalize the teacher work force by requiring, among other things, that all teachers should have a Bachelor's degree. In order to motivate teachers to improve their credentials and also support teacher wellbeing, incentives were offered for teachers to fulfil a professionalization program, at the end of which the teachers became certified. Once teachers are certified, they then become eligible for the teachers' professional allowance (*Tunjangan Profesi Guru*, TPG).².

Furthermore, some local governments have also established an allowance program to support teacher performance. Some of these allowances are merit-based. One of the major teacher allowance programs established outside the national programs is the local performance allowance (*Tunjangan Kinerja Daerah*, TKD), established by DKI Jakarta. In 2018, the DKI Jakarta government introduced the TKD for all its civil servants (Pegawai Negeri Sipil – PNS)—including teachers—under the assumption that it would contribute toward improving their performance. In the case of teachers, performance is measured by a selected set of variables at individual and group levels. The variables were selected based on their relationship with student learning outcomes, as shown by local and international evidence.

¹ The report highlighted how unskilled and unmotivated teachers was one of the four immediate factors that explained why learning failed to occur.

² A different type of allowance, to motivate teachers to teach in rural, remote and border area schools, the teachers' special allowance (*Tunjangan Khusus Guru*, TKG), was also set up by the central government. The amount of the allowance is equivalent to a teacher's base salary. A teacher who is awarded both the TPG and the TKG will receive a pay check equivalent to three times their base salary.

Box 1: Understanding the difference between teacher professional and performance allowances

Although similar in that both are aimed at improving teacher incomes and wellbeing, the (national) teacher professional allowance (TPG) and the (local) performance allowance (TKD) are implemented differently. The former is designed to provide an incentive for all teachers to improve their competency and awards their certification. All certified teachers, regardless of the status of their employment (PNS or non-PNS), receive the TPG allowance on a continuing basis. Meanwhile, the performance allowance in DKI Jakarta is only available to civil servant teachers (PNS) under the government of DKI Jakarta. This means, therefore, that if a teacher in DKI Jakarta is a civil servant, has met the performance criteria and has achieved certification in his/her subject of teaching, he/she will receive both TPG and TKD.

Table A: Comparison between TPG and TKD							
	Teacher Professional Allowance (TPG)	Local Performance Allowance (TKD)					
Program	All teachers, principals and supervisors	All teachers, principals and					
Coverage	nationwide	supervisors in DKI Jakarta					
Beneficiary	Certified teachers (applies to both PNS	Civil servants of the local					
Eligibility	and non-PNS)	government of DKI Jakarta (applies					
		to PNS and candidate PNS)					
Allowance	Fixed amount, double the basic salary	Varying amount based on a formula					
Amount							
Variables	N/A	- Attendance					
		- Performance					
Regulation	Teacher Law No. 14/2005	Governor's Regulation No. 22/2017					

Table A: Comparison between TPG and TKD

This study reviews the implementation of the TKD program related to teachers in DKI Jakarta to identify any initial behavior changes resulting from the policy. The objective of the study is twofold:

- 1) To identify the level of understanding of stakeholders regarding the performance allowance; and
- 2) To identify the impact of the performance allowance on the performance of teachers and other education staff.

2. Global Evidence on Teacher Incentives

Although there is a wide variety of existing programs, there are three main models of performance-based reward programs that are commonly examined in the literature and are found in education systems. The first model is 'merit pay', which generally involves individual pecuniary rewards based on student performance and classroom observation. The second model is 'knowledge- and skill-based' compensation, which generally involves individual pecuniary rewards for acquired qualifications, and demonstrated knowledge and skills that

are believed to increase student performance. The third model is 'school-based compensation', which generally involves group-based pecuniary rewards, typically based on student performance (Beavis, 2003). Beavis also described arguments that support performance pay, together with arguments against it (Table 1).

Arguments In Support of Performance-Based Rewards	Arguments Against Performance-Based Rewards
The current system is unfair and rewards experience and formal qualifications instead of performance.	Fair and accurate evaluation is difficult because performance cannot be determined objectively.
Performance-based rewards improve the governance of schools by increasing the efficiency of resource allocation.	School administration becomes hierarchical and co- operation between school management and staff is strained.
Performance-based pay motivates teachers to perform at their best.	Performance-based financial incentives do not provide incentives for teachers to improve.
There is increased collegiality between teachers and administration.	There is reduced co-operation between teachers.
Student performance is increased, and teacher quality improves.	A range of perverse outcomes occur because of teacher 'game playing' and a narrowing of the curriculum.
The market provides the best approach for efficient allocation of resources, and this model can be applied to teaching.	The market has no place in education.
Relative to other education reforms, performance- based rewards provide a relatively cost-efficient solution.	To implement a performance-based scheme is expensive and time consuming.

Table 1. Arguments that s	upport and oppose	performance-based rewards
Table 17 agamento that o	appoint and oppose	

Source: Beavis, 2003

Some studies find that there is no link between allowances and teacher performance, or student learning outcomes. Astiti, Wilian and Sridana (2018) find that the teacher professional allowance does not affect teachers' working performance. Parsa (2017) finds that allowances received by SMK teachers in East Nusa Tenggara province did not have any direct positive effect on teacher performance. A World Bank publication entitled "Double for Nothing" (2017) also provides evidence that the national teacher professional allowance program in Indonesia has had no impact on student learning outcomes. A similar study in The Gambia finds no positive overall impact of student learning outcomes resulting from a hardship allowance for teachers, although the zero average effects do hide important heterogeneity, with student learning gains for students at the top of the distribution, and losses for those at the bottom (Pugatch and Schroeder, 2014). Despite these rather disappointing results, Chelwa, Pellicer and Maboshe (2018) find that the allowance increased the number of teachers attendance in rural schools by about 10 percent and succeeded in keeping more

teachers in their schools for the full academic year.³ However, once again, there was no effect on student learning outcomes. Lastly, a recent World Bank publication concludes that there is a wide range of results from teacher incentive programs in terms of educational outcomes, with some interventions reporting significant effects and some reporting smaller or negligible effects. However, the design of the incentive scheme and the context in which it operates seem to play an important role in learning outcomes (Lee and Octavio, 2019).

The Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2009 report describes OECD countries that applied teacher performance-based pay schemes. The report suggests that, in countries where teachers' salaries are relatively small (15 percent of GDP per capita or less), performance pay does help improve learning outcomes, while in those countries that have higher salaries the scheme fails to have any effect (OECD, 2010). The findings from a case study in Andhara Pradesh, India, show that: (i) paying teachers extra if their students do well on tests is highly effective; (ii) individual incentives are more effective than group-based incentives; (iii) incentive bonuses in general work better than giving schools money for extra inputs that are unconditional on outcomes; (iv) not all teachers respond equally to incentive-based pay, with teachers on a higher base pay responding less well to the individual or group-based incentives, while more experienced teachers also do not respond as well to incentives; and (v) performance-based pay schemes can help to attract better teachers into the profession (World Bank, 2010).

Following on from this, a crucial factor in successful teacher incentives is their accountability mechanism. For example, if attendance is one of the key indicators of formula for the teacher allowance, there is a need for a robust measure of accountability to check teacher, principal, and supervisor attendance'. It is not sufficient just to ensure that teachers simply come to school, but a mechanism is also needed to check that teachers are present in the classroom and deliver their lessons, or fulfill their supervision roles. In an intervention in India, researchers found that teacher incentives reduced teacher absenteeism and increased students' test scores, with the teachers' attendance monitored using CCTV (Duflo et al., 2012).

Teachers interviewed for this study also mentioned the fairness of the criteria used for the performance indicator calculations. Several studies that found positive effects for both individual and group-based incentives, report that the latter tend to have less effect.⁴

In Chile, the Ministry of Education implemented a regional teaching excellence award called the National System of School's Performance Assessment (SNED). SNED teaching excellence awards are determined by several criteria, including a school's student grade repetition and dropout rates, equity policies, new initiatives, integration of teachers and parents, and improved working conditions. However, student performance is the primary criteria (65 percent of the award decision). Within a given region, schools with similar student and schoollevel characteristics are divided into homogeneous groups and compete with each other in a rank-order tournament according to their average performance. This has been shown to

³ The study was conducted in rural areas, where teachers often leave school in the middle of an academic year to pursue their careers in urban areas. Teachers who received the incentives tended to stay in rural areas for the full academic year, half a year longer than their peers who do not receive the incentives.

⁴ Cited in Lee and Octavio, 2019.

improve the overall educational attainment and reading performance of the students (Alger, 2014). In the United Kingdom, through a performance-related pay (PRP) incentive scheme in the early 2000s, England and Wales also show similar results using a different set of formulae (Populus, 2013). The PRP system was found to be effective in increasing teacher effort and resulted in higher student learning outcomes. Teachers prefer to be paid based on their performance, measured by annual appraisal (43 percent) and student exam results (29 percent), as opposed to seniority or qualifications. The PRP encompasses four input-based standards related to teaching management and skills, and one standard relating to students' academic progress.

3. The Jakarta Teacher Incentive Program

The Government of DKI Jakarta promulgated Governor's Regulation No. 22/2017 on local performance allowances for teachers and educational staff, which was subsequently revised by Governor's Regulation No. 56/2018. The regulation states the variables, the mechanism and the calculation of the allowances. The objective of the performance allowance scheme is to improve performance, school discipline, welfare and service quality of civil servant teachers.

The recipients of the performance allowance are principals, vice-principals, teachers and supervisors in public schools, together with *penilik* (supervisors in non-formal education) and *pamong* (civil servant teachers in non-formal schools). The variables consist of presence and performance indicators. The composition of the allowance as provided in Table 2.

No	Allowance recipients	Presence	Performance
		(%)	(%)
1	Principals, vice-principals, teachers	70	30
2	Supervisor (formal and non-formal)	60	40
3	Pamong (teacher in non-formal)	50	50

 Table 2. Percentage of presence and performance variables

The presence variable is negative, meaning that when civil servants are absent for any reason, the incentive will be reduced depending on the reason (sick, on leave, or no reason) and the number of days absent. The level of reduction is between 1.0 and 2.5 percent, except if no reason is given, in which case the civil servant will incur a 5.0-percent cut.

The performance variables consist of individual variables and group variables. The details of the variables, including the proportion of each variable, depend on the type of job, i.e., principals are different from teachers, etc. As an example, teacher variables are shown in Table 3.

No	Performance variables	Portion of total performance allocation (%)
1	Teacher competency test	30
2	Teacher performance assessment	30
3	Average examination score	10
4	Improved examination score	10
5	School performance (academic/non- academic)	10
6	Reduction in student misbehavior (bullying, drug	10
	abuse, etc.)	
	Total	100

Table 3. The portion of performance variables for teachers

For each of the performance variables, there is an indicator and rules that enable a teacher to receive more or less depending on their performance on each variable. The total amount of 100 percent of the allowance varies depending on the level of civil servant (*golongan*). The level is usually determined by the number of years of experience, and education and performance assessments. The maximum amount that teachers can receive in the form of allowances are shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Maximum allowance for teacher per civil servant level

No	Level (golongan) of civil servant	Amount (IDR)
1	IV/d – IV/e	9,360,000
2	IV/a – IV/c	9,045,000
3	III/c – III/d	8,910,000
4	III/a – III/b	8,010,000
5	II/a – II/d	6,210,000

The amounts shown in Table 4 are lower than non-teacher/education staff rates, since principals and vice-principals can receive higher amounts than teachers, as shown in Table 5.

No	Level of education	Principal (IDR)	Vice principal (IDR)
1	TK, SLB	11,400,000	10,070,000
2	SD	12,000,000	10,545,000
3	SMP	17,000,000	10,830,000
4	SMA, SMK	19,000,000	11,922,500

Table 5. Maximum allowance for principals and vice-principals per level of education

Performance variables are characterized by individual variables such as the teacher competency test (UKG) and teacher/principal performance assessment (PKG), and group variables such as national examination scores, school achievement in selected competitions, and reductions in student misbehavior (student fights or bullying, etc.). For principals, the variables also include targeting for the scholarships for poor students' program (KJP) and the

school's collective score in the UKG. Data on UKG, PKG, and school examination scores are input into the system by the education office as it compiles data from outside sources (Ministry of Education and Culture, MoEC). Data on KJP targeting and student misbehavior are input by school supervisors.

No	Indicators	Collection mechanism
1	Teacher competency test (UKG)	Collected from national data system
2	Teacher/principal performance assessment (PKG)	Collected from national data system
3	National examination scores	Collected from province data system
4	School achievement in academic competitions	School input on the teacher performance allowance data system
5	School achievement in non- academic competitions	School input on the teacher performance allowance data system
6	Student misbehavior	School supervisor input on the teacher performance allowance data system
7	KJP (scholarship for poor student program) targeting	School supervisor input on the teacher performance allowance data system

Table 6. Performance indicators and the collection mechanism

4. Conclusions

- 1. Most teachers (86.7 percent), vice-principals (78.6 percent) and principals (100 percent) are aware of the performance incentive allowance policy. Although some of them do not know the details of the allowance formula, this is not an issue since they rely on school operators (designated person at the school for data entry) to input their data into the system.
- 2. Teachers on the whole view the incentive scheme positively (on a scale of one to five, the score is 4.43), since they perceive that it serves to increase school discipline, motivates them to improve competency, and supports a competitive spirit. However, some feel that the program have negative effect (on a scale of one to five, the score is 3.09). They perceive that the scheme has no effect on improving teamwork (3.42), there are gaps in the allowances received between teachers (3.29) and that incentives do not have effect on overall school performance (3.29 in scale 5).
- 3. There is no significant difference in the amount of the allowance received by teachers and principals. The main issue for teachers is the share between the attendance variable and the performance variables, which is currently 70:30. Most teachers attend school and, even when they are absent, the allowance deduction is very small. Given the higher proportion awarded to attendance in the formula, this results in no significant difference in the total amount of allowance received. Conversely, the variance in the performance variables is significant. However, given that the portion is relatively small (a total of 30 percent for all performance variables), it does not affect the total allowance received a great deal.

4. Individual variables, for example, the teacher performance assessment (52.2 percent) and the teacher competency test (58.6 percent), seem to contribute more than the group variables in the performance portion, i.e., school achievement (36.8 percent) and increased exam scores (28.2 percent). This is in line with the findings from the case study in Andhara Pradesh, India, that shows that individual incentives are more effective than group-based incentives in improving teacher performance.

5. Recommendations

- 1. The performance allowance has achieved a high level of ownership and receives positive feedback from school members (teachers, principals, and vice-principals). The fact that some of school members did not know the details of the formula suggests that more detailed information needs be provided to allowance recipients. If the government wishes to continue with the program, then there are ways to adjust the scheme which could increase the likelihood that the scheme can meet the intended objectives.
- 2. The share of attendance versus performance variables needs to be revised. Giving a greater weight to performance in the allowance would possibly help to improve the impact on behavior change related to teacher performance.
- 3. The program needs to focus more on variables that have a direct link to the individual performance of school members and less on group variables in the performance portion. It does not mean that the group variables are not important, given that this is the first year of implementation of the program. However, the program needs to find group variables that have a more direct link to individual performance.

6. Approach and Methodology

A survey was implemented in 2019 to assess the familiarity of the key stakeholders in DKI Jakarta with the performance incentive scheme and to identify potential behavior changes as a result of the scheme. Fieldwork included 90 schools across education levels, with respondents consisting of principals (15 respondents), vice-principals (15 respondents), supervisors (15 respondents) and teachers (45 respondents). For each level of education, consisting of elementary (SD), junior secondary (SMP), senior secondary (SMA), vocational senior secondary (SMK), and schools for children with disabilities (SLB), three principals, three vice-principals, and nine teachers were selected randomly for the survey. Stratification was based on school size, categorized into large, medium and small schools. The distribution of the sample is shown in Table 7.

Education		School	size				Responder	its	
Education Level	Small	Medium	Large	TOTAL	Principals	Vic-	Teachers	Supervisor	TOTAL
						prin.			
SD	1	1	1	3	3	3	9	3	18
SMP	1	1	1	3	3	3	9	3	18
SMA	1	1	1	3	3	3	9	3	18
SMK	1	1	1	3	3	3	9	3	18
SLB	1	1	1	3	3	3	9	3	18
Total	5	5	5	15	15	15	45	15	90

Table 7. Sample of the study

The study evaluates the implementation of the teacher allowance program in 2018, the first year of program implementation.

5. Findings

1. Awareness of performance allowance policies

Awareness among stakeholders is essential if the policy is to lead to its intended behavior changes. Without knowing the details of the program, how it works, and what the policy impact is supposed to be, those targeted by the program will behave as in a business-as-usual scenario. As such, principals and teachers who are unaware of the existence of the TKD program will not modify their efforts or teaching behavior, thus undermining the amount of incentive payments that they might ultimately have received.

Were they aware of the policy? Most teachers and vice-principals, and all principals, knew about the performance incentive allowance policy. The provincial education office (*Dinas Pendidikan DKI Jakarta*) seems to have been effective in disseminating the new policy to schools through a major information campaign. While its website was not effective in

informing stakeholders of the policy, the use of mass-media seems to have been more effective.






Figure 1. Knowledge of allowance policy






Were they aware of the formula that generates the incentive? To calculate the performance incentive allowance, a different formula it used for each type of recipient. The beneficiaries can learn more about the formula from DKI Governor Regulation No. 22/2017 and it is included in the application process. An allowance recipient reports all the necessary data in his/her application and can then calculate the allowance he/she should receive based on the information provided for each variable. An understanding of which formula is used and how the allowance is calculated are important to the effectiveness of the program.

The study found that only about 55 percent of teachers, 64 percent of vice-principals and 80 percent of principals knew how to calculate their respective allowances. For the remaining allowance recipients, it is likely that many simply allowed the school operators to help them input their applications.

Figure 3. Knowledge of allowance formula



Although many allowance recipients did not know how to calculate their allowance from the formula, they nonetheless seem to have had few difficulties in knowing the amount they should receive. This is because most allowance recipients receive help from school operators with the application process and the process also tells recipients the amount they could receive based on the information reported in the system, even if they do not know how to calculate it.

Difficulty in calculating variables		Not difficult (%)	Quite difficult (%)	Difficult (%)
Attendance	Teacher	95.56	2.22	2.22
	Vice-principal	85.7	0.0	14.3
	Principal	93.3	6.7	0.0
Performance	Teacher	88.89	4.44	6.67
	Vice-principal	85.7	7.1	7.1
	Principal	93.3	6.7	0.0

Table 8. Level of difficulty in calculating the variable

Can they provide the required information for the formula calculation? To calculate the performance incentive allowance, teachers and other recipients need to input their details into the online system developed by DKI Jakarta Government. Some applications related to the allowance consist of e-absensi (to note attendance), e-kinerja (to input the performance variables), and e-tkdbkd.jakarta.go.id (for all variables). The study shows that most teachers and vice-principals, and all principals were familiar with the application process. However, about 10 percent of teachers and seven percent of vice-principals had problems using the application.

No	Level of difficulty	Teachers (%)	Vice-principals (%)	Principals (%)
1	Easy	88.89	92.86	100
2	Quite difficult	2.22		
3	Difficult	8.89	7.14	

Table 9. Difficulties in operating the application

2. Perceptions regarding the formula

Adequacy, complexity and fairness. Most teachers said that the number of variables was adequate, while only a few teachers said that the variable number was too small and a few thought additional variables should be included. Some teachers thought that the formula was rather complicated (22 percent) and needed to be fairer (22 percent).

	Less (%)	Enough (%)	More (%)	Too much (%)
Adequacy of the variables	8.89	86.67	2.22	2.22
	Simple (%)	Quite complicated (%)	Complicated (%)	Very complicated (%)
Complexity of the variables	71.11	22.22	4.44	2.22
	Yes (%)	No (%)		
Fairness of the variables	77.78	22.22		

 Table 10. Teacher perceptions regarding the formula

Perceptions of TKD. The study asked respondents about their perceptions of the performance allowance program using a scale from one to five to express their opinion regarding the impact of the allowance. On the positive side, respondents felt that the allowance was very helpful in terms of their behavior, such as imposing better school discipline, improving teaching competency and increasing incomes. However, using the additional income to buy learning tools seemed to be the lowest priority.

This finding may signal how recipients respond to the formula's incentive. Since the largest portion of the incentive comes from attendance, improving their attendance is foremost in the minds of teachers. While supporting competitiveness and motivation to improve teacher competency comes next, if the main objective of the program is to improve teacher performance and student learning outcomes, then this will need to come first. Teachers need to be motivated to improve their competency and focus more on student learning outcomes, but the formula can only provide this incentive if the weight of this incentive is increased.

Table 11. Perceptions regarding the allowance

No	No Perceptions regarding the allowance		Std. Dev.
	Positive opinions		
1	Increases discipline	4.71	0.51
2	Motivates to improve competency	4.62	0.53

3	Supports competitive spirit	4.60	0.54
4	Encourages to do the best thing	4.51	0.63
5	Improves income significantly	4.51	0.59
6	Increases productivity	4.47	0.59
7	Motivates to work longer	4.38	0.68
8	More focused on learning outcomes	4.33	0.64
9	Increases teamwork	4.24	0.71
10	Use the money to buy learning tools	3.89	0.83
	Average	4.43	
	Negative opinions		
1	Teamwork is same as before	3.42	1.42
2	High gap in allowances among teachers	3.36	1.61
3	No significant impact on school performance	3.29	1.50
4	The allowance formula is not fair	3.18	1.47
5	The allowance is not enough to achieve behavior change	3.13	1.39
6	Do not agree with the score used in the formula	3.13	1.56
7	No relation between performance and allowance	3.07	1.64
8	It is unfair as young teachers can receive more than older teachers	2.87	1.56
9	The allowance payments are too high	2.76	1.48
10	Increases unhealthy competition	2.69	1.77
	Average	3.09	

On the negative side, regarding the fairness of the formula, the impact on performance and the lack of progress in school timework, respondents seemed ambivalent, or had no strong opinions on these issues. Looking at the scores, it can be concluded that teachers felt that the allowance was ineffective in improving school teamwork, although the group variables were supposed to improve this aspect. Teachers also felt that the difference between the allowances that teachers received was too wide.

Looking at the averages, it can be said that teachers interpret the performance allowance more positively than negatively in regard to the effect on their behavior.

3. How are the allowances received?

What teachers actually receive. Teachers and other school staff receive the allowance on the 22nd/23rd of every month. No teacher received the maximum amount of the allowance, i.e., scored 100 points for each variable and in total. It is difficult to score 100 points on the teacher competency test and teacher performance assessment. Note too that only a few schools can win awards in academic or non-academic competitions. On average, teachers scored about 90 percent of the allowance, with a seven percent standard deviation.

No	Month	Teachers	Principals
1	November 2018	89.8 (7.52)	89.4 (6.5)
2	October 2018	90.4 (7.62)	88.0 (6.7)
3	September 2018	89.9 (7.47)	89.9 (6.4)

Table 12. Percentage of allowance received and the standard deviation

The scatter plot in Figure 4 shows the link between performance allowance and teacher quality. We approach teacher quality with school size, assuming that the higher the school size (and thus more teachers), the higher the quality of teachers. The figure shows that most teachers received the same allowance. It also shows that the linear regression line (Fitted values) is almost inelastic (flat), indicating that the difference in quality does not correlate with allowances.




Figure 4. Scatter plot of teacher allowance received and number of teachers

It seems that the difference in allowances received by school staff are relatively modest compared with their total compensation package additional money they receive. The difference between a member of staff who invests significant effort in order to receive a larger allowance, and one who does nothing or continues as normal, is about 10 percent of the allowance. When other compensation elements are factored in (basic salary, TPG, TKD), the variance between the top and bottom performers in terms of incentive is only about 3 percent of a teacher's total compensation. In terms of the capacity of the incentive system to bring about significant behavior change, this difference is simply not large enough.


The variation of allowance variables

These findings show that the variations in allowance received are not large. The gap between the amount received by teachers with low scores and the maximum allowance for scores of 100 points among teachers are not very important⁵. The follow-up question then becomes: is the variation linked to the share of the variables, or the type of variables?

As described before, two components contribute to the allowance: presence variables and performance variables. Presence contributes 70 percent, while performance contributes only 30 percent. Presence is measured using negative variables, which means that being absent for any reason will result in a reduction in the allowance received by a certain percentage. Performance variables consist of both positive and negative indicators.

Share of attendance variables

Most respondents, including teachers, principals, and vice-principals in the study, receive 100 percent of the attendance allocation, as they are not absent for any reason. When a member of staff is absent, his/her allowance is reduced accordingly. The data show that the deductions are not significant, at around only 3 percent, or about IDR 180,000, of the maximum allowance of IDR 6,000,000. However, the fact that only a small number of teachers, principals and vice-principals are absent shows that they almost always attend school.⁶ Since the portion of attendance in the total allowance is 70 percent, the dynamic of this variable has a stronger influence on the dynamic of the total allowance. It appears that the low variance in the allowance is because of the low variance in teacher attendance.





⁵ Comparison is made between the actual allowance received by the teachers (findings) and the ideal range determined by the regulation, which should be between IDR 6,210,000 to IDR 11,922,500.

⁶ Most public schools in DKI Jakarta use finger print mechanisms to report presence.

The standard deviation is almost zero (1.14 percent), which means that most teachers are strongly skewed toward the average, which also means almost full percentage attendance allocation, as there is no significant variation in teacher attendance. As seen in Figure 5, most teachers attend schools and hence receive 100 percent of their allowance for the attendance component of the incentive.






Figure 6. Percentage of attendance allocation received by principals

Similarly, the standard deviation for the attendance allocation for principals is 0.85 percent. Such a small standard deviation means that the variation of the data for principals is also not significant.





The standard deviation is 2.47 percent for vice-principals, which is likewise modest and means that the variation of the percentage attendance allocation for vice-principals is also not too significant.

Share of performance allocation


The study found that the allowances received by teachers and principals mostly comprise the individual variables. For teachers overall, most teachers received part of their allowance for their performance against the variables for the teacher competency test (60 percent of


teachers) and the teacher performance assessment (50 percent), while for principals, beside both of these variables, the KJP targeting also contributes significantly to their allowance.

No	Indicators	Collection Mechanism
1	Teacher competency test (UKG)	Collected from national data system
2	Teacher/principal performance assessment (PKG)	Collected from national data system
3	National examination score	Collected from province data system
4	School achievement on academic competition	School input on the teacher performance allowance data system
5	School achievement on non- academic competition	School input on the teacher performance allowance data system
6	Reduction in student misbehavior	School supervisor input on the teacher performance allowance data system
7	KJP (scholarship for poor student program) targeting	School supervisor input on the teacher performance allowance data system

Table 13. Performance indicators and the data-collection mechanism⁷

Among the performance variables, some contribute more than others to the allowance received. For teachers, it seems that the teacher competency test and the teacher performance assessment contribute most to the allowance (totaling about 60 percent of the total allowance). While for principals, the principal performance assessment and whether the scholarships for poor student program (KJP) is well targeted are major contributors to their allowances.








Figure 9. Contribution of each variable of performance allocation (principals)

These data show that the gap between the maximum score and the real score is relatively wide. The differences in scores that lead to different allowances are also significant. However, given that the performance portion of the total allowance is only 30 percent, these significant differences impact the total allowance proportionately less. This is why the dynamics in the performance variables do not contribute sufficiently toward the total allowance.

Box 2: Improving the formula of the teacher performance allowance: What should it look like?

The team managed to obtain anonymized population data of teachers receiving the TKD allowance between March and December 2017. Using this dataset, we tried to measure the extent of the causal impact of each component on the allowance amount received by program recipients. Below is a summary of the statistics of the components factoring in the TKD of teachers in November 2017.

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Attendance	98.80	4.18	11	100
Teacher Competency Test (UKG)	10.54	8.70	0	60
Teacher Assessment (PKG)	20.99	6.09	0	40
National Exam	5.11	3.89	0	20
National Exam – Increment	3.65	3.75	0	30
Non-academic Achievement	6.21	4.85	0	15
Student behavior	9.49	2.19	0	10

Table A. Summary statistics of TKD components for Teachers, November 2017

Data from 23,495 teachers in DKI show that they would receive an average of IDR 8,768,129 as their nominal allowance baseline, i.e., this is the maximum amount they would receive if they were to get full marks on both the attendance and performance components. Using the above information, a simple simulation was conducted to see the variation in allowances received by three hypothetical teachers: Teacher A with an average score for all components as described in Table A, Teacher B with a similar attendance level, but performing 10 percent less than Teacher A, and Teacher C who has 10 percent lower attendance compared with both teachers, but performing similarly to Teacher A. The allowance outcomes are shown in Table B.

Table B. Simulation of TKD allowance in DKI Jakarta

	Teacher A	Teacher B	Teacher C
a. Attendance	98.80	98.80	88.92
b. Teacher Competency Test (UKG)	10.54	9.49	10.54
c. Teacher Assessment (PKG)	20.99	18.89	20.99
d. National Exam	5.11	4.60	5.11
e. National Exam – Increment	3.65	3.29	3.65
f. Non-academic Achievement	6.21	5.59	6.21
g. Bullying, student brawling, etc.	9.49	8.54	9.49
<i>h</i> . Share of Attendance (70% x a)	69.16	69.16	62.24
Allowance portion of attendance	6,063,971	6,063,971	5,457,573
<i>i.</i> Share of Performance $(30\% \times (b + c + d + e + f + g))$	16.80	15.12	16.80
Allowance portion of performance	1,473,195.69	1,325,876.12	1,473,195.69
Total Allowance Received (h + i)	7,537,166	7,389,847	6,930,769
Proportion to the current scheme	100%	98%	92%

Based on the simulation above, we see that although Teacher A performs 10 percent better than Teacher B (based on the six factors of performance), the allowance received by Teacher B is only two percent smaller than the amount received by Teacher A. However, due to having a 10 percent lower attendance rate, Teacher C receives an allowance which is eight percent lower. This simulation highlights how the current formula failed to provide sufficient incentives for teachers to improve their performance. Since attendance matters more, teachers will receive a relatively full amount of their allowances as long as they have full marks for their attendance. From Table A we can also see that the variation in teacher attendance is relatively small, signaling low absenteeism rates of civil servant teachers in DKI Jakarta. That said, it is time for DKI Jakarta to think about putting greater weight on teacher performance, in the hope of improving student learning outcomes.

4. Do teachers self-report improvements in performance?

Do teachers feel that the allowance amount they receive affects their performance? Respondents of the study were asked to evaluate their perceptions of the program and its relationship to their performance improvement. The responses were recorded as a binary value: YES, if they thought their performance had improved since they received the TKD allowance, or NO, if they thought there was no performance improvement because of the program.

The exercise below shows that, based on the sample data collected in the study, there is no link between the size of allowance and teacher performance. The only variable that shows a statistically significant value is the gender variable. Male teachers have a higher probability of reporting performance improvement than their female colleagues. Other factors, such as a teacher's educational background or their level as a civil servant, as well as the size of schools, proxied using the number of teachers, showed insignificant values. Note that teacher performance here is the perception of the teacher himself/herself of their performance.

Variables	Coef.
Allowance amount	0.009
Number of teachers in schools	-0.002
Gender (1=male, 0=female)	0.449***
Education background	-0.091
Age	0.178
Age (square)	-0.002
Teaching experience	-0.019
Civil servant level	0.094

Table 9. Variables influence on teacher performance

Y=teacher performance assessment: 1= improve, 0 = not improve.

***Sig. at 0.001

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Annex 1: Teacher's Questionnaires

PART A: IDENTITY OF SCHOOL /INSTITUTION

Instruction:

- <u>II.</u>
- 1. Complete and circle the corresponding answers provided by respondent's answer
- 2. Fill in the respondent's answer to the closed essay question in the available column

3. On open interview questions, enumerator writes notes according to numbers or letters by respondents answer that are clear and easy to read.

INTERVIEW BEGINS AT: ____. (WIB/WITA/WIT) * NPSN (National School Principal A.1 Number) A.2 Name of School A.3 School Level / Educational 1. Kindergarten 2. Primary Education Kindergarten Junior High School Institution Level 4. Senior High School 5. Vocational High School 6. School for Children with Disabilities A.4 School Status/Institution 1. Public 2. Private A.5 School Address A.6 Sub-District/District A.7 Regency/City A.8 Province Number of Students A.9 Kindergarten/Early Childhood Education Α. (Choose the relevant school level) 1. Ages 3-4 years old ____ Number of Class Parallel ____ 2. Ages 4-5 years old ____ Number of Class Parallel ____ 3. Ages 5-6 years old ____ Number of Class Parallel ____ **B.** Primary Education School 1. Grade I: ____ Number of Class Parallel _ 2. Grade 2: ____ Number of Class Parallel ____ 3. Grade 3: ____ Number of Class Parallel ____ 4. Grade 4: ____ Number of Class Parallel ____ 5. Grade 5: ____ Number of Class Parallel ____ 6. Grade 6: _____ Number of Class Parallel C. Junior Secondary School 7. Grade 7: ____ Number of Class Parallel ____ 8. Grade 8: ______ Number of Class Parallel _____ 9. Grade 9: _____ Number of Class Parallel _____ D. Senior High School/Vocational High School 10. Grade 10 : ____ Number of Class Parallel ____ 11. Grade 11 : ____ Number of Class Parallel ____ 12. Grade 12 : ____ Number of Class Parallel ____ E. School Children with Disability 1. Primary School Level ____Number of Class Parallel ____ 2. Junior Secondary School Level ____Number of Class Parallel ____ 3. Senior High School Level ____Number of Class Parallel ___ A.10 Number of Teachers A.11 Number of Extracurricular activities Number of School Award A.12 1. District Level a. Field ______year___ b. Field ______year_____ c. Field ______year_____ 2. Provincial Level a. Field ______year_____ b. Field ______year_____

c. Field

year

3. National Level	
a. Fieldyear	_
b. Fieldyear	_
c. Fieldyear	_
4. International Level	
a. Fieldyear	_
b. Fieldyear	_
c. Fieldyear	

	PART B: RESPONDENT IDENTITY				
Instructio		ling answers provided by respondent's answer			
	•	nerators write notes according to numbers or letters by respondents			
	wer that are clear and easy to re				
B.1	Name				
B.2	Sex	1. Male			
		2. Female			
B.3	Education History	A. S1, Course:Year of grad			
		B. S2, Course: Year of grad			
		C. S3, Course: Year of grad			
B.4	Age	years			
B.5	Marital Status	2. Single 2. Married 3. Widowed/er or divorced			
B.6	No Tel. /Mobile Phone				
B.7	Level of employing school	1. PAUD/TK/SLB 2. SD			
		3. SMP 4. SMA 5. SMK			
B.8	Name of School				
B.9	Employment status	1. CPNS/Civil Servant Candidate			
		2. PNS/Civil Servant			
B.10	First year as a Civil Servant				
B.11	Category/level	1. II/a - II/d			
		2. III/a – III/b 3. III/c – III/d			
		4. IV/a – IV/c 5. IV/d – IV/e			
B.12	Length of service as a teacher	year(s) month			
B.13	Current position				
B.14	Length of service in current position	year(s) month			

	ruction:			
1. 2.	•	esponding answers provided by respon er to the closed essay question in the a		
2. 3.	-	enumerators write notes according to		respondents answer tha
0.	are clear and easy to read.		indifficers of fetters by	
	Question	Respondent's Ans	wer	Enumerator Remarks
1.	Are you aware of the Governor's regulation regarding Regional Performance Allowances for Principals, Deputy Principals of Teachers, School Supervisors, and pamong belajar (nonformal education teachers) ?	1. Yes 2. No		
2.	When were you <i>first</i> aware of the Regulation of Jakarta Governor on Sub National Performance Allowance for School Principals, Deputy Principals, Teachers, Supervisors, Overseers and Pamong Belajar?	 2017 2018 Just recently Don't know 		
3.	How did you know about the Jakarta Governor Regulation?	 A. Dinas Pendidikan/Education Age B. Other government agencies; specify C. Peers, specify D. Media, specify E. Website/Internet F. Others, Specify 	······	
4.	Do you have copies of regulatory documents related to regional performance benefits (TKD)?	1. Yes 2. No		
5. W	/hat regulations or	Regulations on TKD	Understanding	
d	ocument(s) do you have	A. Pergub DKI No. 409 of 2016	1 2 3 4	
	opies of, related to the	B. Pergub DKI No. 149 of 2017	1 2 3 4	
	erformance Allowance of DKI	C. Pergub DKI No. 22 of 2017	1 2 3 4	
Ja	Ikarta?	D. Ingub DKI No. 129 of 2016	1 2 3 4	
		E. Technical guide of TKD	1 2 3 4	
u re (1 2:	ow would you assess your nderstanding of these egulations/ documents? .=don't understand at all, =don't really understand, =understand, 4=fully	calculation F. Others, specify	. 1 2 3 4	

6. How did the government	Types of disseminat	tion of information	n Freg	Jency
provide information for you?	A. TKD-specific diss			1
. ,	-	with other schools		
		f information on th		
	policy and other	policies		
	C. Explanation from	n Education Agenc	cy	<u> </u>
	Team (with head	d of department,		
How many times was	section, supervis	sors, etc.)		
information provided	D. Information thro	ough website		
(frequency of information	E. Others, specify			
dissemination)?				
7. What applications do you	Application		unction	
use related to allowance	Application	r	unction	
(TKD) for Teacher and	A. e-Absensi			
Education Staff?				
	B. e-Kinerja			
	C. e-KP			
	D aTkdbkd iakarta c	ro id		
	D. eTkdbkd.jakarta.g	j0.10		
	E. Other,			
		·		
8. How difficult is it for	Level of Difficulties	Explanati	on	
you to use the app?	1. Not Difficult	•		_
	2. Quite difficult			_
Give an explanation regarding				_
your answer.	3. Difficult			
				_
	4. Very Difficult			
<u> </u>				
9. What are the attendance	Indicator of prese		Yes	No
components and indicators in TKD for Teacher	calculation of latest			
Assessment?	A. Absence without B. Absence with pe			
Assessment:	C. Sick	1111551011		
	D. Leave			
	E. Sabbatical leave			
	F. Leave for import			
	G. Sick leave			
	H. Maternity leave			
	I. Hours late (hour)		
	J. Hours of early re	-		
	K. Others:	(
		I		

10. What are the components and indicators of work performance of TKD for the Teacher's assessment?	Work performance indicator (for the calculation of latest received TKD) A. UKG B. Assessment of Teacher Performance Performance C. School's Academic Performance Performance Improvement of National Exam Absolute Final Score D. School's Non-Academic Performance Performance D. School's Non-Academic Performance Performance O. School's Non-Academic Performance Performance O. School's Non-Academic Performance Performance O. School's Non-Academic Performance Performance of OSN, O2SN, FLS2N, LKS, etc. Subse, Bullying, financial Subse, Bullying, financial	Yes	No	
 Other issues related to knowledge/socialization of TKD Teacher and Education Staff 	collection levied on the student by school (Per Month) E. Others:			

	PART D: 0	CALCULATION AND INPUT O	FTKD	
 Fill in the respondent's On open interview que that are clear and easy 	answer to the close estions, enumerators	wers provided by responder ed essay question in the avai s write notes according to nu	lable column	
Question		Respondent's Answer		Enumerator Remarks
 Do you know how to calculate TKD for teachers? How do you know? If you don't know, who assisted you in TKD calculation? 	1. Yes 2. No			
2. In 2018, when was the	Month	Amount of TKD/ month	Frequency	
last time you receive	1. August			
TKD?	2. September			
	3. October			
	4. November			
For how many months did	5. Other			
you regularly receive TKD?				

3. What are the	Component		Dorcor	tago
components and	A. Presence		Percen	llage
percentages considered	B. Work Performance			
for your TKD	C. Others, specify			<u> </u>
calculation?				
. For presence (absence)	Indicator of presence (for th	e calculation o	of Nu	mber of
component, please	latest TKD receiv		day	ys/hour
complete the indicators	L. Absence without perm			
used to calculate the	M. Absence with permission	on		
presence component of your TKD per latest TKD	N. Sick			
in 2018	O. Leave P. Sabbatical leave			
	Q. Leave for important ma	attors		
	R. Sick leave	atters		
	S. Maternity leave			
	T. Hours late (hour)			
	U. Hours of early return (I	hour)		
	V. Others:			
. For work performance,	Work performance indicator	r (for the	%	Values
please complete the	calculation of latest received	J TKD)		
indicator values that	F. UKG			
were used to calculate	G. Assessment of Teacher			
the work performance	Performance			
component of your TKD per latest TKD in 2018	H. School's Academic Performance			
	- Calculation of National Exam Absolute Final Score			
	- Improvement of National Exam			
	Score			
	I. School's Non-Academic			
	Performance			
	- Performance of OSN, O2SN,			
	FLS2N, LKS, etc.			
	- Number of Brawls, N			
	Abuse, Bullying, fina collection levied on			
	by school (Per Mont			
	J. Others:	,		
6. Did you experience	Level of Difficulty	Expla	nation	
difficulties in	1. Not Difficult	-		
calculating the	1. Not Difficult			
attendance aspect of				
TKD? If there are	2. Quite difficult			
please explain what difficulties are faced				
	3. Difficult			
	4. Very difficult			

7. Did you experience	Level of Difficulty	Explanation	
difficulties in	1. Not Difficult		
calculating aspects of			
work performance in TKD? If there is,	2. Quite difficult		
please explain what	3. Difficult		
difficulties are faced	5. Difficult		
	4. Very difficult		
8. Who is involved in	Parties Involved	Function	-
assessing or	A. School Supervisor		-
calculating aspect of	B. B. Pusdatikomdik (Center	of	-
work performance in	Data and Education		
TKD, before	Communication		
inputting?	Information Technology)		-
	C. Suku Dinas Pendidikan (Su	b	
	Educational Office in the		
	City) D. P2KPTKK (Center for the		-
	Development of		
	Competency of Teachers,		
	Educational Personnel and	1	
	Vocational Program)		
	E. Personnel of School data		-
	operation		_
	F. Others		_
9. What are the steps	Describe the TK	D Input Scheme	
and process to input			
data on the TKD system?			
system			
Give details of the			
process			
Provide separate paper			
if needed			
10. What is the task of	A. Assist in inputting data		
school operator, relative to the TKD	 B. Assist in calculating achiev C. Estimate/predict result of 	vement (data) for each variable	
GTK System?	D. Others		
GTK System:			

	PART E: QUALITY OF TKD DATA	
•	e corresponding answers provided by respondent's answer answer to the closed essay question in the available column	
that are clear and easy	estions, enumerators write notes according to numbers or letters to read.	
Question	Respondent's Answer	Enumerator Remarks
 How sufficient are the components and indicators used to calculate TKD GTK in assessing your performance? 	 Insufficient Sufficient Numerous Too Numerous 	
Please explain your answer!		
 How complicated is it to calculate TKD values in assessing your performance? Please explain your answer! 	 Easy Quite complicated Complicated Highly complicated 	
 Do you think the TKD formulation is (meaning, all have equal opportunity to achieve the highest value) Please explain your answer! 	1. Yes 2. No 3. Don't know	
 4. Do you know the status of the assessment of your performance variables? Please explain your answer! (how, when) 	1. Yes 2. No	
5. How do you get information on allowance resulting from your performance assessment?	 A. Education Office/Dinas Pendidikan B. Website (online channel) C. Other governmental agencies D. Others 	

How did you get this		
information?		
6. Is there any difference	1. Yes	
between your	2. No	
inputted indicator and	3. Don't know	
the SKD status you		
receive from the		
application?		
If so,		
a. What indicators		
generally differ?		
What contributes		
to the difference?		
h Carlin		
b. Can this be		
revised? How?		
7. Is there any	1. Yes	
verification/validation	2. No	
of your inputted data,	3. Don't know	
prior to the		
determination of TKD		
amount you would		
receive?		
If so, who undertakes		
that process?		
What is the process		
like?		
8. Do you know the	1. Yes	
amount of TKD	1. Yes 2. No	
received monthly	2. NO 3. Don't know	
(IDR)?		
(
How do you know?		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
9. Do you think the	1. Yes	
percentage of absence	2. No	
and work	3. Don't know	
performance		
components of TKD		
need revision?		
If so, what should be		
the correct		
percentage? What are your reasons		
What are your reasons for the revision?		
10. For absence	1. No need to change (should be maintained)	
component of TKD, is	2. To be omitted	
	3. To be added	
		۰ا

there any variable you think should change?	4.	To be modified	
If variables need to change, which one(s) need to be omitted, to be added or modified, and what are the reasons?			
11. For work performance	1.	No need to change (should be maintained)	
component of TKD, is	2.	To be omitted	
there any variable you	3.	To be added	
think should change?	4.	To be modified	
If variables need to			
change, which one(s) need			
to be omitted, added or			
modified, and what are			
the reasons?			
What about the			
percentage of each			
indicator?			
12. Do you have other			
issues related TKD			
data quality?			

	PART	E: IMPACT OF TKD ON TE	ACHER BEHAVIOR	
2. Fill in the respondent	he correspondi 's answer to th lestions, enume	ing answers provided by i e closed essay question ii	respondent's answer	by respondents answer
Question		Respondent's An	swer	Enumerator Remarks
 Is the amount of TKD you receive sufficient? If otherwise, why? What should the amount be? 	1. Yes 2. No			
 Has the TKD you receive impacted on your performance as teacher? What changes have you experienced? 	Changes1. Yes2. No	Before TKD started	After TKD started	

3. For 2018, what is the trend of the result of	Option	Proof of Change in 2017		of Change 2018
your performance	1. No			
assessment by the	change/constant			
school supervisor within the last three	2. Improving			
months?				
	3. Declining			
What instrument(s)		•		
have been used?				
4. What attempts have	-	pt; the same as prior	to TKD	
you made to improve	B. None because I h	-		
your KKG grades?		ore teacher training		
Please explain what you	D. Got more learnin E. Others,	g materials		
have done (training	L. Others,			
courses attended,				
additional materials).				
5. What attempts have	A. No special attem	ot; the same as prior	TKD	
you made to improve	B. Participated in m	ore teacher training		
your PKG grades	C. Active participati			
(Teacher Performance		on in seminars/work	-	
Assessment)?	_	article(s) for journals		
Please explain what you	F. Others		••••	
have done (training				
courses, additional				
materials).				
6. If you have ever	Training O	rganizers	Freq.	Freq.
attended training			old	new
courses, who were the		ning d by Education	TKD	TKD
organizers?	A. Training is orga Office	nized by Education		
Please write the	B. Training from o	ther local		
number of training	government en			
courses (frequency)	-	on-governmental		
you attended during	organizations	0		
previous TKD and the current TKD.	D. Online training			
	E. Others:		1	
What have you done to				
attend more training				
courses?				

7 What is way the			0 1-1	Marci
7. What is your time allocation for learning		Activities	Old TKD	New TKD
activities during the	A	. Preparation for learning and	IND	IND
previous TKD and the	А	teaching		
current TKD?	В	-		
current rkb:	D	(materials/learning media)		
	C			
	C	. Other.		
Please explain how you				
prepare for it				
8. What attempts have	Α.	No special attempt; the same as prio		
you made to improve	В.	Added hours for extracurricular activ		
school performance in	С.	Coaching of non-academic competer		
non-academic areas?	D.	Added learning hours for subjects the	at are part	t of
	-	competitions		
Please explain what	Ε.	Became facilitator for events		
you have done!	F.	Others:		
9. What attempts have	A.	No special attempt; the same as prio	r to TKD	
you made to improve	А. В.	Additional teaching hours		
student/pupil's	С.	Improve teaching skills		
learning outcomes?	D.	Use multiple pedagogic approaches		
	Ε.	Use comprehensible learning tools		
Please explain what	F.	Other:		
you have done!				
,				
10. Do you think all staff	1.	Yes		
at the school have	2.	No		
performed better				
since the				
implementation of				
TKD?				
Dia ana amila ina mana				
Please explain your				
answer and present your				
evidence	٨	No special attempt: the same as price	r to TKD	
11. What attempts have been made to	А. В.	No special attempt; the same as prio Provide direction to students		
prevent student	ь. С.	Organize more extra-curricular activi	tion	
brawls, narcotics	D.	Organize regular religious activities	ues.	
abuse, bullying, and	Б. Е.	Severe sanctions for offenders		
financial collection	Г. F.	Intensive communication with paren	ts	
levied on the	G.	Others:		
student by school	0.			
(per month)?				
Please explain your				
answer and present your				
evidence				

PART F: GENERAL RESPONSE OF TKD TEACHERS

Instruction:

1. Read each of the questions carefully

2. Choose one of five scale options based your assessment of each statement, 1 is the lowest and 5 is the highest

Nia				SCORE		
No	RESPONSE TO TKD PROGRAM	1	2	3	4	5
1	Encourages me to work better					
2	Improves my income significantly					
3	Motivates me to work longer than before					
4	Increases teamwork in school					
5	Motivates me to improve my competency					
6	Develops competitive spirit among teachers					
7	Improves teacher discipline in their work					
8	Improves teacher productivity					
9	Teachers are more focused on student learning outcomes					
10	Encourages teachers use their money to buy learning materials					
11	TKD formula is not fair					
12	The amount of TKD is too high for me					
13	The amount of TKD is not enough to improve behavior					
14	Work behavior is more or less the same compared to before TKD					
15	No significant impact on school performance					
16	Initiates unhealthy competition among teachers					
17	The difference in allowance received among school staff is high					
18	It is unfair as young teachers can receive more than older teachers					
19	No relation between performance and allowance					
20	Do not agree with score used in the formula					

THE INTERVIEW ENDS AT:	(WIB/WITA/WIT)*
DURATION OF INTERVIEW:	(HOUR) (MINUTES)

REMARKS:

Thank you for your participation.

Annex 2: Principal's Questionnaires

PART A: IDENTITY OF SCHOOL /INSTITUTION

Instruction:

TAKTA. IDENTITY OF SCHOOL / INSTITUTION

- 1. Complete and circle the corresponding answers provided by respondent's answer
- 2. Fill in the respondent's answer to the closed essay question in the available column
- 3. On open interview questions, enumerator writes notes according to numbers or letters by respondents answer that are clear and easy to read.

INTERVIEW BEGINS AT: ____. ___. (WIB/WITA/WIT) *

A 1	NDCN (National Cabaal Dringing)	
A.1	NPSN (National School Principal Number)	
A.2	Name of School	
A.2 A.3		1 Kindergarten 2 Drimany Education
A.3	School Level / Educational Institution Level	1. Kindergarten2. Primary Education3. Junior High School4. Senior High School
	Institution Level	 Junior High School Vocational High School School for Children with
		Disabilities
A.4	School Status/Institution	3. Public 2. Private
A.5	School Address	
A.6	Sub District/District	
A.7	Regency/City	
A.8	Province	
A.9	Number of Students	F. Kindergarten/Early Childhood Education
	(Choose the relevant school level)	4. Ages 3-4 years old Number of Class Parallel
		5. Ages 4-5 years old Number of Class Parallel
		6. Ages 5-6 years old Number of Class Parallel
		G. Primary Education School
		13. Grade I: Number of Class Parallel
		14. Grade 2: Number of Class Parallel
		15. Grade 3: Number of Class Parallel
		16. Grade 4: Number of Class Parallel
		17. Grade 5: Number of Class Parallel
		18. Grade 6: Number of Class Parallel
		H. Junior Secondary School
		19. Grade 7: Number of Class Parallel
		20. Grade 8: Number of Class Parallel
		21. Grade 9: Number of Class Parallel
		I. Senior High School/Vocational High School
		22. Grade 10 : Number of Class Parallel
		23. Grade 11 : Number of Class Parallel
		24. Grade 12 : Number of Class Parallel
		J. School Children with Disability
		4. Primary School Level Number of Class Parallel
		5. Junior Secondary School LevelNumber of Class Parallel
A.10	Number of Teachers	6. Senior High School Level Number of Class Parallel
A.11	Number of Extracurricular activities	
A.12	Number of School Award	5. District Level
		d. Sectoryear
		e. Sectoryear
		f. Sectoryear
		6. Provincial Level
		d. Sectoryear
		e. Sectoryear

f. Sector	year
7. National Level	
d. Sector	year
e. Sector	year
f. Sector	year
8. International Level	
d. Sector	year
e. Sector	year
f. Sector	year

	PART B: RESPONDENT IDENTITY						
Instru	ction:						
1	1. Complete and circle the co	rresponding answers provided by respondent's answer					
2	2. Fill in the respondent's answer to the closed essay question in the available column						
3	3. On open interview questions, enumerator writes notes according to numbers or letters by						
	respondents answer that a	are clear and easy to read.					
B.1	Name						
B.2	Sex	3. Male					
		4. Female					
B.3	Education History	D. S1, Department:Year of grad					
		E. S2, Department:Year of grad					
		F. S3, Department:Year of grad					
B.4	Age	years					
B.5	Marital Status	4. Single 2. Married 3. Widowed/er/divorced					
B.6	No Tel. /Mobile Phone						
B.7	Level of employing school	2. PAUD/TK/SLB 2. SD 3. SMP 4. SMA 5. SMK					
B.8	Name of School						
B.9	Employment status	 CPNS/Civil Servant Candidate PNS/Civil Servant 					
B.10	Date of first time as a Civil Servant (DD/MM/YY)						
B.11	Category	3. II/a - II/d 4. III/a - III/b 3. 4. IV/a - IV/c 5. IV/a - IV/c 5. IV/d - IV/e year(s) month					
B.12	Length of Service as a teacher	year(s) month					
B.13	Current position	 Principal Deputy Principal for 					
B.14	Length of service in current position	year(s)month(s)					

PART C: KNOWLEDGE OF SUB NATIONAL PERFORMANCE ALLOWANCE (TKD)				
2. Fill in the respond	le the corresponding answers provided by respondent's answer ent's answer to the closed essay question in the available colum questions, enumerator writes notes according to numbers or la easy to read.	in		
Question	Respondent's Answer	Enumerator Remarks		
1. Are you aware of the Governor's regulation regarding Regional Performance Allowances for Principals, Deputy Principals of Teachers, School Supervisors, and pamong belajar (nonformal education teacher)?	1. Yes 2. No			
 When were you <i>first</i> aware of the Regulation of Jakarta Governor on Sub National Performance Allowance for School Principals, Deputy Principals, Teachers, Supervisors, Overseers and <i>Pamong Belajar</i>? How did you know about the Jakarta Governor Regulation? 	 5. 2017 6. 2018 7. Just recently 8. Don't know G. Dinas Pendidikan/Education Office H. Other government agencies; specify I. Peers, specify J. Media, specify K. Website/Internet L. Others, Specify 			
 4. Do you have copies of regulatory documents related to regional performance benefits (TKD)? 	3. Yes 4. No			
Question	Respondent's Answer	Enumerator Remarks		
5. What regulation or document(s) do you have copies of, related to Performance Allowance of DKI Jakarta?	Regulations on TKD Understanding G. Pergub DKI No. 409 of 2016 1 2 3 4 H. Pergub DKI No. 149 of 2017 1 2 3 4 I. Pergub DKI No. 22 of 2017 1 2 3 4 J. Ingub DKI No. 129 of 2016 1 2 3 4 K. Technical guide of TKD calculation 1 2 3 4 L. Others, specify 1 2 3 4			

	1			
How would you assess				
your understanding of				
these regulations/				
documents? (1=don't				
understand at all,				
2=don't really				
understand,				
3=understand, 4=fully				
understand)				
6. How did the	Types of dissemination		Fre	equency
government provide	F. TKD-specific dissemina			
information for you?	information on with ot			
	G. Dissemination of infor	mation on this		
	policy and other polici	es		
	H. Explanation from Educ	ation Agency		
	Team (with head of de	partment,		
	section, supervisors, e	etc.)		
How many times was	I. Information through w	vebsite		
information provided	J. Others, specify			
(frequency of				
information				
dissemination)?				
7. What applications do	Application	Func	tion	
you use related to				
-				
GTK TKD?	F. e-Absensi			
-				
-	F. e-Absensi G. e-Kinerja			
-	G. e-Kinerja			
-				
-	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP			
-	G. e-Kinerja			
-	G. e-KinerjaH. e-KPI. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id			
-	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP			
-	G. e-KinerjaH. e-KPI. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id			
-	G. e-KinerjaH. e-KPI. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id			
GTK TKD?	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP I. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id J. Other,	Explanation		
GTK TKD? 8. What is the level of	G. e-KinerjaH. e-KPI. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id	Explanation		
GTK TKD? 8. What is the level of difficulty in using the	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP I. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id J. Other,	Explanation		
GTK TKD? 8. What is the level of	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP I. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id J. Other, <u>Level of Difficulty</u> 5. Not Difficult	Explanation		
GTK TKD? 8. What is the level of difficulty in using the	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP I. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id J. Other,	Explanation		
8. What is the level of difficulty in using the application?	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP I. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id J. Other, Level of Difficulty 5. Not Difficult 6. Quite difficult	Explanation		
GTK TKD? 8. What is the level of difficulty in using the application? Give an explanation	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP I. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id J. Other, <u>Level of Difficulty</u> 5. Not Difficult	Explanation		
8. What is the level of difficulty in using the application?	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP I. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id J. Other, Level of Difficulty 5. Not Difficult 6. Quite difficult 7. Difficult	Explanation		
GTK TKD? 8. What is the level of difficulty in using the application? Give an explanation	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP I. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id J. Other, Level of Difficulty 5. Not Difficult 6. Quite difficult	Explanation		
GTK TKD? 8. What is the level of difficulty in using the application? Give an explanation regarding your answer?	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP I. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id J. Other, Level of Difficulty 5. Not Difficult 6. Quite difficult 7. Difficult 8. Very Difficult			
GTK TKD? 8. What is the level of difficulty in using the application? Give an explanation regarding your answer? 9. What are the	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP I. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id J. Other, <u>Level of Difficulty</u> 5. Not Difficult 6. Quite difficult 7. Difficult 8. Very Difficult Indicator of presence (f	or the	Yes	
GTK TKD? 8. What is the level of difficulty in using the application? Give an explanation regarding your answer? 9. What are the attendance	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP I. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id J. Other, <u>Level of Difficulty</u> 5. Not Difficult 6. Quite difficult 6. Quite difficult 7. Difficult 8. Very Difficult Indicator of presence (f calculation of latest TKD r	or the eceived)		No
GTK TKD? 8. What is the level of difficulty in using the application? Give an explanation regarding your answer? 9. What are the attendance components and	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP I. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id J. Other, <u>Level of Difficulty</u> 5. Not Difficult 6. Quite difficult 7. Difficult 8. Very Difficult Indicator of presence (f calculation of latest TKD r W. Absence without perm	or the eceived) hission		
 GTK TKD? 8. What is the level of difficulty in using the application? Give an explanation regarding your answer? 9. What are the attendance components and indicators in TKD for 	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP I. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id J. Other, <u>Level of Difficulty</u> 5. Not Difficult 6. Quite difficult 6. Quite difficult 7. Difficult 8. Very Difficult 8. Very Difficult Undicator of presence (f calculation of latest TKD r W. Absence without perm X. Absence with permissi	or the eceived) hission		
GTK TKD? 8. What is the level of difficulty in using the application? Give an explanation regarding your answer? 9. What are the attendance components and	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP I. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id J. Other, J. Other, 6. Quite of Difficulty 5. Not Difficult 6. Quite difficult 7. Difficult 8. Very Difficult Indicator of presence (f calculation of latest TKD r W. Absence without perm X. Absence with permissi Y. Sick	or the eceived) hission		No
 GTK TKD? GTK TKD? 8. What is the level of difficulty in using the application? Give an explanation regarding your answer? 9. What are the attendance components and indicators in TKD for 	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP I. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id J. Other, Level of Difficulty 5. Not Difficult 6. Quite difficult 7. Difficult 8. Very Difficult 8. Very Difficult 1ndicator of presence (f calculation of latest TKD r W. Absence without perm X. Absence with permissi Y. Sick Z. Leave	or the eceived) hission		No
 GTK TKD? 8. What is the level of difficulty in using the application? Give an explanation regarding your answer? 9. What are the attendance components and indicators in TKD for 	G. e-Kinerja H. e-KP I. eTkdbkd.jakarta.go.id J. Other, J. Other, 6. Quite of Difficulty 5. Not Difficult 6. Quite difficult 7. Difficult 8. Very Difficult Indicator of presence (f calculation of latest TKD r W. Absence without perm X. Absence with permissi Y. Sick	or the eceived) hission		No

		1	1	
	BB. Leave for important matters			
	CC. Sick leave			
	DD. Maternity leave			
	EE. Hours late (hour)			
	FF. Hours of early return (hour)			
	GG. Others:			
		r	1	
10. What are the	Work performance indicator (for the	Yes	No	
components and	calculation of latest received TKD)			-
indicators of work	K. Accuracy of KJP Distribution			_
performance of TKD	L. Assessment of Principal			
for Principal	Performance			_
assessment	M. Teacher Competency Test			_
	N. School's Academic			
	Performance			_
	- Calculation of National			
	Exam Absolute Final Score			_
	- Improvement of National			-
	Exam Score			
	O. School's Non-Academic			-
	Performance			
	- Performance of OSN, O2SN,			-
	FLS2N, LKS, etc.			
	- Number of Brawls, Narcotics			-
	Abuse, Bullying, financial			
	collection levied on the			
	student by school (Per			
	Month)			
	P. Others:			-
				-
11. Other issues related				
to knowledge /				
dissemination of TKD				
GTK				

	PART D: C	ALCULATION AND INPU	T OF TK	D	
Instruction:				_	
-		answers provided by res	-		
-		closed essay question in t			
-	-	ator writes notes accordin	ng to nu	imbers or let	tters by respondents answer
that are clear and Question	easy to read.	Respondent's Answer			Enumerator Remarks
1. Do you know how to	3. Yes	Respondent s Answer			Enumerator Remarks
calculate TKD for	4. No				
teachers?					
How do you know?					
If you don't know, who					
assists you in TKD					
calculation?					
2 In 2019, when was the	Month	Amount of TKD / mont	h Fue		
2. In 2018, when was the last time you receive		Amount of TKD/ mont	n Fre	cuency	
TKD?	6. Agustus 7. September				
	8. Oktober				
	9. November				
Per how many months do	10. Lainya				
you regularly receive TKD?					
			-		
3. What are the	-	nponent	Percei	ntage	
components and	D. Presence				
percentages considered for your TKD	E. Work Perfor F. Others, spec				
calculation?	F. Others, spec	пу			
4. For presence (absence)	Indicator of prese	ence (for the calculation	of Nu	mber of	
component, please	latest	TKD received)	da	ys/hour	
complete the indicators		hout permission			
used to calculate the		h permission			
presence component of	JJ. Sick				
your TKD per latest TKD in 2018	KK. Leave				
111 2010	LL. Sabbatical le				
	-	important matters			
	NN. Sick leave	21/0			
	PP. Hours late (
	QQ. Hours of ea	· · ·			
			I		
5. For work performance,	Work performant	e indicator (for the	%	Values	
please complete the	calculation of late	-	/0	values	
indicator values that		JP Distribution			
were used to calculate		f Principal Performance			
the work performance	C. Teacher Com	-			
component of your TKD		s Academic			
per latest TKD in 2018	Perforn	nance			
	- Calcula	tion of National Exam			
		e Final Score			
	D. Improvement	of National Exam Score			

	- School's Non-Academ	ic		
		Performance		
		- Performance of OSN, O2SN,		
	FLS2N, LKS, etc.		_	
	E. Number of instances of Bra			
		Narcotics Abuse, Bullying, financial		
	collection levied on the stu			
	school (Per Month)			
	F. Others:			
6. Did you experience	Level of Difficulty	Explanation	-	
difficulties in	5. Not Difficult		-	
calculating the	5. Not Difficult			
attendance aspect of				
TKD ? If yes please	6. Quite difficult		-	
explain what				
difficulties you faced			_	
-	7. Difficult			
	8. Very difficult		-	
			-	
7. Did you experience	Level of Difficulty	Explanation	-	
difficulties in	8. Not Difficult		—	
calculating work	o. Not Difficult			
performance in TKD?	9. Quite difficult		—	
If yes, please explain	3. Quite difficult			
what difficulties you	10. Difficult		—	
faced	10. Difficult			
lacea	11 Vanudiffiquit		<u> </u>	
	11. Very difficult			
9 Who is involved in		Functi		
8.Who is involved in	Parties Involved	Function		
assessing or calculating	G. School Supervisor			
assessing or calculating aspect of work	G. School Supervisor H. B. Pusdatikomdik (Center o			
assessing or calculating aspect of work performance in TKD,	 G. School Supervisor H. B. Pusdatikomdik (Center o Data and Education 			
assessing or calculating aspect of work	 G. School Supervisor H. B. Pusdatikomdik (Center o Data and Education Communication 			
assessing or calculating aspect of work performance in TKD,	 G. School Supervisor H. B. Pusdatikomdik (Center o Data and Education 			
assessing or calculating aspect of work performance in TKD,	 G. School Supervisor H. B. Pusdatikomdik (Center o Data and Education Communication 	of		
assessing or calculating aspect of work performance in TKD,	 G. School Supervisor H. B. Pusdatikomdik (Center o Data and Education Communication Information Technology) 	of		
assessing or calculating aspect of work performance in TKD,	 G. School Supervisor H. B. Pusdatikomdik (Center of Data and Education Communication Information Technology) I. Suku Dinas Pendidikan (Sub Educational Office in the 	of		
assessing or calculating aspect of work performance in TKD,	 G. School Supervisor H. B. Pusdatikomdik (Center of Data and Education Communication Information Technology) I. Suku Dinas Pendidikan (Sub Educational Office in the City) 	of		
assessing or calculating aspect of work performance in TKD,	G.School SupervisorH.B. Pusdatikomdik (Center o Data and Education Communication Information Technology)I.Suku Dinas Pendidikan (Suk Educational Office in the City)J.P2KPTKK (Center for the	of		
assessing or calculating aspect of work performance in TKD,	 G. School Supervisor H. B. Pusdatikomdik (Center of Data and Education Communication Information Technology) I. Suku Dinas Pendidikan (Suk Educational Office in the City) J. P2KPTKK (Center for the Development of 	of		
assessing or calculating aspect of work performance in TKD,	G. School Supervisor H. B. Pusdatikomdik (Center of Data and Education Communication Information Technology) I. Suku Dinas Pendidikan (Suk Educational Office in the City) J. P2KPTKK (Center for the Development of Competency of Teachers,	b		
assessing or calculating aspect of work performance in TKD,	 G. School Supervisor H. B. Pusdatikomdik (Center of Data and Education Communication Information Technology) I. Suku Dinas Pendidikan (Suk Educational Office in the City) J. P2KPTKK (Center for the Development of 	b		

	K. Personnel of School data operation L. Others
9. What are the steps and process to input data on the TKD system?	Describe the TKD Input Scheme
Give details of the process	
Provide separate paper if needed	
10. What is the task of school operator, relative to the TKD GTK System?	 E. Assist in inputting data F. Assist in calculating achievement (data) for each variable G. Estimate/predict result of TKD one would achieve H. Others

PART E: QUALITY OF TKD DATA				
Instruction:				
1. Complete and circ	1. Complete and circle the corresponding answers provided by respondent's answer			
2. Fill in the respondent's answer to the closed essay question in the available column				
3. On open interview	questions, enumerator writes notes according to numbers or le	tters by respondents answer		
that are clear and	that are clear and easy to read.			
Question	Respondent's Answer	Enumerator Remarks		
1. How sufficient are	5. Insufficient			
the components and	6. Sufficient			
indicators used to	7. Numerous			
calculate TKD GTK in	8. Too Numerous			
assessing your				
performance?				
Please explain your				
answer!				
2. How complicated is	5. Easy			
it to calculate TKD	6. Quite complicated			
values in assessing	7. Complicated			
your performance?	8. Highly complicated			
Please explain your				
answer!				
3. Do you think the TKD	4. Yes			
formulation is fair for	5. No			
all? (meaning, all have	6. Don't know			
equal opportunity to				
achieve the highest				
value)				
Please explain your				
answer!				

 4. Do you know the status of the assessment of your performance variables? Please explain your answer! (how, when) 	3. Yes 4. No	
 How do you get information on allowance resulted from your performance assessment? How is information acquired? 	 E. Agency of Education/<i>Dinas Pendidikan</i> F. Website (online channel) G. Other governmental agencies H. Others 	
 6. Is there any difference between your inputted indicator and the SKD status you receive from the application? If so, a. What indicators generally differ? What contributes to the difference? b. Can this be revised? How? 	 Yes No Don't know 	
 7. Is there any verification/validation of your inputted data, prior to the determination of TKD amount you would receive? If so, who undertake that process? What is the process like? 	 Yes No Don't know 	
8. Do you know the amount of TKD received monthly (IDR)? How do you know?	 Yes No Don't know 	

 9. Do you think the percentage of absence and work performance components of TKD need revision? If so, what should the correct percentage be? What are your reasons for the revision? 	 Yes No Don't know 	
 10. For absence component of TKD, is there any variable you think should change? If variables need to change, which one(s) need to be omitted, to be added or modified, and 	 No need to change (should be maintained) To be omitted To be added To be modified 	
 what are the reasons? 11. For work performance component of TKD, is there any variable you think should change? If variables need to change, which one(s) need to be omitted, added or modified, and what are the reasons? 	 No need to change (should be maintained) To be omitted To be added To be modified 	
What about the percentage allocated to each indicator?		
12. Other issues related TKD data quality?		

PART E: IMPACT OF TKD TO PRINCIPALS' BEHAVIOR CHANGE			
Question	Respondent's Answer	Enumerator Remarks	
1.Is the amount of TKD you receive sufficient?	1. Yes 2. No		
If otherwise, why? What should the amount be?			
2. Has receiving the TKD impacted your performance as principal/deputy principal?	1. Yes 2. No		
What changes do you experience?			
3. What have you done to ensure that KJP is well targeted?	 i. No special attempt, the same as prior to TKD ii. More intensive household survey to candidate recipients iii. Verification of candidate recipient data iv. Impose sanctions on students who falsify data v. Grievance mechanism for community related to candidate recipients vi. Dissemination of information to candidate recipients 		
Please explain and present the evidence for what you have done!	vii. Others:		
 How many students are recipients of KJP/KJP Plus? How many are mistargeted? 	KJP recipient: students Mistargeted: students		
If there are cases of mistargeting, how did they manage to be recipients of KJP?			
5. What attempts have you made to improve school management?	 A. No special attempt; the same as prior to TKD B. Better/improved school planning C. Better school finance management D. Others: 		
Please explain what you have attempted to do!			
6. For 2018, what is the trend of the result of your performance assessment by the school supervisor within the last three months?	 No change/constant Increasing Declining 		
What instrument(s) have been used?			

Question	Respondent's Answer	Enumerator Remarks
7. What attempts have you	A. No special attempt; the same as prior to TKD	
made to improve the	B. Increase student learning motivation	
school's academic	C. Mastery of teaching material and improvement in	
performance (student	quality of learning	
learning outcomes)?	D. Ensure textbook availability and enrichment	
	E. Tutoring program	
	F. Cooperation with parents	
	G. Others:	
Please explain what you have done!		
8. What attempts have you	G. No special attempt; the same as prior to TKD	
made to improve the	H. Adding hours for extracurricular activities	
school's non-academic	I. Coaching of non-academic competence (life skills)	
performance?	J. Providing rewards for high achieving students	
	K. Providing rewards for high performing teachers	
	L. Others:	
Please explain what you have done!	M.	
9. What attempts have you	G. No special attempt; the same as prior to TKD	
made to improve	H. Organize more training courses	
teacher quality?	I. Motivate teachers	
. ,	J. Facilitate KKG/MGMP events for teachers	
Please explain what you	K. Others:	
have done!		
10. Do you think all staff	3. Yes	
at the school have	4. No	
performed better		
following the		
implementation of TKD?		
IKD?		
Please explain your		
answer and present your		
evidence		
11. What attempts have	H. No special attempt; the same as prior to TKD	
you made to prevent	I. Send students on exchange programs	
student brawls,	J. Organize more extra-curricular activities	
narcotics abuse,	K. Organize regular religious activities	
bullying, and financial	L. Severe sanctions for offenders	
collection levied on	M. Cooperation with parents	
the student by school	N. Others:	
(per month)?		
Please explain your		
answer and present your		
evidence		
12. What attempts have	A. No special attempt; the same as prior to TKD	
you made to improve	B. None because all teachers have passed UKG	
the results of teachers'	C. Training/Diklat for teachers whose UKG scores are low	
UKG at this school?	D. Encourage teachers to continue their studies	
	E. Others:	

Please explain your answer and present your evidence				
	THE INTERVIEW ENDS AT:	(WIB/WIT	A/WIT)*	
	DURATION OF INTERVIEW:	_ (HOUR) (N	1INUTES)	

REMARKS:

Thank you for your participation.

Acknowledgements

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